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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses what features and advantages of the Model Law regime 
that Chinese law could learn to improve the Chinese cross-border insolvency 
system at both international and regional levels. Cross-border insolvency is 
one inevitable consequence of the globalisation of business activity. For 
solving transnational insolvencies, there is a clash of competing national laws 
on issues, including the recognition of foreign claims, the process related to 
the distribution of assets, and different policy preferences for protecting 
different groups of creditors. The ongoing trend of harmonising cross-border 
insolvency laws has been actively promoted by the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency. The Model Law was developed based on the 
principle of modified universalism, and its soft law nature aims to assist 
national insolvency laws and facilitate recognition of foreign proceedings. 
Although the interpretation of the law in enacting countries can be different, 
the thesis concludes that the Model Law can interconnect individual 
insolvency proceedings in an orderly and effective manner through its main 
features such as the centre of main interests (COMI) and cooperation and 
communication.  
Cross-border insolvency rules in China are conservative, and the only relevant 
article (article 5 EBL 2006) sets the basic recognition rules, which have a 
restrictive application, based on the principle of reciprocity and bilateral 
agreements. However, after reviewing relevant Chinese laws for dealing with 
international matters, the thesis finds that there are legal concepts under the 
Chinese commercial law system sharing similarities with the Model Law 
system, which provide legal potential for China to adopt a modified 
universalism approach, and this study also argues that adopting COMI could 
be a good start to improving Chinese international insolvency law. As China 
includes various jurisdictions, this research also focuses on Hong Kong 
because of its legal and financial significance. Although Hong Kong has not 
developed statutory international insolvency law, there is a flexible common 
law approach, which can achieve similar results as the Model Law system. 
The interregional insolvency within China is a dilemma between treating cases 
from other regions (such as Hong Kong) as foreign matters and politically 
highlighting such matters as national matters. This thesis argues that the close 
political and economic connections between the mainland and Hong Kong 
require an effective interregional insolvency recognition regime and 
transplanting the Model Law regime into a regional context, applying a COMI-
based recognition approach, could be a workable system. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This thesis is about whether the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency could assist 
and provide a workable model for the reform of Chinese (and Hong Kong) 
interregional and international insolvency law. With the fast development of 
innovative technologies in communication and transportation, the trade 
barriers between different countries have been significantly reduced. As the 
result of faster and cheaper communication methods, people and institutions 
pursue profits and competitive advantages through cross-border flows of 
trading activities. 1  As Professor Westbrook argued, as the influence of 
transnational corporations on national and international markets continues to 
increase, one inevitable consequence is cross-border insolvency.2 During the 
last few decades, while the regulation of multinational insolvency has made 
significant progress in the western world, the eastern developing countries are 
still at a primary stage in this specific legal area.  
Generally, most countries’ economy systems are market-oriented, so it is 
unavoidable that some international companies will meet financial problems 
and will be eliminated by market discipline. Following on from the company 
failures, there are complicated legal problems involved. Therefore, cross-
border insolvency cases are directly caused by the rapid development of 
international enterprises and investment. In recent years, especially after the 
financial crisis in 2008, cross-border insolvency has received greater attention 
in both legal and business fields. The failure of a large multinational company 
may cause catastrophic effects in its industry or even for the entire global 
market; the insolvency of Lehman Brothers might be the most striking example, 
which involved 2985 legal entities in over 50 countries. 3  The significant 
                                                             
1 Rosalind Mason, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency Law: Where Private International Law 
and Insolvency Law Meet’, in Paul Omar (ed), International Insolvency Law: Themes 
and Perspectives (Ashgate 2008), 28–29. 
2 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice 
of Law and Choice of Forum’ (1991) 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 457. 
3 Andrew Cornford, ‘The Failure of Cross‐border Financial Firms: New Thinking in 
the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis’ (2010) Observatoire del la Finance < 
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development of cross-border insolvency is the inspiration of this thesis. This 
introductory chapter sets out basics elements of this research, which includes 
four main parts. First, the research background and necessities of this 
research will be briefly discussed. Section 2 sets out the specific research 
questions of this thesis and thesis structure will be introduced in section 3. 
The last part explains the methodologies that will be used in the research.  
1.1 Research Background and Necessities  
1.1.1 International Development 
Most literature agrees that solving cross-border insolvency needs a unified 
system and cooperation among the countries involved; therefore, international 
insolvency law can be identified as the legal area that deals with the conflict 
of laws that arises if an insolvent debtor’s assets are in more than one 
jurisdiction.4 Without a well-recognised system, cross-border insolvency may 
cause serious legal conflicts. For instance, forum shopping, which means 
‘identifying the optimal jurisdiction for the purpose of the restructuring or 
insolvency of a given company, and taking measures so that the law of that 
jurisdiction is applied’,5 is a cause of concern. Some international companies 
may try to find a legal vulnerability in existing systems and conduct activities 
to achieve a more favourable position. Moreover, identification of debtor’s 
assets and verification of creditor’s claims are the two fundamental processes 
for any insolvency proceedings, but it is impossible to accomplish effective 
and accurate outcomes without the cooperation of different jurisdictions. 
According to the World Bank, an acceptable system for international 
insolvency should be effective in achieving the “goal of maximising the value 
                                                             
http://d5769291.u920.sgohost.net/pdf/failure_of_crossborder_financial_firms_cornfo
rd.pdf > accessed 12 June 2017. 
4 Jenny Clift, ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency - A Legislative 
Framework to Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency’ 
(2004) 12 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 307. 
5 Wolf-Georg Ringe, ‘Forum Shopping under the EU Insolvency Regulation, Legal 
Research Paper Series’ (2008) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 33/2008, 2 < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1209822 > accessed 18 June 
2015. 
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of the debtor’s worldwide assets, protecting the rights of the debtors and 
creditors and furthering of the just administration of the proceedings”. 6 
Although the importance of needing an efficient system for cross-border 
insolvency has been realised by most countries and international 
organisations, the development of international instruments has been slow 
since there are conflicts among different legal systems and domestic 
insolvency laws are usually the mirrors of an individual country’s historical, 
political, cultural and social norms. Furthermore, local laws are always in 
favour of local interests and national benefits, so international cooperation 
could be limited and selective. One of the objectives of this thesis is to identify 
the essential difficulties and issues behind cross-border insolvency.  
To solve the international issue, western countries have made significant 
efforts to bring greater harmonised rules in regulating cross-border insolvency 
proceedings over the last few decades, and, finally, the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency was introduced by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law in 1997. The law has special features, which, unlike 
a multilateral convention, merely offers legislative guidance for states. The 
design of the articles was from a worldwide perspective, and they give 
individual nations the freedom to decide how to apply the provisions. The law 
provided a clear statement about the objective of the law: “to assist states to 
equip their insolvency laws with a modern, harmonised and fair framework to 
address more effectively instances of cross-border insolvency”.7 After the law 
had been published, the UNCITRAL provided different additional documents 
to promote the law and help countries adopt it, such as the Guide to the 
Enactment of the Model law and the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.8 
                                                             
6 World Bank, ‘Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights 
Systems’ (2001) 53. 
7  UNCITRAL, ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997)’ 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html > 
accessed 28 April 2015. 
8 UNCITRAL, ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to 
Enactment and Interpretation’ 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-
Guide-Enactment-e.pdf> accessed 28 March 2018; Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
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Moreover, many major international organisations also recommended the 
adoption of the law, for example, the group of G22 believed that the wider use 
of the Model Law would facilitate the efficient resolution of cross-border 
insolvency. The Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank also actively encourage the adoption of the law in various events. 
The UNCITRAL has so far been adopted by 43 jurisdictions across the globe 
according to the UN record.9 However, it is interesting to notice that the 
countries that have adopted the law reflect a diverse group of countries 
economically, and most of them are economically significant. 10  The 
insolvency law is a tool to solve the systemic market failures and whether one 
country has a clear and effective insolvency system decides the investment 
attractiveness of that country. According to the ranking of ease of doing 
business from the World Bank, half of the top ten countries (all developed 
countries) have adopted the Model Law.11 Additionally, the European Union 
also adopted the EC Regulation on insolvency proceeding,12 which applied 
some similar theories to the Model Law. As a consequence, it can be observed 
that the countries that have applied the Model Law and are covered by the EC 
Regulation include almost all major advanced economies. For other less-
developed countries, there are still no unified regimes that have been widely 
accepted. Therefore, the question is whether the Model law is a perfect tool 
to facilitate cross-border insolvency for all the countries or a tool suitable only 
for economically developed countries. 
                                                             
Law, <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf> 
accessed 28 March 2018. 
9 UNCITRAL, ‘Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997)’, 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.htm
l > accessed 28 March 2018. 
10 Steven T Kargman, ‘Emerging Economies and Cross-Border Insolvency Regimes: 
Missing BRICs in the International Insolvency Architecture (Part I)’ (2012) Insolvency 
and Restructuring International 8. 
11 World Bank Group, Doing Business 2015: Going beyond Efficiency (12th Edition, 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2014). 
12 Council Regulation (EC) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings 
[2015] OJ L141/19. 
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1.1.2 Cross-border Insolvency Law in China 
Slow Development  
In mainland China, the development of insolvency law has been very limited, 
and the legal area of cross-border insolvency is still a relatively new concept 
under Chinese law. At the early stage (the 1950s) of newly-established China, 
most enterprises and banks were owned by the government and private 
investment and companies were not allowed. The business activities of those 
state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) were conducted according to official 
guidance; even though there were some financially distressed SOEs, the 
government would not let them be wound up since the results of this would 
cause social instability.13 So there was no point in building an insolvency 
system under such protection, and also it was impossible for the creditors to 
enforce their claims against debtors. The new chapter of the Chinese 
economy started at the end of 1978 due to the launch of the Reform and 
Opening up Policy, which changed the planned economy to a market 
economy. In order to assist the economic transition, the legal reforms used 
the experiences from advanced countries to build the first insolvency law of 
China. However, the purpose of the law was to protect state sovereignty and 
local creditors and only applied to SOEs; additionally the law did not include 
any articles for the cases with international elements.14  The international 
cases needed to open duplicated proceedings in a Chinese court. During this 
period, insolvency practitioners had to find answers from the insolvency 
section of the Civil Procedure Law,15 but the articles were too simple and 
vague to address any practical cross-border insolvency problems.  
                                                             
13 Zhang Haizheng and Gao Ran, ‘An Analysis of Cross-Border Insolvency in China’s 
New Bankruptcy Law: A Big Step Forward’ (2011) International Corporate Rescue 
93. 
14 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China 1986; Steven J. 
Arsenault, ‘Leaping over the Great Wall: Examining Cross-Border Insolvency in 
China under the Chinese Corporate Bankruptcy Law’ (2011) 21 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 1. 
15  Chapter 19 Procedure for Bankruptcy and Debt Repayment of Legal Person 
Enterprises, Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 1991.  
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With the rapid development of the Chinese economy and international 
relations, both internal and external factors required a new insolvency system 
to replace the outdated one. The open market for social and private security 
and the banking industry promoted the new law to protect their interests; from 
outside, the US and the European Union have pressured the government to 
make a new bankruptcy law.16 In 2007, the new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law17 
came into force, which was also modelled on legally advanced countries’ laws 
and philosophies, and the main objective was that it was “formulated in order 
to regulate the procedure of corporate bankruptcy, to wind up debts and 
indebtedness fairly, to protect the legitimate rights and interests of creditors 
and debtors, and to maintain the order of the socialist market economy”.18 
Compared with the previous version, the new law shows some notable 
changes, such as the reorganisation process and a special article for the 
insolvency of financial institutions. Moreover, for the first time, the Chinese law 
addressed the problem of international insolvency problems.   
 
                                                                                                                   
(Source: KPMG, 2013) 
                                                             
16 Zhang Haizheng and Gao Ran (n 13) 98. 
17 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of People’s Republic of China 2006 (EBL 2006). 
18 Adam Li, ‘China: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law and Policy’ (2006) The Law of 
International Insolvency and Debt Restructurings 127.  
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As one of the most important economies in the world, and with the open up 
policy having been applied deeper and wider, the Chinese market has become 
one of the most attractive investment destinations in the world. According to 
the chart above, inbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been steadily 
increasing since 2000 and has exceeded 100 billion US dollars every year 
since 2010.19 Moreover, an increasing number of Chinese investors are trying 
to expand their business activities into the global market, which means that 
insolvency cases with international elements from both outbound and inbound 
would increase as well.  
 “Big” Step of the New Bankruptcy Law 
The new law addressed the international insolvency problem for the first time. 
However, with only one article, it is impossible to solve specific issues relating 
to cross-border insolvency. There are two paragraphs under this article. The 
first one regards the extraterritorial effects of Chinese proceedings, which 
makes it clear that the proceedings initiated in a Chinese court are binding on 
the debtor’s assets located inside and outside of China. The second 
addresses the recognition of foreign bankruptcy judgments, which stated the 
recognition and enforcement subject to the condition that the judgments do 
not offend Chinese public policies and local interests.  
Article 520: 
“The bankruptcy proceedings opened by the People’s Court under 
this law shall have effects on the assets of the debtor located 
outside of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.  
Where any legally effective judgment or ruling made by a foreign 
court involves any debtor’s assets within the territory of the 
People’s Republic of China and if the representatives applies to or 
requests the people’s court to recognize or enforce it, the people’s 
court shall, according to the relevant international treaties that 
China has concluded or acceded to or according to the principles 
                                                             
19  KPMG, ‘Investment in the People’s Republic of China’ (2013) < 
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Inv
estment-in-China-201311.pdf> accessed 20th January 2015. 
20 Article 5, EBL 2006 (China). 
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of reciprocity, conduct an examination thereon and, when believing 
that it does not violate the basic principles of the laws of the 
People’s Republic of China, does not damage the sovereignty, 
safety or social public interests of the state, does not damage the 
legitimate rights and interests of the creditors within the territory of 
the People’s Republic of China, grant recognition and permission 
for enforcement. ” 
Unfortunately, although this was a big step for the Chinese insolvency system, 
only one article is not sufficient. The article 5 stated that the Chinese courts 
have jurisdiction over both local and overseas assets, which means all these 
assets should be put into a pool of assets for distribution based on the Chinese 
law’s distributive rules. However, in judicial practice, the realisation of legal 
effects on overseas assets always depends on the corresponding regulations 
of countries where those properties are located. The article also implies that 
once the Chinese court has accepted the application, all the assets of the 
insolvent debtor should be handed over to an administrator appointed by 
China; moreover, any preference for using the debtor’s foreign assets shall be 
invalidated, and execution of those assets should be discontinued. If the 
purpose of the first paragraph is to clarify the position of the law’s 
extraterritorial effects, the second paragraph could be more imprecise.  
The process of recognising foreign judgments can be divided into two steps. 
The first is the examination of international treaties or the principle of 
reciprocity between China and the involved foreign country; on the condition 
that there are no such conditions, the Chinese court can adjudge that no 
recognition of foreign judgment shall be granted. If the international treaties 
do exist or the principle of reciprocity can be applied, the second step is to 
examine whether the foreign judgments violate the basic principle of Chinese 
laws, which is not to damage the sovereignty and public interests and the 
interests of Chinese creditors. The recognition and enforcement only will be 
granted when the two conditions are both satisfied. It seems that Chinese law 
tries to add double insurance about recognition of the foreign judgments. 
Without clear interpretation, this article will potentially lead to serious concerns 
regarding the enforceability of foreign judgments. To sum up, the current 
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provisions about cross-border insolvency just provided a basic principle of 
international insolvency and only touched upon the essential problems with 
unclear language, and also did not address substantive issues, which may 
cause conflicts in practice. 
More importantly, cross-border insolvency law is supposed to encourage the 
confidence of foreign investors and improve the environment for foreign 
investment by improving the certainty and predictability of the law. 21 The 
unclear language may undermine these goals since the investors cannot 
analyse the risks associated with specific trading. Especially, the wording of 
the second paragraph can be interpreted by foreign creditors as an unfair 
protective rule for state and local creditors. Although the law should provide 
safety to prevent local creditors from injustice distribution, finding the balance 
point is important. Therefore, specific guidance on cross-border insolvency 
procedures and practical issues is urgently needed under Chinese law.   
 
Interregional Issues within China: Hong Kong as Example 
When discussing legal issues within China, the fact that China is a country 
with various jurisdictions cannot be ignored. There are four independent 
jurisdictions, including the mainland, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, which 
operate simultaneously and equally within one country. As Taiwan is a 
politically disputed region and currently is not controlled by the central 
government of China, the legal issues of Taiwan are not included in this 
research. China’s interregional problems are mainly generated by the “One 
Country, Two Systems” policy, which was adopted in the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration and Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration to resume the sovereignty 
of Hong Kong and Macau.22 Those two areas are now Special Administrative 
                                                             
21 Fernando Locatelli, ‘International Trade and Insolvency Law: Is the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency an Answer for Brazil? (An Economic Analysis 
of its Benefits on International Trade)’ (2008) 14 (2) Law and Business Review of the 
Americas 314. 
22 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the 
Question of Hong Kong; Joint declaration of the Government of the People's Republic 
of China and The Government of the Republic of Portugal on the question of Macao. 
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Regions of China (SARs). The Basic Law, which formalised the “one country, 
two systems” concept, serves as the legal foundation between the central 
government and its SARs.23 While the Basic Law emphasises that the central 
government is the sole authority, the main ideas of the law are to keep social 
and legal orders unchanged in Hong Kong and Macao after the reunification, 
and to make it clear that the autonomy of the SARs and law of the mainland 
will not be enforced in SARs.24 Although the legal systems of each of the 
regions are relatively independent, interregional legal issues among different 
regions require special discussion because of the close economic, 
geographical, historical and cultural connections. For insolvency issues, since 
insolvency proceedings are usually a collective debt collection system, a 
higher degree of cooperation at the national level should be more effective 
and easier than using international rules. However, there is no cooperative 
system within China to facilitate interregional insolvency. So this thesis is 
trying to explore the potential solutions to interregional legal issues.   
To make a comprehensive analysis of the interregional insolvency issues in 
China, it is important to understand the insolvency system of each region, and 
their similarities and differences will be the foundation in the development of 
regional solutions. For this thesis, Hong Kong is going to be analysed in detail. 
As one of the influential financial centres, Hong Kong has been an important 
investment destination; after the reunification, foreign investors have been 
using it as an investment channel to enter the mainland market. Therefore, 
compared to Macau, conducting research into Hong Kong’s insolvency 
system and its connection with the mainland would have more legal and 
financial significance. Furthermore, the central government usually adopts the 
same approaches to deal with SARs’ issues, thus the research into Hong 
Kong will have potential implications for Macau. 
                                                             
23 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) was 
adopted on 4 April 1990, and came into effect on 1 July 1997; The Basic Law of the 
Macao Special Administrative Region (Macao SAR) of the People's Republic of 
China adopted on March 31, 1993 and came into effect on 20 December 1999. The 
two laws are generally the same in structure and contents. 
24 Article 8, 18, The Basic Law of HKSAR (Hong Kong); Article 8, 18, The Basic Law 
of Marcao SAR (Marcao). 
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Hong Kong 
Because of its colonial history, the Hong Kong legal system is based on the 
English law, supplemented by local legislation. For the insolvency system, 
therefore, the courts can always find references to case law. When a foreign 
insolvency representative is trying to find recognition from the Hong Kong 
courts, traditionally, the courts are willing to cooperate and assist the foreign 
proceedings based on the common law power. 25  However, there is no 
comprehensive statutory framework offering a legal basis for recognising 
foreign insolvency proceedings.  
Additionally, Hong Kong courts have the statutory power to wind up 
“unregistered companies” under the Companies Ordinance.26 Therefore a 
foreign insolvency practitioner can also seek a winding up order in the Hong 
Kong courts to protect or gain control over assets located in Hong Kong. This 
provision gives courts the right to wind up non-Hong Kong companies, but it 
only deals with one aspect of international insolvency, ignoring problems such 
as recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and foreign-appointed 
liquidators. It must be noticed that jurisdiction issues play an important role in 
cross-border insolvency law in Hong Kong due to the lack of a formal cross-
border insolvency cooperation regime. 27  According to section 327, Hong 
Kong’s courts have discretionary power over companies that are unregistered 
in Hong Kong. However, based on case law, it has been clarified that this wide 
statutory term does not mean the courts have unlimited jurisdiction.28 The 
case law has adopted a “sufficient connection” test to limit the statutory power 
(a detailed discussion of this is in chapter 5). Recent case laws seem to 
suggest that Hong Kong judges have been using the jurisdiction rules flexibly 
                                                             
25 E. L. G. Tyler, ‘Insolvency Law in Hong Kong’, in Roman Tomasic (ed), Insolvency 
Law in East Asia (Ashgate Publishing Company 2006) 223. 
26 Section 327, Cap. 32 Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Ordinance (Hong Kong). 
27 Xinyi Gong, ‘A Balanced Way for China’s Inter-Regional Cross-Border Insolvency 
Cooperation’ (PhD Thesis, Leiden University 2016) 68. 
28 Re Chime Corporation Limited [2004] 7 HKCFAR 546, para 40. 
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and innovatively.29 Since Hong Kong has not enacted the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, one purpose of this research is to see whether the Hong Kong courts 
have developed effective cross-border insolvency solutions.  
Regarding the interregional insolvency issues between the mainland and 
Hong Kong, courts from both regions still treat cases from the other region as 
foreign matters. There are no provisions under Hong Kong law that give 
special treatment for recognising insolvency judgments issued by mainland 
courts. Therefore it could be assumed that the mainland’s insolvent 
companies also will be treated as foreign companies. In the mainland, the 
Supreme People’s Court has issued inconsistent opinions relating to the 
treatment of Hong Kong insolvency matters. According to the Provisions on 
Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction over Foreign-related Civil and Commercial 
Cases in 2002,30 the cases involving the element of Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan should be treated as foreign matters. This seems to imply that Article 
5 of the new bankruptcy law is applicable to those Special Administrative 
Areas as foreign jurisdictions. In practice, most judges of the mainland courts 
also regarded Hong Kong as a foreign element.31  
In contrast, in 2011, the High Court of Beijing referred a case to the Supreme 
People’s Court requesting clarification on whether or not the winding-up order 
issued by the High Court of Hong Kong can be recognised in the mainland, 
and the Supreme People’s Court replied that Article 5 and relevant articles 
under the Civil Procedure Law, which regulate recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments, could not be applied to this Hong Kong-related case.32 
The central government always emphasises its sovereignty over Hong Kong, 
and Hong Kong-related issues are national issues, so treating Hong Kong 
                                                             
29 For instance: In re Yung Kee Holdings Limited [2012] 6 HKC 246; Re Pioneer Iron 
and Steel Co. Ltd [2013] HKCFI 324 (discussion in Chapter 5). 
30  Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Concerning the 
Jurisdiction of Civil and Commercial Cases Involving Foreign Elements, The 
Supreme People’s Court [2002] Judicial Interpretation No. 5. 
31 For instance: Gu Laiyun and others v Nardu Company Limited [2006] Guangzhou 
Intermediate People’s Court Civil Division IV First Instance No. 44. 
32 NORSTAR Automobile Industrial Holding Limited [2011] Supreme People’s Court 
Civil Other No. 19. 
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cases as a foreign matter is obviously not the intention of the highest court—
but without a relevant legal solution, the only option seems to use foreign-
related rules. This reflects the reality that there is a lack of a corresponding 
legislative and judicial approach to connect the two legal systems in the 
country, and conducting research about cross-border insolvency in both areas 
would provide a chance to explore the solution to the dilemma. 
   
1.2 Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the possible theoretical support for the 
reform of Chinese and Hong Kong law on international insolvency based on 
the analysis of the regime proposed by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency. Specifically, this thesis seeks to answer five main 
questions:  
First, the research attempts to discover the fundamental issues of the cross-
border insolvency and the importance of this particular area in modern 
business society, including its nature and definition, its development, the 
principle concepts behind the laws and the current regimes for solving cross-
border insolvency.  
Second, the thesis will examine whether the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency is effective enough to solve multinational insolvency cases. 
This is because the Model Law has been marked and promoted as an 
effective regime by international organisations. This question will focus on 
investigating the special features and interpretations of the law in practice. 
Third, the thesis explores why the only article under the Chinese Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law 2006 is not enough to solve international insolvency cases 
and what issues it has caused in practice.33 In particular, relevant historical 
and political factors will be examined to understand the rationales and 
legislative gaps in developing Chinese insolvency and cross-border 
insolvency systems.   
                                                             
33 Article 5, EBL 2006 (China). 
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Fourth, the research asks whether the Hong Kong legal system, which is 
independent of the Chinese legal system, could provide an effective solution 
for international insolvency. Specifically, this question explores the influences 
of international business development on Hong Kong’s common law approach 
for international insolvency.     
Finally, the research examines how the political arrangement “one country, 
two systems” changed the legal relationship between the mainland and Hong 
Kong and its influences on the interregional insolvency issues. This question 
explores whether international experience could provide references for 
solving interregional issues within China. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure  
Chapter 2, which considers the first research question, will focus on the review 
of basic concepts and features of the area of insolvency. It will explain the 
natures of insolvency and cross-border insolvency, and how the different 
locations of the insolvent debtor’s assets and the creditors could be the 
fundamental difference between domestic and international insolvency. Then 
the chapter will explore why this fundamental difference makes cross-border 
insolvency such a difficult subject. The three essential problems that cross-
border insolvency laws are trying to solve include identification of jurisdiction, 
choice-of-law and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, so the 
chapter also explains the importance of finding a unified system for 
international insolvency.  
Next, the chapter discusses the theories put forward for solving the 
multinational insolvency issues. Universalism and territorialism are the two 
dominant theories. The former means one jurisdiction plays the main role in 
dealing with the collection, administration and distribution of all the debtor’s 
assets, the latter means proceedings should be limited to the assets within the 
individual national territory. Since universalism emphasises the efficiency and 
integrity of whole proceedings and territorialism pays more attention to 
national sovereignty, the chapter examines why it is impossible to adopt a 
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pure version of the two theories. Currently, modified universalism seems to be 
the most accepted and effective system because it mixes the advantages of 
two pure concepts, these advantages will be discussed. The UNCITRAL 
Model law and the EC regulation on insolvency proceedings could both be 
seen as examples applying modified universalism.  
Next, chapter 3 will be connected with the second research question, which 
will concentrate on the development and application of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. After the long history of chaos in this legal area, the introduction of the 
Model Law seems to provide a unified regime to encourage cooperation and 
assistance between different courts. The main features of the law will be 
analysed, including the language and the rationale behind it. In particular, 
based on the concepts of the second chapter, the modified universalism 
encourages the efficiency and predictability of cross-border insolvency. The 
chapter will review the fundamental legal frameworks the Model Law proposed 
based on the theories mentioned in the previous chapter, to explore whether 
the law can solve cross-border insolvency effectively. Especially, the law is 
allowed to be modified at the national level, so the application of the law may 
be different in enacting countries. In order to explore the real meaning of the 
Model Law system and more importantly how its features could improve and 
assist the domestic insolvency system, the significant cases from enacting 
countries, including the US and the UK, will be discussed to show the use of 
the Law in practice.  
To answer research question three, background information and the current 
law of the Chinese insolvency system will be carefully reviewed in chapter 4. 
Because of the political and historical factors, the Chinese economy was a 
planned economy for a fairly long time, and all the business activities were 
centrally controlled by the government. Therefore, the development of the 
insolvency system under the Chinese legal system was very limited. After the 
opening up policy, with the rapid development of the national and international 
economy, many foreign-funded companies have started to influence the 
economic development of China. So a clear insolvency system, especially for 
cross-border insolvency issues, is needed for the health of the Chinese 
market. Although the new bankruptcy system (European Bankruptcy Law 
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(EBL) 2006) addressed this issue for the first time in Article 5, the unclear 
interpretation and lack of guidance make it difficult to apply in practice. The 
operation of the cross-border insolvency article heavily depends on 
international treaties or the principle of reciprocity, and it has potential to be 
used as a protective method. Therefore, the rationale behind this article will 
be discussed. A comparative study between Chinese law and the Model Law 
also will be conducted. The purpose of this is to identify the shortcomings of 
Chinese law based on the characteristics of the Model Law and the 
necessities for potential improvements.  
Chapter 5 will focus on the current insolvency system of Hong Kong. As a 
special administration area of China, its legal system is based on the common 
law system. The current system for cross-border insolvency in Hong Kong is 
more comprehensive than Chinese law. As one of the most influential global 
financial centres, it is strange to see that Hong Kong still has not established 
its own corporate rescue and international insolvency regulations. However, 
based on common law principles, Hong Kong courts had a good history of 
cooperation with foreign courts regarding multinational insolvency cases, and 
the willingness to apply flexible approaches when it is appropriate to solve 
modern international business issues. The comparison between the Hong 
Kong system and the Model Law will also be conducted in this chapter. For 
answering research question four, the comparison will examine whether the 
common law approach in Hong Kong could solve cross-border insolvency.    
Chapter 6 tries to solve the last research question. Because of the “one 
country, two systems” policy, the mainland and Hong Kong are two different 
jurisdictions in the same country. Although they have close political and 
economic connections, interregional insolvency issues between the two areas 
have not been effectively addressed. For example, the mainland courts are 
still treating the insolvency cases from Hong Kong as foreign matters, and the 
mutual judgment recognition agreement had limited application and failed to 
cover any insolvency issues.34 Such a legal gap is not consistent with the 
                                                             
34 Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong SAR 
Pursuant to Choice of Court Agreements between Parties Concerned 2006. 
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political and economic intentions of the Hong Kong authority and central 
government. For solving such an issue, mutual judgment recognition 
regarding interregional insolvency between the two regions could be a good 
starting point. The purpose of this chapter is to review the complexities of the 
interregional issues based on political and legal influences and explore 
whether the UNCITRAL Model Law could have potential application to solve 
those issues.    
Chapter 7 will address the issues of corporate group insolvency in China. This 
chapter will be a supplementary discussion of current issues within the 
Chinese insolvency system (chapter 4). Chinese corporate groups are closely 
connected with the development of state-owned enterprises in different 
historical periods. Even though the Chinese insolvency system has not 
addressed the insolvency issues of corporate groups, courts have used 
practical approaches such as substantive consolidation. As insolvency of 
corporate groups has become an urgent issue under both the UNCITRAL 
Model Law and the European Insolvency Regulation, the purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss what experiences and principles of the two international 
regimes the Chinese law can learn from for the codification of corporate group 
insolvency at both national and international levels.  
The last chapter will conclude the whole thesis and address to what extent the 
research questions have been answered. Potential implications of improving 
the Chinese insolvency system will be summarised. Research limitations and 
future research areas will also be discussed.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
Based on the background information and the primary outline of this thesis, 
there are several different legal systems from various jurisdictions that will be 
involved in this thesis. Therefore, it is important to ensure the efficiency and 
accessibility of all necessary research information. This part describes the 
methods used for this thesis and its necessities. Discussion of these methods 
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can also clarify the structure of the thesis and highlight the strengths and 
limitations of those methods.      
1.4.1 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research methods will be the main system the thesis applies, which 
are a valid and reliable method for social research.35 According to Dobinson 
and Johns theories, the qualitative legal research can be divided into two 
different types: doctrinal and non-doctrinal research.36 Doctrinal research can 
be defined as research which asks what the law is in a particular area, which 
always involves analysis of case law and related legislation. It is one of the 
most important legal research systems since it is the process used to identify, 
analyse and synthesise the content of the law, with the aim to help the 
researchers understand certain legal areas.37  All the other research, like 
specific socio-legal issues or policy and law reform, can be identified as non-
doctrinal.38 In modern legal society, the doctrinal and non-doctrinal areas 
always link to each other, so it is normal that a research project involves both 
methods. The development of a certain legal area is always influenced by 
many factors, such as cultures, economic development and new social trends; 
therefore, legal research without considering non-doctrinal factors may not be 
valid.  
For this thesis, one primary aim is to investigate the application of the Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and its influences on different jurisdictions, 
which will be appropriate to conduct the doctrinal study, including the practical 
case studies and analysis of specific law provisions. Another important part is 
about the studies of Chinese and Hong Kong insolvency systems, which will 
need both research methods. For example, as mentioned in previous parts 
the current Chinese law for international insolvency problems is still vague and 
                                                             
35 Bruce L, Berg, Qualitative Research for the Social Sciences (4th edn, Allyn & 
Bacon 2001) 10. 
36 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh 
University Press 2007) 17. 
37 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Method in Law (Routledge Ltd, 
2013) 7. 
38 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (n 36) 20. 
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ambiguous, so the reasons the current law need to be improved will be 
discussed in this thesis, and this will include both legal and social factors. 
1.4.2 Information Collection 
For qualitative research, the most vital step following the research questions 
is to select the right databases for correct information, because the 
documents-based research depends on analysing the existing information to 
find what the researchers need.39  The methodology should be thorough, 
systemic, justifiable and reproducible.40 The data and information volume for 
this thesis will be enormous since it involves various jurisdictions and legal 
systems, thus it requires the collection methods to be valid and reliable. The 
specific methods and contents will be discussed below.   
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law Databases 
Legislation: The original version of the Model Law can be found on the United 
Nation’s website, alongside other supportive documents, such as the previous 
reports of the Working Groups and versions of the guidance to enactment.41 
The information will show the big picture of the Model Law’s background and 
development process, and help the researcher to understand the basic 
principles behind the design of the law. Since the law can be modified by the 
individual nation to fit into its own national law system, the adapted national 
version of the law can be accessed on government websites.  
Case Study: The jurisdictions mainly focus on two main countries that have 
already adopted the Model Law, the US and the UK, since the two countries 
have solid histories dealing with cross-border insolvency cases and a more 
well-established legal system, and therefore the study of their cases could be 
more justified to show the law’s functions. Moreover, the judgments from 
courts in those countries always draw serious attention and affect the law in 
                                                             
39 ibid. 
40 Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal 
Research (Oxford University Press 2010). 
41 UNCITRAL: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997 
Model.html. 
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other jurisdictions. For the databases of those cases, Westlaw UK and Lexis 
Library provide most filed cases of the UK courts and some important cases 
from other jurisdictions including the US and Europe.  
 
China and Hong Kong Databases 
For the information on China and Hong Kong, because of their lack of 
experience in this particular legal area, the information could be considered 
difficult to collect. In the mainland, the publicity of legal information and 
judgments is still at an early stage. There was no requirement for publishing 
court judgments until January 2014. The Supreme People’s Courts 
established the case database for central public access to the judgments of 
all levels, which only provides case judgments that were finalised after 1 
January 2014. 42  As for international insolvency cases, because of the 
territorial approach that the Chinese law and judges traditionally adopted, 
information on international insolvency cases is very limited. Therefore, the 
main information about China depends on supporting documents from non-
government organisations’ reports, professional legal practitioners’ 
organisations and other scholars’ research articles in China and overseas. For 
the information on Hong Kong, the legislation and regulations can be 
accessed from both the government websites of China and Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong has a well-established case publicity system so detailed case reports 
can be accessed online. Moreover, as Hong Kong still applies the common 
law system, some published information and cases can also be found from 
the UK databases, such as Westlaw.  
1.4.3 Comparative Study 
The other method the thesis will use is comparative study. Comparative law 
is a young branch of legal studies, which focuses on the research of 
                                                             
42 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Issuance of Judgments on the 
Internet by the People's Courts, The Supreme People’s Court [2013] Judicial 
Interpretation No. 26 the database: <http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/> accessed on 20 
April 2018. 
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differences and similarities between different nations. 43 This method has 
useful functions and advantages when formulating legal research. First, it 
helps one attain a deeper understanding of the current law, and to realise the 
gaps and shortcomings of the law. There is no perfect legal system in the 
world, since laws are always in the process of development process alongside 
the development of the society; hence, comparative law is the opportunity to 
learn from other legal systems, after which improvements can be made to the 
current law. Foreign laws could be very helpful when a country needs to 
reconstruct their legal system, especially for some developing countries. 
Furthermore, for legal areas like international insolvency, possibly, 
international cooperation and harmonisation will be encouraged through the 
process of comparison. Therefore, the method of comparative law can be a 
good technique for research into cross-border insolvency. For this thesis, the 
comparative method will be used to compare the system of the Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency with Chinese law and Hong Kong law.  
 
The Subjects of Comparison  
From the perspective of China and Hong Kong, it is also necessary to conduct 
a comparison. As mentioned before, Chinese law’s position on cross-border 
insolvency shows an imbalance compared to the rapidly increasing number of 
foreign enterprises in mainland China. Thus, to understand where the 
shortcomings are is good for the future development of Chinese law. Hong 
Kong would be a more interesting subject to analyse. Before the sovereignty 
of Hong Kong transferred to the Chinese government, the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) of China adopted the Basic Law of Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR). 44  The law stated that after Hong Kong 
reverted back to the Chinese government, the main legal system would not 
                                                             
43 Pier Giuseppe Moneteri, Methods of Comparative law (Edwartd Elgar Publishing 
Ltd, 2012). 
44 The National People’s Congress (NPC): the national legislature of the People's 
Republic of China; Special Administrative Regions: are autonomous territories that 
fall within the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China, including Hong Kong 
and Macao. 
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be changed, and principles, like the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, 
subordinate legislation and customary law, would continue to apply in Hong 
Kong. Moreover, the Hong Kong government also has more rights of 
autonomy, such as to make their laws and regulations subject to Chinese 
constitution law. Therefore, it is necessary to research how a jurisdiction in 
such a special position will solve an international issue.      
 
Comparison System 
Normally, the comparison may include three perspectives: the general culture 
of the laws; black letter laws, such as legislation and treaties; and application 
in practice. 45 Accordingly, the comparisons in this thesis will be divided into 
two main parts. The first part will focus on the structures of laws, which means 
the comparison is to explore the laws on a theoretical level. For instance, the 
historical background of the design and necessities of law could play a vital 
role in its wordings and future application. The concepts behind the laws will 
also be discussed. In the area of cross-border insolvency, the universalism 
and territorialism are well-recognised theories; therefore, to discuss which 
approach that different legal system adopted is the starting point of 
researching the law. Furthermore, a comparison of wordings that different 
laws used will be conducted. Sometimes, a specific word in a legal article can 
reflect the attitudes of lawmakers and the objectives that the law was intended 
to achieve. The Model Law could be a very good example of this. When the 
term “adequately protected” changed to “sufficient protection”,46 the courts’ 
power allowed by the law also changed. For this thesis, the subjects are an 
international instrument that has no binding power and national laws in 
different jurisdictions, so comparing the approaches and concepts behind the 
wording is the main task here. Based on this part, a comparison can not only 
                                                             
45 Jaap Hage, ‘Comparative Law as Method and the Method of Comparative’ (2014), 
Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper 11/2014 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2441090> accessed 20 
December 2014. 
46  The difference between article 21 of the Model law and the section 1521 of 
Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 
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identify the similarities and differences of those insolvency systems, but more 
importantly, can also demonstrate gaps between national and international 
levels, which is closely related to one of the main research questions. 
After the research around the laws themselves, the application of them in 
practice will be compared in the second part. Through the research of real 
cases solved by different laws, this part will illustrate the features of laws from 
a more direct and clearer angle; moreover, the approaches that the local 
courts applied to the conducted law also provide an opportunity to understand 
them objectively. For example, with the rapid process of globalisation, the 
“offshore companies” cases might be an important type of cross-border 
insolvency cases. When an insolvent business is registered in a so-called “tax 
haven” jurisdiction and conducted most of their business activities in another 
nation, the issues, such as which country has jurisdiction to open insolvency 
proceedings, the location of company’s main interests or the methods to deal 
with assets in other jurisdictions, may cause legal disputes among different 
jurisdictions. Therefore, in this part, different solutions for this kind of cases 
under the Model Law and Chinese / Hong Kong laws will be covered. As well 
as complementing the discussion of the first part, performing this analysis is 
a good method for seeing whether the Model Law is an effective regime for 
international insolvency as well. 
1.4.4 Conclusion and Information Reliability 
In conclusion, qualitative research will be conducted for this thesis. 
Specifically, the doctrinal study is the main method to research the Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency, and the information databases include legislation 
and cases from various jurisdictions, and also secondary sources based in 
libraries and on the internet. Those databases should provide as much 
information as feasible. Moreover, professional websites will be used to collect 
information on Chinese law and Hong Kong law, and search terms for these 
two jurisdictions will be used in both Chinese and English to cover the most 
possible databases. Based on the information collected, the method of 
comparisons will also be undertaken to study the differences between the 
Model Law and the two legal systems existing in China. From two 
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perspectives of comparison, a detailed picture of the development of the legal 
area under those jurisdictions will be shown.  
Since most of the information will be collected on the internet, the issue of 
information reliability should be noted. To guarantee reliability as much as 
possible, only government websites and professional websites or legal 
information providers will be used. The articles collected from search engines 
(Google and Baidu) will be revised and evaluated critically based on the 
authors, publishing organisations or year published. Overall, strict screening 
standards will be conducted during the collection process.   
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Chapter 2 The Nature of Cross-Border Insolvency 
Because international cases always involve more than one jurisdiction, 
complicated legal issues and potential conflicts may arise, such as which 
country has the jurisdiction to open proceedings against the international 
debtor, or which law should be applied to govern the proceedings. Generally, 
the same problem can be solved by completely different methods under 
different jurisdictions since differing nations’ insolvency laws illustrate differing 
balances of political considerations and the nature of social arrangements;1 
so, a chaotic situation may arise since the creditors and assets are all in 
different countries. That is the major reason why issues of domestic 
insolvency will be more difficult to solve at the global level. As a result, to 
understand the principle issues needed to be addressed under cross-border 
insolvency laws, it is necessary for us to have an insight into the phenomenon 
of insolvency. By getting to the bottom of the issue, it will also provide 
theoretical support for the research of specific jurisdictions in future chapters.  
This chapter will focus on the elaboration of the nature of insolvency and the 
inherent complexity of cross-border insolvency, which explains why this 
specific legal area is important at both domestic and international levels. First, 
the various trigger points of insolvency and their applications in different 
jurisdictions will be discussed. Then, the following section addresses the three 
main common goals among different insolvency systems: encouraging 
cooperation among creditors, achieving fair distribution and improving market 
stability. Section 3 considers why regulating cross-border insolvency is difficult 
based on three fundamental issues---jurisdiction, choice of law and 
recognition. Section 4 discusses how the theories of solving international 
insolvency-universalism and territorialism-have been developed, and their 
applications at international and national law level.  
                                                             
1 Gerard McCormack, ‘Universalism in Insolvency Proceedings and the Common 
Law’ (2012) 32 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 325. 
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2.1 The Nature of Insolvency 
It has been widely acknowledged that the process of globalisation has caused 
national economies to become more open and increasingly linked globally, 
and one of the direct influences on this trend has been allowing international 
enterprises to take risks and reap the benefits of any success they have 
achieved.2 As the World Bank has identified, “globalisation is not a single 
process, it proceeds as people and institutions seek profits and competitive 
advantage through expanding trade in goods and services and cross-border 
flows of financial resources and people”.3 One inevitable result of this process 
may be a cross-border failure. The reasons that lead an international company 
to failure can be various, but the causes of business failure always include 
both internal failures and external pressures.  
Regarding internal failures, the most common reason for insolvency is the 
failure to manage cash flows. A lack of money will stop the operation of the 
whole company since a healthy cash flow covers all the expenses of current 
operations, and provides funds for the next business cycle. Accordingly, 
managing cash flows requires the comprehensive ability to analyse all 
relevant information; failure at any stage will cause the collapse of the 
business. Mismanagement, another main reason for insolvency, is 
responsible for around a third of business insolvencies.4 Managerial skills, 
such as developing appropriate market strategies and business expansion 
plans, are closely connected with the fate of the company. Apart from the 
internal factors, external pressures are more likely to bring unexpected failure, 
especially for multinational enterprises.5 Changes in consumer behaviour can 
be unpredictable, so a business that fails to follow consumer trends will be 
automatically eliminated from the market. Also, changes in regulations or laws 
                                                             
2 Rosalind Mason, ‘Cross-border Insolvency: Where Private International Law and 
Insolvency Law Meet’ in Paul J. Omar (ed), International Insolvency Law: Themes 
and Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2008), 28. 
3 The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006 (The World Bank, 2006), 
311. 
4 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 155. 
5 ibid, 161. 
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in foreign markets may cause extra operational costs or investment, so 
companies may fail to keep the expenses balanced and meet financial 
challenges. In the international market, the competition from local competitors 
can be severe since it brings costs and price advantages. Furthermore, 
changes in the economic environment will invariably impinge on corporate 
activities. The 2008 financial crisis, which started in the banking industry and 
influenced almost all fields of industry all over the world, maybe a good 
example. Therefore, for a cross-border company, because of the high amount 
of capital input, it will face more managerial and operational pressures from 
both internal and external forces.  
 
The Start of Insolvency  
The primary objective of insolvency systems is to liquidate companies that are 
insolvent and cannot be rescued, and to give businesses that are in financial 
trouble, but are economically viable, a second chance to enter the rescue 
process.6 It is important to understand the standards that determine whether 
a company is in the proper circumstances to be put into insolvency. 
Technically, insolvency means that a business is unable to meet its financial 
obligations as they fall due, or also can be identified as a situation whereby a 
company’s total liabilities exceed its total assets.7 To understand this, it is 
necessary to distinguish liquidity issues and solvency issues. A liquidity crisis 
means that a company is experiencing cash-flow problems. Although in theory, 
its assets are greater than its debts, some assets are illiquid, and cannot meet 
payment requirements promptly. Liquidity reflects the relationship between 
liquid assets and short-term financial obligations.8 The solvency crisis means 
the value of a company’s assets cannot cover all its debts, and it illustrates 
                                                             
6  International Monetary Fund, ‘Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key 
Issues’ (1999) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/ > accessed 20 February 
2015. 
7 Roman Tomasic, Insolvency Law in East Asia (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) 
403. 
8 Julie E. Margret, ‘Insolvency and Tests of Insolvency: An Analysis of the “Balance 
Sheet” and “Cash flow” Tests’ (2002) 12(2) Australian Accounting Review 59. 
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the long-term calculation of a company’s ability to pay. 9  Generally, the 
evaluation of whether a company satisfies the test of entry to the insolvency 
process will be based on consideration of both situations, which are directly 
reflected in the company’s balance sheet and cash-flow.  
 
Balance sheet Test and Cash Flow Test  
The balance sheet test and the cash flow test are two primary tests of inability 
to pay debts, and they are both commonly used in insolvency laws as trigger 
points for formal insolvency proceedings. The former means that solvency 
issues have occurred and assets are insufficient to discharge liabilities. The 
latter is connected to liquidity issues, which means a company’s liquid assets 
cannot cover its debts as they fall due, so the reality that the company’s assets 
exceed its total liabilities are not met.10  
There are some connections between balance sheet insolvency and cash flow 
insolvency. The balance sheet test is based upon an assessed valuation of 
the totality of assets and liabilities associated with the insolvent debtor, so it 
is possible that a company is cash flow insolvent but balance sheet solvent. 
On the other hand, if a business keeps making a loss in its business activities, 
balance sheet insolvency will occur once the accumulation of its loss is higher 
than its capital. If there are no new capital inflows, sooner or later cash flow 
insolvency will occur as well. Cash flow insolvency is more straightforward 
than balance sheet insolvency since its evidence can be proved by the cash 
flows records of the company.  
The application of the two tests has been adopted by national laws in different 
ways. Some countries only apply a single test; for example, only the cash-flow 
test is applied to decide whether a company is insolvent according to the 
Australian Corporation Act and Bankruptcy Act. Most jurisdictions attempt to 
combine the two tests. Under the Chinese bankruptcy system, the court can 
                                                             
9 ibid. 
10 Ray Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2005) 114. 
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declare insolvency if one of the two conditions is satisfied: 
Article 2: Where an enterprise legal person cannot pay off his debts due and 
his assets are not enough to pay off all the debts, OR he cannot apparently 
pay off his debts, the debts shall be liquidated according to the provisions of 
this Law.11 
The first condition is clear: that it requires both cash flow insolvency and 
balance sheet insolvency to declare a company is entering the insolvency 
process. The second condition is more flexible in its application. If a debtor 
fails in financial management, and loses the capability of repaying all of its 
debts, this provides the possibility of declaring insolvency without the 
presence of a balance sheet test. However, the law fails to give a clear 
interpretation of ‘apparently lacks the ability’. Professor Wang has explained 
that it means the debtor is not yet insolvent but it can be clearly predicted 
when it will not be able to pay its debts at a future specific time, based on the 
available financial and operational information.12 The judicial interpretation 
issued by the Supreme Court explained that the meaning of ‘inability to pay 
due debts’ implies three conditions: the debt must have become due, the 
debtor must obviously lack the ability to pay the debt, and the fact of the debt 
not having been paid must have lasted for a long period.13 The explanation 
provides basic requirements based on the cash flow test, but no guidance 
about the evaluation of overall debts and assets.  
England’s insolvency law treats the two tests more independently. The cash 
flow test has been set out under section 123 (1) (e) ‘if it is proved to the 
satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts as they 
fall due’, and section 123 (2) sets out the balance sheet test, but also 
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emphasises that the test should take into account the debtors’ contingent and 
prospective liabilities.14 Apart from these two tests, this section also includes 
very specific standards for showing a company’s inability to pay debts: if a 
company fails to pay, secure or compound, to the reasonable satisfaction of 
the creditor, a debt more than £750 within three weeks of a written demand 
having been issued.15  
The Supreme Court’s decision confirmed that the cash flow test should 
consider not only debts that are immediately payable, but also debts that fall 
due in the reasonable future, and make a decision based on the different 
circumstances of cases.16 A similar principle is also applied to the balance 
sheet test: since the article is ‘far from exact’, the test cannot be satisfied 
simply based on the company’s statutory balance sheet. The court 
emphasised that the test needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and 
to take into account all the possible omitted information.17 This point is also 
significant for international cases since business activities are always 
conducted in more than one jurisdiction. It is possible that some information 
cannot be timely reflected in the balance sheet. It requires the review of all 
relevant information and the nature of the company’s business to illustrate the 
genuine financial position of a company.   
 
2.2 The Goals of the Insolvency Law 
Once a business becomes insolvent, the relationship between debtors and 
creditors changes dramatically, and the latter will become the residual 
claimants of corporate activities.  Secured creditors, who can look to specific 
property or collateral for repayment of a debt, may exercise their right and 
                                                             
14 Insolvency Act 1986, s123 (1) (e), (2). 
15 Insolvency Act 1986, s123 (1) (a). 
16 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail [2013] UKSC 28. 
17  ibid; also Latham & Watkins, Eurosail- Has the Balance Been Redressed 
(Restructuring, Insolvency & Workout Practice, 2013) <https://www.lw.com/thoughtL 
eadership/eurosail-uk-supreme-court-insolvency> accessed 12 March 2015  
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enforce their security over the debtor’s assets, and along with other creditors, 
which may include other lenders or any entity to which a debtor owes money 
for services provided, may start legal proceedings to seek remedies. In this 
situation, the function of the insolvency laws is to govern the liquidation, or the 
rescue proceedings, and regulate the process of satisfying outstanding 
creditors’ claims from the insolvent debtor’s assets.18 Although the insolvency 
systems are different in different nations, there are common characteristics 
and goals shared by them.  
2.2.1 Cooperation among Creditors 
The main goal of all insolvency systems is to regulate collective actions faced 
by different types of creditors. When a company’s financial distress becomes 
serious, each creditor wants to collect a debt and hold the debtor’s properties 
or assets as soon as possible, and it is difficult to expect that they could 
voluntarily coordinate themselves.19 The situation is perfectly understandable 
for individual creditors; however, the better outcomes may not be achieved if 
the value of a debtor’s assets as a whole is higher than the sum of those 
assets’ market prices. Thus, in the interest of all creditors, the best way is to 
work together to decide whether restructuring would be possible, or decide on 
the best way to sell the debtor’s assets so as to maximise their value.20 
Moreover, during the cooperation, another problem is that some creditors 
might refuse the restructuring plans that maintain the going concern value of 
the business, and adhere to the plans that may be risky, but also would be 
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value-enhancing for them. Therefore, governing the creditors’ claims and 
balancing the agreements and interests among different creditors is one of the 
main purposes of the insolvency law. To address the creditor problems, in 
practice, a legal specialist, called an administrator or officeholder, normally will 
be nominated to investigate the properties available for distribution, and 
manage the upcoming processes. The identification of a debtor’s divisible 
assets is the fundamental feature of any insolvency proceedings. 21 
Additionally, in order to satisfy all the creditors and ensure all the creditors are 
ranked equally, the principle of pari passu, which means “ranking equally", 
usually applies to insolvency law rules. For the purpose of orderly liquidation 
and fairness to all creditors, the creditors receive distribution pro rata based 
on pre-insolvency entitlements.22 The rule also has been well-applied for 
cases with international elements as the foremost principle; many jurisdictions 
adopt the same treatment to foreign creditors as domestic creditors.23  
2.2.2 Distributive Nature 
Insolvency laws always involve satisfying creditors’ claims by distributing 
debtors’ assets to them, and another main goal of the insolvency system is to 
resolve distributional disagreement in insolvency proceedings. In most of the 
situations, the creditor’s claims cannot all be guaranteed; so it is necessary to 
have an insolvency law to regulate the distribution orders among different 
types of creditors. However, the insolvency laws across jurisdictions are very 
diverse, and the differences reflect the different political policy goals pursued 
by governments and policymakers.24 Regarding the rules of distribution, the 
priority of creditors’ legal rights may be ranked based on the nature of their 
claims. In many countries, creditors’ rankings always have a certain purpose 
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in order to protect specific classes of creditors. For example, under the 
Mexican law, the employees’ claims should be satisfied before any other kinds 
of creditors; but, under the US Bankruptcy Code, the secured creditors always 
have priority, and labour claims are categorised as unsecured creditors.25 
However, even though the jurisdictions provide similar priority rights for certain 
creditors’ claims, the outcomes may still differ regarding how the distribution 
is received. For instance, in some states, the right of claims of employees’ 
payment would be covered by the pension’s claims, while some other 
jurisdictions do not support similar claims.  
Furthermore, pro-creditors and pro-debtors principles play an important role 
in the distribution of assets. 26  The pro-debtors approach engages in 
increasing the possibility of restructuring insolvent companies since it can 
avoid the loss of job opportunities and negative influences on suppliers. On 
the contrary, a pro-creditors regime aims to protect the creditor’s contractual 
rights and focus on distributing assets at greater value. Such rules affect the 
distribution among creditors significantly, and are also essential elements for 
governments and lawmakers to consider in deciding insolvency law rules.27 
So this can be another reason why insolvency regulations diverge 
considerably from country to country.   
2.2.3 Encouraging Market Stability 
Modern insolvency systems seek to encourage commercial morality and 
integrity.28 Because of the relationship among different types of enterprises 
are becoming closer, and one insolvent company might lead to a negative 
                                                             
25 Mexico: Law of Commercial Insolvency (Ley de Concursos Mercantiles), Article 
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27 ibid. 
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chain reaction among other related companies, the insolvency laws have been 
paying more attention to business rescue and reorganisation. Such a trend 
has recognised that the economic benefit of the preservation of a company is 
an equally important consideration for the maximisation of creditor returns, 
and the culture emphasises a focus on the possibilities of an insolvent 
company’s future development rather than its quick, effective liquidation.29 As 
the UNCITRAL’s Working Group stated in its report, reorganisation offers an 
opportunity to keep all the essential parts of the business together rather than 
dispose of them in fragments, which may achieve better value than before.30  
A domestic insolvency system has a close connection with its economic 
environment, so in order to contribute to economic growth, the insolvency law 
needs to maximise the value of the firm by putting its assets to the highest-
valued use.31 For this purpose, an insolvency law should be effective in both 
ex-ante and ex-post perspectives. From the ex-ante side, the law should 
promote commercial moralities among company managers, shareholders and 
creditors, and guide them to keep the business out of insolvency.32  The 
managers should do their best to manage the operation to avoid financial 
distress, or strict punishment may be enforced. In some insolvency 
procedures, the managers could be replaced by court-appointed officials in 
insolvency proceedings, or punished by being held responsible for the firm’s 
debts if the financial problem has been caused by their negligence. Some 
incentives in the laws to encourage shareholders and creditors to actively 
monitor the business activities can be effective in avoiding business collapse 
as well. Efficient regulation could create as few insolvency cases as possible 
by strictly regulating the business launch process, but many insolvency 
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31 Sarah Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of the Law of Corporate Distress in the 
Twenty-First Century’ (Society and Economy Working Papers, LSE Law 2014) < 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2014-27_Paterson.pdf> accessed 02 
March 2015. 
32 Sefa M. Franken (n 26), 105-106. 
35 
 
regulations have ignored such a function since it is difficult to evaluate ex-ante 
empirically. 33 For ex-post effectiveness, it can be easily evaluated by 
assessing the expenses of the whole process, and the payments outcomes. 
34  
In the 21st century, insolvency policies play a more vital role in commercial 
society. For instance, if the legal provisions do not include clear regulations 
about the priority of distribution among various creditors, it would directly affect 
the willingness of investors to lend money to new enterprises. As a result, 
market confidence and business dynamism would be damaged. So it is 
obvious insolvency issues have significant influences not only on the 
shareholders related to the debtor, but on the development of the national 
economy at both micro and macro levels. As the number of multinational 
enterprises and their impacts grow, this legal domain has been burdened with 
political and commercial demands.35 Therefore, a well-established insolvency 
system is important for a complete legal system, and the good commercial 
order of a state.  
2.2.4 The Corporate Rescue Culture 
Traditionally, liquidation or winding up is the last resort of an insolvent 
company as it is a collective process leading to the end of a company’s 
existence.36 The process of liquidation always involves a court-appointed 
liquidator to collect and realise the assets of the insolvent debtors, and 
distribute the assets to creditors based on their legal priority laid down by the 
insolvency laws. However, the insolvency culture has been changing following 
the development of business and legal cultures, and corporate rescue has 
emerged under modern insolvency law. It should be noted that the definition 
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of corporate rescue here can be very broad. Rescuing a company does not 
mean that the company should be kept at its current operational level; so if a 
company has been proved to be inefficient and not economically viable, the 
normal winding-up procedure should be initiated.37 
In order to decide whether a company can be rescued, there are two concepts 
that should be clarified. The difference between financial distress and 
economic distress should be clarified. 38  A company in financial distress 
usually means that it has cash flow issues. As mentioned above, a cash flow 
problem is related to the liquidity situation of the company. If and when a 
company cannot meet its current liabilities may be caused by short-term 
dislocations in the market. Temporary illiquidity and large debt repayment can 
be normal in the business life cycle, and it does not mean the company is not 
economically viable.39 This kind of situation is the main reason for having 
corporate rescue procedures, the purpose of which is to help those companies 
survive their financial troubles and recover to operate healthily. Economic 
distress is the situation that arises when “the net present worth of 
the troubled company’s business as a going concern is less than the value of 
the assets broken up and sold separately.”40 Those companies are not eligible 
for rescue.  
Compared to the dissolution of an insolvent company, trying to rescue one 
may accomplish better results not only for creditors and shareholders, but also 
for social and economic interests.41 For instance, some work placements can 
be sustained, and negative influences on relevant suppliers and customers 
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can be avoided as well.42 Although the development of a corporate rescue 
culture has not been operating long, it has been defined as a “major 
intervention necessary to avert eventually failure of the company”,43  and 
accepted worldwide. For instance, under the UK insolvency regime, 
administrations and the Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) have a good 
history, and have been significant in facilitating company rescue plans, the 
primary purposes of those procedures being to rescue the company as a 
going concern, and achieve better result for the creditors as a whole than 
would have been likely if the company had been wound up.44 Chapter 11 
under the US Code is there to give debtors legal protection and an opportunity 
to reorganise; it also possibly provides creditors better value for their debts.45 
A well-established insolvency law system for the modern business market 
should have the ability to eliminate hopeless enterprises and guide 
commercially viable businesses to gain a second chance, especially the 
businesses that are capable of making a useful contribution to the economic 
life of the country. 46  Considering the broader picture, the insolvency of 
international business can affect more than creditors, employees and 
shareholders, it can even affect the domestic and global market environment. 
Therefore, international organisations have explicitly pointed out that 
corporate rescue should be a main principle and focus of insolvency reforms.47 
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2.3 The Nature of Cross-Border Insolvency 
With the growing convergence of economic activities around the world, the 
likelihood is that any given insolvency situation will not be restricted to only 
one state. Therefore, for a country that wants to attract more foreign direct or 
indirect investment to boost its domestic economy, it is very important to have 
a legal system regulating the failure of foreign businesses.48 The next part will 
focus on the basic issues and theories of cross-border insolvency.  
2.3.1 The Meaning of Cross-Border Insolvency 
The starting point for explaining the meaning of cross-border insolvency is that 
it is a by-product of the globalisation of business activities.49 Legal scholars 
have tried to give clear explanations based on the nature of the issues. Goode 
clarified that terms such as ‘international insolvency’ or ‘cross-border 
insolvency ’ do not have specific meanings, but the situations are generally 
linked with insolvencies which arise from cross-border trading, or where 
insolvency laws of two or more jurisdictions are possibly involved. 50 
Westbrook describes “transnational insolvency is the management of the 
general financial default of a multinational enterprise”.51 The definition from 
UNCITRAL is more detailed,  stating that cross-border insolvency refers to 
cases ‘where the insolvent debtor has assets in more than one state or where 
some of the creditors of the debtor are not from the state where the insolvency 
proceedings are taking place’.52 Some commentators have also discussed 
the nature of international insolvency under the content of the private 
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international law, which points out that the international insolvency laws need 
to be multifunctional, concerning problems like conflict of law rules, procedural 
and substantive standards.53  
However, it should be noted that cross-border insolvency cannot be merely 
treated as an extension of the legal domain of insolvency laws.54 It is an 
independent issue that involves the insolvency laws of two or more countries. 
Since this area is a by-product of business globalisation, the law should be 
designed and specialised taking an international point of view. Another reason 
is that international insolvency is more complicated than domestic cases. 
Cross-border insolvency laws not only need to solve similar issues faced by 
domestic laws, but they also need to address problems such as jurisdiction 
disputes or coordinating the interests of local and foreign creditors. 
Furthermore, as solving an international case requires the cooperation of local 
courts and insolvency practitioners among different nations, the procedural 
and material norms could be essential. Therefore, the laws for cross-border 
insolvency require global considerations and a more comprehensive system.  
2.3.2 Three Fundamental Issues  
The main issue of cross-border insolvency is caused by the significant 
differences among national insolvency laws. 55  Due to various political 
systems and social and commercial development, the divergence can be 
reflected in many problems. Furthermore, most domestic insolvency systems 
cannot keep pace with the continuing development of international trade and 
investment, which may lead to international inconsistency in solving cross-
border insolvency.56 Overall, in order to overcome the differences among 
national insolvency laws, private international law issues can be applied to 
identify three fundamental issues for solving cross-border insolvency: choice 
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of forum, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of decisions from 
foreign insolvency proceedings.57 
Choice of Forum 
Firstly, the issue of jurisdiction: a court needs to decide whether the 
international matter can be or will be heard.58 This question is important 
because creditors located in different jurisdictions may file insolvency petitions 
in front of different courts, or proceedings against the same debtor already 
exists. It requires the court to decide the jurisdiction as soon as possible to 
avoid causing confusion to both creditors and debtor. Currently, international 
regimes are trying to address this problem by using the concept of centre of 
main interests (COMI), which means that the courts of the state that the 
debtors were incorporated, or its principal places of business, will have the 
jurisdiction to hear the case. The purpose of the concept was to provide a 
unified standard for the choice of forum issue, but the application of COMI has 
caused serious discussions and issues in practice. The problem will be 
discussed in detail later in this thesis.   
Choice of Law 
The second inherent issue is the choice of law – to decide which law will be 
used to govern the whole proceedings. For multinational insolvency, the rule 
of choice of law is about predictability and certainty, which is the essential 
knowledge that debtors or creditors need to know before and after the 
commencement of any insolvency proceedings.59 It means that an effective 
law for cross-border insolvency, following either private international or 
international regimes, should permit the creditors to anticipate the applicable 
law which will control the whole proceedings. It seems that the ‘home country 
rule’, which means the law of the company’s home country, or principle asset 
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country, should be applied is the well-recognised principle for this problem 
since it could provide the most accurate and reliable prediction for the 
applicable law in advance.60 However, the main issue is about the definition 
of ‘home country’. Country of incorporation can be easily identified, but such 
a standard might not always reflect the real situation of multinational 
enterprises, which means the real “home” should mirror the company’s 
principle centre, and be consistent with creditors’ expectations regarding the 
location and applicable law of a possible insolvency process.61 
From the point of view of individual countries, the application of their 
insolvency law on international cases is obviously the preferred choice. Firstly, 
as the local assets and creditors would not be governed by foreign laws, 
national sovereignty can be protected, especially for some jurisdictions that 
have not built a valid insolvency system. Additionally, holding control of the 
insolvency proceedings can increase the possibility of reaching an outcome 
that is more beneficial to local interests, such as the protection of local 
creditors and an increase in tax revenues to the state. Then, using one’s own 
law is more efficient and economical. The whole proceedings would be faster 
because the learning cost and time needed to be familiar with foreign 
insolvency law that may be applied can be avoided. Franken provided an 
explanation about this issue from an economic perspective which might be 
more direct to the nature of the problem.62 The analysis illustrated that legal 
choices for cross-border insolvency depend on the extent to which the legal 
system increases economic benefits from cross-border trading activities.63 
Some countries’ economic growth mainly depends on export and import 
business activities, and drawing more foreign direct and indirect investment 
into the domestic market is the main tool to stimulate economic development; 
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in other words, the sum of international trading is a big part of their GDP. 
Therefore, such countries prefer to apply their own law to achieve results that 
protect their interests. It can be said that, from either political or economic 
considerations, own insolvency law is always the preferred choice.  
Recognition and Enforcement 
Finally, the problem of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
directly influences the outcomes of insolvency proceedings. This question is 
the most international part of the whole cross-border insolvency process as it 
deals with problems like how to work with the foreign courts that have issued 
the judgment, or what effects the judgement will have. A cross-border 
insolvency system cannot be successful without a comprehensive process to 
deal with the recognition and enforcement of foreign orders. Particularly, this 
is the part that requests international cooperation since there will be situations 
such that foreign representatives might require controll of the local assets 
belonging to the insolvent debtor, or the content of a foreign judgment may 
conflict with the local laws. In particular, the most difficult issue behind this 
question is finding the balance between protecting local interests and assisting 
the foreign proceedings.  
Although it is a well-accepted concept that cooperation among different courts 
of jurisdiction is the best way to solve international insolvency cases,64 details 
about how to achieve mutual agreement on this problem remain unclear. The 
principle of comity has been suggested by international regimes and 
organisations. Based on the interpretation of the US Supreme Court 
explanation, the legal meaning of comity is neither an absolute obligation nor 
a courtesy nor goodwill, so it should be seen as the recognition by a state to 
allow legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation to be conducted 
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within its territory for the purpose of international duty and convenience.65 So, 
the decision still needs to be made according to private international laws, and 
the question is to what extent the local laws and courts should cooperate with 
foreign proceedings. Under most legal systems, the principle usually is that 
the comity can be granted if foreign decisions are not violating the domestic 
laws and public policies; however, the application of the principle cannot be 
that straightforward. 
A recently-decided common law case can be a good example to illustrate the 
issue. The main issue of the Singularis case was about the scope of common 
law powers to assist foreign insolvency proceedings. 66  In this case, the 
Cayman Islands court, which was the court conducting the winding up, issued 
an order requiring certain assets and financial information from the debtor, 
based on the Company Act in Bermuda. When the liquidator from the Cayman 
court tried to enforce the order in Bermuda, the court rejected the application 
on the grounds that the equivalent order would not be issued and applied by 
the court where the foreign proceedings were being conducted. The majority 
of judges agreed that the common law had the power to cooperate and assist 
foreign insolvency proceedings, but the power was limited to not only local law 
and public policy, but also the foreign courts’ statutory powers. Under such 
circumstances, even the foreign liquidator had been recognised; the foreign 
judgment could not be enforced. Therefore, under common law, there are 
strict limitations relating to international assistance.  
The case reflects some essential questions about cross-border insolvency. 
The first one is the identification of assets. Since the locations of multinational 
companies’ assets can be very dispersed, the investigation of that information 
can be difficult and time-consuming without the assistance of local courts 
where the insolvent debtors’ assets are located, which will directly influence 
the efficiency of the whole proceedings. More importantly, it may increase the 
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possibility that debtors will hide certain assets or of forum shopping. Secondly, 
another essential issue is the power of foreign insolvency representatives. As 
mentioned above, states prefer to use their own law to regulate international 
cases. Therefore, on what conditions the foreign representatives can take 
over and administer local assets, and what they can do to those assets, are 
all important issues under insolvency law. Moreover, the creditors are also 
located in different jurisdictions, and so the legal position of creditors from 
abroad is also an issue; which nation’s distribution rules will be used to satisfy 
all creditors’ claims can also be vital for the result. So communication and 
negotiation can be essential for international cases. Other practical issues 
include how documents and evidence need to be examined for recognition, or 
how witnesses are to be examined if the relevant parties are in different foreign 
countries. All these questions need to be solved based on a unified regime 
that can allow all countries to work together.  
 
2.4 Theories of Regulating Cross-border Insolvency 
Before discussing the practical solutions to multinational insolvency, the 
conceptual backgrounds which offer a foundation for solving this specific 
matter will be examined. Traditionally, there are two theories within this area: 
universalism and territorialism. 67  The main differences between the two 
involve two aspects. First, they are related to the number of countries or courts 
which have the jurisdiction to open the insolvency proceedings against a 
debtor, and the second aspect is the different multinational effects of 
insolvency proceedings under each concept.68 However, according to the 
practical experiences of applying those two systems, there are some revised 
or modified systems which have been developed based on those two aspects. 
Thus, in this part, apart from the discussion of the basic concepts, some 
                                                             
67 Lynn M. LoPuck, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist 
Approach’ (1999) Cornell Law Review 696. 
68 Edward S. Adams and Jason K. Fincke, ‘Coordinating Cross-Border Bankruptcy: 
How Territorialism Saves Universalism’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European 
Law 43, 47-50. 
45 
 
influential modified concepts also will be analysed.   
It is worth noting that the goals of the two approaches are similar.69 Fairness 
is the main objective, and the point is that no matter where the creditors are 
located, they should be treated equally. Also, the expenses and time should 
be minimised, the possible conflicts between different countries should also 
be minimalised, and the interests of both debtors and creditors all need to be 
considered. Overall, increasing the economic efficiency and predictability of 
the insolvency proceedings is the aim of both systems.  
 
2.4.1 Universalism and Territorialism  
Pure universalism means that a single set of insolvency proceedings should 
exist to deal with the worldwide assets of the debtor, and this concept treats 
the world as a single international market that needs one market-symmetrical 
law to govern the insolvency process.70 Accordingly, the home country will 
have jurisdiction to collect, administer and distribute all the assets no matter 
where the assets are located, and creditors from different locations have equal 
rights to submit claims and get paid. Ancillary proceedings might exist since 
the assets are located in different jurisdictions, but those separate 
proceedings cannot make independent distribution decisions since their sole 
purpose is to facilitate and assist the principal proceeding under the law of the 
debtor’s home country. There is thus the need for international cooperation 
and communication to manage the worldwide assets. The idea of the 
universalists is that the regulations governing multinational insolvencies 
should reflect the borderless nature of the global market, so a global market 
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requires a global bankruptcy law.71  
The opposite face of universalism is territorialism, which implies a system 
whereby each country controls the debtor’s assets located within their territory, 
and recognises other countries’ rights to do the same. In other words, each of 
the insolvency courts would assume jurisdiction over assets within its 
country’s borders, and then make a decision whether to join the international 
reorganisation or liquidation based on local laws. This approach guarantees 
that each state’s own distributive rules and policies will govern the 
administration and distribution of local assets. Under this system, creditors will 
have to commence several separate insolvency proceedings in each 
jurisdiction where the particular assets are located; problems such as choice 
of forum and choice of law are only connected to the location of those assets.72 
Supporters of territorialism claim that only such a system can provide 
simplified solutions for chaotic cross-border cases, and a reliable prediction 
for creditors in terms of jurisdictions or applicable law, not like universalism, 
which may cause confusion about those issues.73 
Theoretically, the two systems are built on different premises. While 
universalism pays more attention to economic efficiency, national sovereignty 
and the considerations of protecting local interests are the political motives of 
territorialism. 74  Convenience is one of the claimed advantages under 
universalism. A single forum controls all the proceedings and assets, so the 
international restructuring or sale of businesses would be more efficient and 
easier.75 Debtors and creditors would only need to deal with one insolvency 
representative. However, the problem could be that the creditors in various 
jurisdictions may not be informed in time, and language barriers may put 
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foreign creditors in a disadvantageous position since they are forced to file 
claims in another jurisdiction. Regarding this point, territorialism may be more 
predictable for creditors since the only factor which matters is the location of 
assets; but, without an appropriate mechanism, worldwide individual 
proceedings would make international procedures like reorganisation very 
difficult. Furthermore, the cost of litigation is relatively inexpensive under a 
single set of proceedings as the number of proceedings is reduced, and the 
duplicated expenses can be avoided.76 More importantly, it is argued that the 
value of the debtor’s assets will be maximised as a whole, which is better for 
the interests of both creditors and debtors.77  
In a system of territorial proceedings, the values will be limited to the local 
assets, and the sum of values of an individual asset is likely to be diminished. 
From the perspective of fairness, creditors are likely to be treated more equally 
under universalism as the distribution priorities will be ranked by classes 
among the whole pool of creditors.78 Another advantage of territorialism is 
that the legal conflicts among involved nations will be avoided while the unified 
system requires cooperation and compromises; nevertheless, national 
processes are easily being over-protective for local interests and discriminate 
against foreign creditors.79    
The ultimate benefit of universalism is to increase global efficiencies.80 Over 
the years, the concept of universalism, at least as a general theory, have been 
recognised for solving international insolvency issues. However, a 
universalism system in practice can only be accomplished under ideal 
conditions, and it has been accused of ignoring and underestimating the 
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importance of issues like choice of forum and choice of law.81 The operation 
of universalism needs a unified system for deciding which jurisdiction will have 
the power to conduct the universal insolvency proceedings and relevant 
matters; but without well-recognised international treaties or conventions, 
such a uniform standard is difficult to build. In practice, the different 
interpretations of the idea of a ‘centre of main interests’ have proved how 
complicated the issues could be. Therefore, universalists have accepted that 
the approach to achieving universalism has to be pragmatic and realistic; as 
professor Westbrook described it: “The idea of universalism is of a single 
primary bankruptcy proceeding in the debtor’s home country, with courts 
elsewhere acting in an ancillary or supportive role to the primary court, 
resulting in unitary administration of assets under on bankruptcy law. Because 
that result would require sophisticated international agreements, the ideal 
remains some distance away.”82 
2.4.2 Modified Universalism 
Modified universalism was developed as a pragmatic approach and first baby 
step to achieving universalism; it embraces the fundamental ideas of pure 
universalism, but respects that individual states may only unilaterally control 
its laws and territory.83  Thus, modified universalism accepts multinational 
insolvency should be governed under the laws and by the court of the debtors’ 
home country, and other local courts where such debtor’s assets are located 
could open secondary proceedings and have ‘the discretion to evaluate the 
fairness of the home country procedures and to protect the interest of local 
creditors.’84 Another important feature is that cooperation among domestic 
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courts is encouraged to achieve an effective and ideal result.85 
Modified universalism seems to be more feasible by mixing the features of two 
different regimes together, which means the solution might accomplish not 
only certain efficiencies that universalism has proposed, but also protection of 
local interests.86 One of the advantages is that it provides flexibility to deal 
with foreign assets, which can be the main feature of territorialism; moreover, 
it also maintains most of the features of pure universalism, such as the 
influence on the main proceedings of holding them in the court of the home 
country, so that the highest efficiencies can still be achieved.87  Under this 
system, the expenses can be higher than the original approach, but the 
duplicative costs can be avoided by limiting the power of the court which 
opens the proceedings other than the “home country” proceedings. Another 
reason people support the modified approach is that it reduces political 
concerns by protecting the sovereignty of a nation.88 The ancillary court has 
the power to use its own national law to decide whether to cooperate with the 
foreign court. In this way, each state can make decisions by assessing the 
situation of each case, not unconditionally accept the foreign judgment.89 
Because of the flexibility, the approach can be more acceptable to countries 
with different legal systems, and more workable in the real world. With the fact 
that international regimes, including the European Union and the UNCITRAL, 
have adopted it, the development of modified universalism seems to have 
settled the long-running debate between universalism and territorialism.90 
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2.4.3 Modified Universalism and National Laws  
In practice, apart from the international regimes for cross-border insolvency, 
some jurisdictions have good histories of applying universalism or modified 
universalism to address failures of international businesses.  
The United States: In the United States, the Bankruptcy Code has broad 
winding up jurisdiction over international companies, which could be exercised 
over any legal persons who have a domicile, or place of business, or property 
in the United States.91 Even if just a single bank account has been opened in 
a US bank, it could form a sufficient jurisdictional connection. Thus, the law 
gives courts the power to wind up foreign incorporated companies despite the 
absence of principle insolvency proceedings in the jurisdiction of the home 
country. Beside the jurisdiction, the provisions about automatic stay show 
more universal attempts. Under the code, once the insolvency case is filed in 
the courts, the automatic stay will be applied to creditors, and any action to 
obtain assets or collect a debt from the insolvent debtor should be prohibited.92 
Creditors will be punished if they continue their actions against the debtor, 
whether in the United States or overseas.  
Moreover, assisting foreign proceedings for solving cross-border insolvency 
also had a good history under US law. Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
which has been replaced by Chapter 15 adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law,93 
was the main source for the US courts dealing with insolvency cases with 
international elements. It gave the bankruptcy court broad and flexible 
authority to grant relief to assist foreign bankruptcy courts in the company’s 
home jurisdiction.94 Section 304 was enacted in 1978, and the major purpose 
was to “provide a statuary mechanism through which the United States courts 
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may defer to or facilitate foreign insolvency proceedings”.95 The general goals 
of section 304 and chapter 15 are similar, but a main difference between the 
two is that the language and application of section 304 were primarily 
discretionary. 96  The section only stated that the court “may” grant relief, 
whereas chapter 15 applies mandatory rules, such as “foreign proceedings 
shall be recognised”, if the case satisfies certain conditions listed in the 
chapter.97 
Furthermore, section 304 allowed the foreign representative to commence 
ancillary in the US bankruptcy court for the purpose of aiding foreign 
proceedings. This section shared some common factors with modified 
universalism. A foreign proceeding under the definition of section 304 was a 
“proceeding in a foreign country in which the debtor’s domicile, residence, 
principal place of business or principal assets were located at the 
commencement of such proceeding”. The definition agreed with universalism 
regarding how the main principle proceeding should be commenced. 
Additionally, section 304 also gives the courts discretion to grant appropriate 
relief to assist foreign representatives. Thus, the relief granted could be 
tailored to fit the circumstances of particular cases, and the foreign 
representative could also apply for additional relief if it was necessary. 
Therefore, it seems that section 304 applied the “modified universalism” 
approach to cross-border insolvency: affording maximum flexibility and 
assistance to a foreign insolvency proceeding, while safeguarding certain 
fundamental rights of local claimants.98  
The United Kingdom: The cross-border insolvency law in the UK is more 
complicated than the US. While chapter 15 is the only source for solving 
international insolvency issues, there are four regimes under the UK’s legal 
system. The European Regulation is applied when the COMI of the debtor is 
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located within one of the member states. Section 426 of the Insolvency Act 
1986 only applies to proceedings from related jurisdictions or designated 
countries specified under this section.99 For other countries, the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Regulation, which enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law, is 
applied. 100  Additionally, the common law principles on international 
insolvency operate in parallel with the statutory regime, which has illustrated 
the existence of more influences on the development of universalism under 
English law. Generally, if the foreign insolvency proceeding is opened by the 
court where the debtor has a centre of main interests or its genuine 
incorporated location, the English courts would probably recognise the 
extraterritorial effects of the foreign proceedings. The common law principle 
shares a strong connection with modified universalism promoted by the Model 
Law system, which provides that English courts should, subject to public policy, 
cooperate with the courts in the country of the principal proceedings to ensure 
that the distribution process is conducted under a single system.101 Case laws 
have illustrated that most UK judges support modified universalism, and 
believe that international cooperation is the desired approach for solving 
cross-border insolvency.102   
However, since modified universalism has not been codified or formalised as 
a unified concept, its effects and interpretation have to depend on the courts 
and judges at the national level.103 In practice, cases from enacting countries 
have demonstrated the difficulties caused by the different understandings of 
modified universalism. In the UK, according to the Supreme Court case Robin 
v Eurofinance, a foreign insolvency judgment should not be enforceable in the 
UK if the particular relief the foreign representative seeks would not be granted 
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under the UK law.104 Furthermore, in the Privy Council case Singularis,105 
Lord Sumption reaffirmed that ‘the principle of modified universalism is a 
recognised principle of the common law’, but the courts’ power is limited to its 
own statutory and common law powers.106 However, US judges have adopted 
a flexible approach, inherited from the former law Section 304, and have taken 
an international-minded approach by showing a willingness to grant relief to 
foreign representatives based on the foreign law when it is appropriate.107 
The different interpretations of modified universalism are one of the reasons 
for the inconsistent application of the Model Law in enacting countries, and 
this point will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has been observed that an enterprise’s financial distress is 
always caused by multiple pressures, and for international companies, those 
pressures are more severe because of factors like local competition and 
regulations. When cross-border insolvency occurs, it leads to complicated 
legal issues; the fundamental differences among domestic insolvency laws 
and the preference to protect local interests and creditors are the two main 
reasons behind the complexity. With the development of modern business, 
insolvency laws are now paying more attention to corporate rescue in order to 
improve market stability and sustainability. The trend could be more vital for 
multinational cases with worldwide influence. For the purpose of maximising 
creditors’ interests or achieving better restructuring plans, cooperation among 
creditors and courts in different jurisdictions is needed; furthermore, the most 
important step for solving international insolvency is how to accomplish a 
judgement’s extraterritorial effects in other countries. Therefore, an effective 
system for regulating cross-border insolvency requires being not only 
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predictable and accessible, but also recognisable and enforceable in other 
jurisdictions. Approaches established based on modified universalism seem 
to be the appropriate solution, providing a comprehensive system to simplify 
the whole proceedings, and encouraging all the involved courts to work 
together by allowing the secondary proceedings. More importantly, the 
concept already has good application at private international law level. 
However, the different understandings of modified universalism at the national 
level may have negative effects on the potential consistency encouraged by 
international insolvency cooperation. Therefore, the next chapter is going to 
explore whether the UNCITRAL Model Law, which was established based on 
modified universalism, can achieve international efficiency and consistency.  
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Chapter 3 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency 
The previous chapter focused on discussions about the nature of cross-border 
insolvency and basic theories that could be used for solving relevant issues. 
This chapter will concentrate on the main features of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and its enactment in different countries. As the overall purpose of this 
study is to explore whether the features of the Model Law would be helpful for 
improving Chinese cross-border insolvency, the function of this chapter is to 
establish a comprehensive understanding of the operation of the law. 
Moreover, as a soft law, enacting countries’ experiences will be important 
indicators of the effectiveness of the Model Law, so practical analysis will set 
out the foundation for the comparative discussion between the Chinese 
insolvency system and the Model Law.   
In this chapter, the application and characteristics of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law will be examined in detail. After the general introduction of the 
background of the Model Law in the first part, part two will discuss the basic 
philosophy and nature of the law. Then, part 3 will focus on the application 
and the main features of the Model law, including the recognition procedure 
based on the concept of centre of main interests (COMI), different types of 
relief, exception articles and the cooperation system under the law. A brief 
comparative analysis between the European Insolvency Regulation and the 
Model Law also will be made in this part, with the purpose of further 
understanding the international origin of the Model Law. The last part looks at 
the extra protective methods and different interpretations that enacting 
countries have applied in implementing and enforcing the Model Law; the 
discussion will focus on the true meaning of the cooperative features of the 
Model Law and their effectiveness.  
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3.1 International Efforts on Cross-Border Insolvency  
The importance of regulating international insolvency is well-recognised by 
countries, having realised that there should be a system to harmonise those 
diverse and uncoordinated legal proceedings associated with multinational 
companies’ insolvency. 1 The efforts trying to develop an ideal international 
insolvency system have a quite long and complicated history. During the early 
20th century, bilateral or multilateral agreements were developed by some 
countries to regulate multinational insolvency issues. The experience of the 
European Union provides a good example of those regional regimes. The 
adoption of the Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 1346/2000 of 
29 May 2000 illustrates it is possible to have a unified insolvency solution 
among states with multiple political, commercial and legal systems.2 However, 
the application of those agreements is usually limited to a regional group of 
participating countries that are geographical neighbours or trading partners, 
and it requires a certain degree of similarity in those counties’ commercial law 
systems.  
In response to the expansion of international trade and the growth of 
multinational enterprises, countries that are neither neighbours nor trading 
partners also face international insolvency issues.3 Especially with the rapid 
development of emerging markets in the global economy, the international 
market requires a global solution that can solve cross-border insolvency 
problems beyond territorial boundaries.4 As a result, more efforts at both 
                                                             
1 Jenny Clift, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency-A Legislative 
Framework to Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency’ 
(2004) 12 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 307. 
2  Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (It has been 
amended by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Insolvency Proceedings (Recast), which came in to effect in 2017) 
(hereinafter EIR). 
3  Ian F. Fletcher (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency: Comparative Dimensions: The 
Aberystwyth Insolvency Papers (London: The United Kingdom National Committee 
of Comparative Law, 1990). 
4 Steven T Kargman, ‘Emerging Economics and Cross-Border Insolvency Regimes: 
Missing BIRCs in the International Insolvency Architecture (Part 1)’ (2012) Insolvency 
and Restructuring International 8. 
57 
 
national and international have been made for finding a better framework for 
multinational insolvencies. For example, the Business Law section of the 
International Bar Association developed the Model International Insolvency 
Cooperation Act (MIICA). 5  Although the regime has not been widely 
recognised, it still indicates the importance of government cooperation for 
solving international insolvency, and that the concept of model law could be a 
possible solution. In addition, it provided some valuable experience in 
developing the UNCITRAL regime.6 Furthermore, both the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund have emphasised the importance of the 
convergence of national insolvency laws in a time of globalisation, and the 
necessity of a cross-border insolvency system.7  
Having realised the importance of cross-border insolvency, and that it would 
not be possible in the foreseeable future to have a unified substantive law for 
different legal systems, UNCITRAL formed a Working Group of delegates from 
various countries and international organisations to draft the Model Law, 
focusing on procedural issues such as cooperation among the courts, foreign 
representatives’ access to local courts and effects of recognition. Developing 
this law was explained as a realistic approach to find possible solutions for 
issues in a relatively short time.8 After three years’ negotiations and review, 
the Model Law was adopted by consensus on May 30, 1997. The introduction 
of the Model Law was a significant achievement, and countries were 
recommended to use that as an opportunity to review their legislation on their 
cross-border insolvency laws and give favourable consideration on the 
adoption of the Model Law. At the time of writing, there are 45 jurisdictions that 
                                                             
5 See generally: Elizabeth K. Somers, ‘The Model International Insolvency 
Cooperation Act: An International Proposal for Domestic Legislation’ (2011) 6 (4) 
American University International Law Review 677. 
6 UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation 
(2009). 11 < http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2009Practic 
eGuide.html > accessed 10 June 2015. 
7 The World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes 
(2015); IMF, Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures (1999). 
8 Felicity Deane and Rosalind Mason, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency and the Rule of Law’ (2016) 25 (2) International Insolvency Review 139, 
150. 
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have enacted the Model Law as part of their domestic law, including some of 
the world’s most economically powerful countries, such as the US and the UK.  
 
3.2 The Nature of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
The Model Law was designed to ‘assist States in equipping their insolvency 
laws with a modern, harmonised and fair framework to address more 
effectively instances of cross-border insolvency’.9 In order to achieve this goal, 
the Working Group drafted this law as a model law rather than a convention, 
which means that it is a list of legislative recommendations for countries to 
adopt as part of national law.10 The main reason for having a model law was 
that national insolvency laws usually have a close relationship with national 
judicial and civil laws; the Model Law would respect the differences in 
domestic insolvency regimes.11 The Working Group believed that, with proper 
guidance, the Model Law would be more effective in solving cross-border 
issues. 12  As a result, the Model Law was accompanied by a Guide to 
Enactment, which provides detailed background and explanatory information 
for each article.13  
The nature of the Model Law gives countries the freedom and flexibility to 
modify, or even leave out, certain provisions if it is necessary. Such flexibility 
is important for greater acceptance of the law around the world, rather than a 
treaty.14 The aim of the drafters was that a majority of countries would adopt 
                                                             
9 UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to 
Enactment and Interpretation (1999) (revised 2013) 19 (The Model Law Guide). 
<https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-
Guide-Enactment-e.pdf> accessed 20 May 2017. 
10  UNCITRAL, The UNCITRAL Guide: Basic Facts about the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (2007), 14-16. 
11  The Model Law Guide, 19-23; Bob Wessels (ed.), Cross-Border Insolvency: 
International Instruments and Commentary (Kluwer Law International 2007), 4-5. 
12 The Model Law Guide, 24. 
13 The Model Law Guide (n 9). 
14 Paul Omar, ‘Communication and co-operation between insolvency courts and 
personnel’ (2006) International Company and Commercial Law Review 120. 
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the law and a certain degree of uniformity could be achieved in this legal 
area.15 The Guide to Enactment also specifically recommended countries to 
make as few modifications as possible in order to maintain a satisfactory 
degree of unification and certainty.16 There are five objectives set out in the 
preamble of the Model Law, including: cooperation between foreign courts and 
authorities, greater legal certainty, fair and efficient cross-border insolvency, 
protection of debtor’s assets, and the desire to encourage the rescue of 
troubled international businesses. All countries would expect to achieve those 
five goals if they had a cross-border insolvency regime; therefore, most 
jurisdictions are encouraged to choose to adopt it with little or no 
modification.17 Furthermore, the Model Law was designed with the purposes 
of effectively solving multinational insolvency and promoting an international 
market environment, so in order to act in the common interest, individual 
countries are encouraged to retain uniformity as much as possible.18  
The “soft” law nature is the main difference between the Model Law and the 
European Regulation. Although both regimes have implemented the 
philosophy of modified universalism and similar concepts such as COMI and 
establishment, their implementation is established based on different 
principles.19 The primary concern of the Model Law is to facilitate the national 
law to deal with inbound foreign insolvency proceedings, and to encourage 
cooperation between proceedings. In contrast, the European system was 
established based on market integration, so its insolvency regulation is a 
mandatory rule among all member states, and mutual trust and recognition 
                                                             
15 The Model Law Guide, 49. 
16 ibid, 25. 
17 M. Cameron Gilreath, ‘Overview and Analysis of How the United Nations Model 
Law on Insolvency Would Affect United States Corporations Doing Business Abroad’ 
(2000) Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 399. 
18 Law Commission, Insolvency Law Reform: Promoting trust and Confidence (Law 
Commission 2001) < http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/nzlc/sp/SP11/SP11.pdf > accessed 
2 August 2013 (NZ). 
19 EIR, Recital 23 of the Preamble; Jay L. Westbrook, ‘Chapter 15 at Last’ (2005) 79 
Am. Bankr. L.J. 713, 716 and Edward J. Janger, ‘Universal Proceduralism’ (2007) 32 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 819, 824. 
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among different judicial systems is the underlying principle.20     
Some would argue that its flexibility would be a disadvantage for the Model 
Law. For example, it may lead to conflicts between one state which has 
decided to adopt a few provisions into domestic law and another country which 
has enacted a whole part of it. In this case, there would be no guarantee of 
uniformity in the quantity of adopted provisions among enacting countries, and 
the quality of the application of the Model Law would suffer. In fact, because 
of the nature of soft law, the Model Law has been implemented differently in 
enacting countries,21 and the freedom to modify and interpret has caused 
inconsistencies in practice. Hence, in this chapter, those variations at the 
national level will be used as examples to discuss the true meanings of the 
Model Law’s provisions.  
 
3.3 The Operation and Main Features of the Model law     
The scope of the Model Law extends to foreign proceedings relating to 
insolvency if the proceeding is collective and the assets of the debtor are 
subject to court control. It means that various proceedings will be entitled to 
recognition, whether it is compulsory or voluntary, winding-up or 
reorganisation.22 However, the insolvency of financial institutions may not be 
regulated by the Model Law as those entities are usually administered under 
special regulatory regimes.23  One of the most important purposes of the 
Model Law is to provide direct access for foreign representatives to the courts 
                                                             
20  Gerard McCormack and Hamish Anderson, ‘Brexit and Its Implication for 
Restructuring and Corporate Insolvency in the UK’ (2017) 7 Journal of Business Law 
533. 
21  Gerard McCormack, ‘US Exceptionalism and UK Localism? Cross-Border 
Insolvency Law in Comparative Perspective’ (2016) 36 Legal Studies 136; Look Chan 
Ho, ‘Applying Foreign Law – Realising the Model Law’s Potential’ (2010) Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 552. 
22 The Model Law Guide, 40. 
23 ibid. 
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of a country which is an enacting country. 24  It proposes a cooperative 
approach that enables faster action than through diplomatic methods. Other 
than direct access, foreign representatives also have the right to commence 
local proceedings in the recognising country based on local laws, or to 
participate in a local proceeding concerning the same debtor, or to intervene 
in individual actions in the recognising country affecting the debtor or its 
assets.25 Apart from direct access for foreign representatives, protection of 
foreign creditors is another intention. The Model Law provides that foreign 
creditors should be treated equally to local creditors for the purpose of starting 
insolvency proceedings or participating in local proceedings in an enacting 
country.26 Although the priority in distribution will be decided by local laws, the 
Model Law requires that an enacting country should treat foreign creditors at 
least as well as a local unsecured creditor, provided that the equal local claim 
would receive at least that treatment.  
3.3.1 The Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law  
The Model law adopted a system that has characteristics of modified 
universalism. There are two types of proceedings under this system, named 
main proceeding and non-main proceeding. In order to identify these 
proceedings, the concepts of centre of main interest (COMI) and 
establishment were applied, which means that if the foreign proceeding was 
opened in the country where the COMI of the debtor is located, the proceeding 
should be identified as the main proceeding by the recognising court. The idea 
of non-main proceeding is identified as “a foreign proceeding, other than a 
foreign main proceeding, taking place in a State where the debtor has an 
establishment”; and then, additional proceedings can be opened in those 
countries other than the state where the COMI is located.27 Moreover, the 
power of the non-main proceeding is only limited to the assets within the 
territory. The term “establishment” means “any place of operations where the 
                                                             
24 ibid, 27; The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (The Model 
Law), Article 9. 
25 ibid; The Model Law, Article 11. 
26 ibid, 107; the Model Law, Article 32. 
27 The Model Law, Article 2. 
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debtor undertakes a permanent economic activity.”28 While Article 2 of the 
Model Law does not contain a definition of the term “centre of main interests”, 
Article 16 provides a presumption that, “in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the debtor’s registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an 
individual, is presumed to be the centre of the debtor’s main interests.”  The 
main difference between being recognised as a main proceeding and a non-
main proceeding is in how the foreign proceeding will be treated by the courts 
applying the model law, and what specific provisions of the domestic 
insolvency law will be applied to it. For example, certain provisions of the law 
will automatically apply upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding, but not 
of a foreign non-main proceeding. For example, primary relief such as a stay 
of individual enforcement action against the foreign debtor or his assets, or a 
suspension of the debtor’s right to transfer assets, would be triggered upon 
recognition of a main proceeding.29  
The interpretation of the concept of centre of main interests (COMI) is the 
central factor that effectively operates the Model Law. Apparently, a debtor 
could have its headquarters and principal operating facilities in a different 
country than where its registered office is located, and evidence of such a 
situation might be used to rebut the presumption provided by Article 16. This 
could potentially lead to a conflict if two jurisdictions have different definitions 
of the meaning of the centre of main interests. This issue has begun to 
influence the use of international regimes, both the Model Law and the EU 
regulation. The more detailed explanation of the concept was given in the 
judgment of the Eurofood case,30 which was a long-awaited judgment for 
applying COMI in practice. It stated that COMI must be the place of the 
company’s central administration, which is responsible for the management 
and supervision of the company. While the European court provided some 
guidance for deciding COMI, the US judges tried to make a clearer standard 
for this issue. Still, the application of the concept varied under different legal 
systems, and the detailed discussion on this issue will be conducted in the 
                                                             
28 The Model Law, Article 2 (f). 
29 The Model Law, Article 20. 
30 Eurofood IFSC Ltd (Case C-341/04) [2006] B.C.C 397. 
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next section.  
The Model Law did not provide unified choice-of-law rules and took a neutral 
position on this matter, so enacting countries needed to apply their private 
international laws to decide the applicable law. The purpose of the Model Law 
is to encourage an effective cross-border insolvency solution operating as part 
of the domestic legal system.31 So the neutral design would help to reduce 
the time-consuming procedures and facilitate quick access to foreign 
proceedings for purposes of asset preservation.32 More importantly, it reflects 
the principle of modified universalism and provides flexibility for contestation 
between divergent legal systems.33 Therefore, it has been argued that such 
neutrality is the feature or advantage of the Model Law. Another similar 
flexibility under the law is that there is no reciprocity requirement, which is 
making it easier to invoke the law.34 So a non-enacting country can also 
invoke the Model Law to seek recognition in an enacting country. 35  For 
example, if the main proceeding is opened in China, which is not an enacting 
country, the representative from this proceeding can still seek recognition in 
the US, based on the Model Law, because the US is an enacting country. 
Hence, the COMI of cross-border companies can be in any country, and the 
application of the Model Law will not be limited to those enacting countries.  
                                                             
31 Paul J. Omar, ‘The UNCITRAL Insolvency Initiative: A Five-year Review’ (2002) 
Insolvency Lawyer 228. 
32 Andre J. Berends, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency: A 
Comprehensive Review’ (1998) 6 Tulane Journal of International Comparative Law 
309, 319-321. 
33 Adrian Walters, ‘Modified Universalisms & the Role of Local Legal Culture in the 
Making of Cross-Border Insolvency Law’ (2017) American Bankruptcy Law Journal 
[forthcoming], 16 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3084117> 
accessed 12 March 2018. 
34 Keith D. Yamauchi, ‘Should Reciprocity Be a Part of the UNCITRAL Model Cross-
Border Insolvency Law’ (2007) 16 International Insolvency Review 145. 
35 Irit Mevorach, ‘On the road to universalism: a comparative and empirical study of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency’ (2011) European Business 
Organization Law Review 517. 
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3.3.2 The Concept of Centre of Main Interest (COMI) 
COMI plays the essential role in the Model Law since the operation is based 
on the recognition of main or non-main proceedings. In order to understand 
the concept and its application, this part discusses the COMI under the Model 
Law from a practical perspective.  
As one of the supporters and enacting members of the Model Law, the US 
courts have discussed the issue in some influential cases. In Re Sphinx,36 the 
insolvent debtors were incorporated in the Cayman Islands, and most of their 
assets were in the United States. Most of their assets were located in the US, 
and business administration and management were mainly conducted in the 
US. The debtors did not conduct trading or business in the Cayman Islands, 
and the only activities they conducted there were limited steps to maintain the 
debtors in standing as registered Cayman Islands companies. The debtors 
went into liquidation in the Cayman Islands, and the representatives appointed 
by this proceeding tried to seek recognition under Chapter 15 of the 
Bankruptcy Code in the US.  
In deciding the COMI of the debtors, although there was evidence showing 
that COMI was outside of Cayman Islands, the court was inclined to agree 
that the Cayman Islands were the location of COMI because the proceeding 
in the Cayman Islands could influence all the investors, and there were no 
other pending proceedings against the debtors; also, there were no objections 
submitted against such recognition. The court eventually did not recognise the 
proceeding as the main proceeding because the investors’ tacit consent to the 
Cayman Islands proceeding was for an improper purpose; it was thus 
recognised as a non-main proceeding.37 Although the conclusion was not 
wrong, the reasoning process received criticisms from commentators. Since 
the court could have reached the conclusion that the COMI location was the 
US, the foreign proceeding had already lost the eligibility to be recognised as 
                                                             
36 In Re SPhinX, Ltd, 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr, SD N.Y. 2006). 
37 ibid, para 122. 
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the main proceeding. 38  Therefore, as an early case concerned with the 
problem of COMI after the adoption of the Model law, the US court showed 
some misunderstandings of the Model Law structure. Nevertheless, the court 
discussed some specific factors to rebut the presumption that the registered 
location was the COMI, provided “Various factors, singly or combined, could 
be relevant to such a determination: the location of the debtor’s headquarters; 
the location of those who actually manage the debtor; the location of the 
debtor’s primary assets; the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors 
or of a majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case; and/or the 
jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes…”39 
Another noticeable case related to the definition of COMI was Bear Stearns.40 
The debtors in question had a similar situation as the debtor in the previous 
case. Their registered offices were in the Cayman Islands, which was the only 
connection that the debtors had in that place. The court found that the only 
business done in the Cayman Islands was limited to keep those companies 
as registered companies there; moreover, there were no employees and 
managers in the registered place, and all the assets and business activities 
were conducted in the United States. Based on those facts, the presumption, 
which is debtors’ COMI should be the place of the debtor’s registered office, 
could be rebutted. The court held that the proceedings in the Cayman Islands 
could not be recognised as foreign main proceeding, and as there were no 
commercial activities conducted in the registered place, so the proceedings 
also could be recognised as non-main proceeding.  
In the decision, the judgment made it clear that the reasoning in SPhinX was 
incorrect. It stated that courts must make an independent decision as to 
whether the foreign proceeding meets the definitions under Chapter 15, and 
the reasoning that the court gave in the first case was not made based on the 
                                                             
38 Daniel M. Glosband, ‘SPhinX Chapter 15 Opinion Misses the Mark’ (2007) 25 
American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 83. 
39 In Re SPhinX, Ltd 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr, SD N.Y. 2006), para 112. 
40 In Re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd 
(2007) 374 BR 122 and affirmed (2008) 389 BR 325. 
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specific articles of the law.41 However, the judge agreed and cited the same 
factors that should be considered for deciding COMI for SPhinX.42 
Another important point is that the US court considered the decision of 
Eurofoods case under the European Regulation. The US judges agreed with 
the European approach that the presumption is rebuttable when the debtor’s 
registered place is offshore islands, and no material business activities were 
conducted in such a location.43  
Although the US courts considered the reasoning of the European case, it 
does not mean the function of COMI is the same under the two regimes. Look 
Chan Ho stated in his article: “especially given that COMI is not a defined term 
and is thus capable of a spectrum of interpretations, its true meaning is to be 
determined by reference to the purpose and context of the legislation in 
question”.44 Under the European regulation, identifying the location of COMI 
seems more important. The Regulation states the COMI had to be identified 
by reference to criteria that were objective and ascertainable by third parties, 
and the objective of it is to provide certainty and foreseeability for company 
creditors.45 Moreover, the certainty and foreseeability of the COMI could be 
essential for the application EC regulation, because the member state where 
the COMI is located has the jurisdiction to open the insolvency proceedings, 
and the law of that member state will be applied.46 The judgment of such 
proceedings will be automatically recognised in all member states.47 Hence, 
with all of these following effects tied up with the location of the COMI, it is 
necessary to ensure the certainty. From the point of view of creditor protection, 
                                                             
41 ibid, para 131-133. 
42 ibid, para 128. 
43 ibid, para 129-130; see also Look Chan Ho, ‘Proving COMI: Seeking Recognition 
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creditors need to be able to foresee the insolvency risks associated with a 
debtor, and the possible jurisdictions that may govern the insolvency risks. 
Hence, because of the important function of the COMI, it is reasonable that 
the European courts gave the presumption significant weight. It also should 
be noted that the EC regulation was designed to work within the European 
Union, which is a closely united political and economic community, so it has 
conditions and a legal environment to ensure its application. 
Under the Model Law, the role of the COMI is to determine the nature of the 
foreign insolvency proceedings when seeking recognition, and the concept 
has no effects on deciding which jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings 
or choice-of-law rules. The rationale behind the law is to focus on the 
recognition and assistance for foreign insolvency proceedings, not to decide 
the appropriate jurisdiction to open insolvency proceeding. For creditors, no 
matter where the COMI is located, the foreign main proceedings will be 
entitled to the same recognition and assistance under the Model Law; 
therefore, the COMI is less significant than in the European Regulation. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the Model Law has provided a modest way to solve 
international insolvency, so no matter if a foreign proceeding is recognised as 
the foreign main proceeding or non-main proceeding, the law allows the 
recognising court to make relief in discretion. Therefore, it seems that the law 
allows for flexibility in deciding the COMI. In the Guide to Enactment, it gave 
a clear rationale for the presumption: 
“Article 16 established presumptions that allow the court to expedite the 
evidentiary process; at the same time they do not prevent, in accordance with 
the applicable procedural law, calling for or assessing other evidence if the 
conclusion suggested by the presumption is called into question by the court 
or an interested party.”48 
The method which the US court applied reflects the rationale of the Model Law. 
The registered office does not have special evidentiary value and does not 
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shift the burden of proof;49 thus, if the foreign proceeding is not in the country 
of the registered office, then the foreign representative bears the burden of 
proof on the question of the COMI. If the foreign proceeding is in the country 
of the registered office, and if there is evidence that the COMI might be 
elsewhere, then the foreign representative must prove that the COMI is in the 
same country as the registered office.50 Following this logic, US judges used 
the concept of “the principal place of business” to determine the COMI. The 
notion, which means the place where the central management directs, 
manages and coordinates the company’s commercial activities, 51  is 
consistent with the factors listed in the Bear Stearns case. Therefore, the 
judges should make a comprehensive decision based on all the relevant 
evidence.  
In conclusion, the development of the US approach in deciding the COMI 
location seems an appropriate interpretation of COMI under the Model Law. 
One piece of evidence is that such an approach has also been recognised by 
the European system. The new recast provides a comprehensive assessment 
of all relevant factors which should be made to rebut the COMI presumption.52 
The flexible and comprehensive test is more applicable for jurisdictions with 
different legal systems. Therefore, the US approach may be a good reference 
for other countries that have adopted or are preparing to adopt the Model Law.  
3.3.3 The Recognition and Relief 
After the submission of a petition and the information required to seek 
recognition, the recognising court can grant provisional interim relief based on 
Article 17 of the Model Law, if foreign debtors can show that such “relief is 
urgently needed to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the 
                                                             
49 Re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd (2006) 349 BR 629 at 635; see also Gerard 
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50 ibid. 
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creditors”.53 Then, the court should take sufficient time to decide whether the 
application qualifies for recognition as a main or non-main proceeding at the 
earliest possible time.54However, under the Model Law, it is important to notice 
that there are no automatic effects until the recognition has been granted. 
Certain automatic reliefs for main proceedings are followed by recognition 
under article 20, which includes the rule that no proceedings to execute upon 
the assets of the debtor may be brought, and any proceedings underway will 
be suspended, and the right to transfer or to encumber any assets of the 
debtor will be suspended, unless such action actually corresponds to the 
normal business operation of the company. Furthermore, the decisions of 
granting reliefs for non-main proceedings are entirely discretionary. 
Additionally, for both main and non-main proceedings, the recognising court 
can also grant additional relief at their discretion, such as extending the stay 
of proceedings or appointing the foreign representative to administer the local 
assets.55 
Therefore, regarding available relief, the Model Law gives recognising 
countries more space to consider the real circumstances of the individual case, 
then reach appropriate decisions. 56  More importantly, the flexibility also 
provides a condition that foreign representative and the local court can 
conduct cooperative methods wherever possible.57 For instance, if the local 
court entrusts the representative for the local assets, there is more possibility 
of conducting an international reorganization or deal with the debtor’s assets 
as an entirety, and the solution will be better for both debtor and creditors. 
Those articles of granting relief give courts a great level of freedom to tailor 
appropriate relief to ensure the interests of both creditors and debtors are best 
met.  
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3.3.4 Safeguards under the Model Law 
In order to protect national sovereignty, the Model Law contains some 
provisions which can be treated as safety exceptions, or ‘concessions’, as 
described by Mohan.58 Some of those articles can be a double-edged sword; 
they can promote the adoption of the Model Law globally, but also may 
undermine the intended objectives of the law if countries overuse them.59  
Article 1(2) of the Model Law permits a State to exclude certain entities from 
the operation of the Model Law, such as a bank or insurance company that 
may be subject to a “special insolvency regime”. The reasons for the exclusion 
of such entities is that their insolvency may require protection of interests of a 
large number of individuals, and insolvency of financial institutions requires 
particularly prompt and circumspect actions.60 However, it is advisable to 
adopt some features of the Model Law to be applicable to specially regulated 
insolvency proceedings, such as the cooperation and discretionary relief 
sections.61 It has been pointed out that since the objective of the Model Law 
is to facilitate cross-border insolvency problems that may relate to assets in 
various jurisdictions, such exclusions should be limited.62 The divergence in 
adopting this article may cause confusion in practice. For example, a financial 
institution’s insolvency proceedings could be recognised under the Model Law 
system in some jurisdictions, but not in other jurisdictions which choose to 
exclude all financial institutions from the operation of the Model Law. Such a 
situation is in conflict with the efficiency objective of the system.  
Article 3 is about the preservation of the right of a State to honour its treaty or 
other agreement obligations should there be a conflict between the treaty and 
the Model Law. It expresses the principle of the supremacy of international 
treaty obligations of a state. For instance, under the British Model Law, the 
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Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, it states that when the application 
of the Model Law is in conflict with the UK’s obligations under the European 
Insolvency Regulation, the EU law will prevail.63 
Article 6 emphasises the public policy exception, which provides a state’s 
courts may refuse to “take action governed by this Law if the action would be 
manifestly contrary to the public policy” of the State.64 The article is necessary 
for enacting countries even if they have their own exceptional provisions in 
their private international laws because the international public policy 
provision is usually wider than domestic ones, and mostly focuses on issues 
regarding cross-border cooperation.65 Thus, when enacting countries adopt 
the international articles, it could provide a better environment for cooperation 
for international issues. The Model Law does not define “public policy” as “the 
notion of public policy is grounded in national law and may differ from State to 
State”.66  
3.3.5 Cooperation 
Another feature that should be noticed is the provisions about cooperation 
among recognising courts, foreign courts and representatives. The 
cooperation and coordination principle is reflected primarily in articles 25-27. 
Article 25 clearly states that the courts should cooperate to the maximum 
extent possible with foreign courts or their representatives. Cooperation 
among involved parties to a cross-border insolvency proceeding is 
indispensable to the law’s effectiveness; therefore, the Model Law applies 
strict and non-precatory language, which imposes mandated duty to the courts. 
67  It further provides that the court is entitled to communicate directly with or 
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to request information or assistance directly from, a foreign court or foreign 
representatives. Such entitlement avoids traditionally time-consuming 
procedures when gaining information from foreign courts, such as through 
higher courts or diplomatic channels. Nevertheless, the law gives discretion 
to local courts to interpret “the maximum extent”. Allowing domestic courts to 
determine the degree of cooperation can be seen as another flexibility of the 
Model Law. The advantage can be shown in a case which may involve two 
countries respectively adopting a common law system and a civil law system.  
For the common law country, the actions of cooperation may include 
communication with the foreign courts directly; in contrast, the actions of the 
court in the civil law country will be limited to the local law. Therefore, no 
uniform requirement on the ways of cooperation may be effective; so the 
freedom can give recognising courts more space to decide their methods of 
cooperation based on domestic regulation, and achieve real maximisation of 
efficiency.  
The UNCITRAL Guide suggests that authorisation of direct communication is 
necessary to avoid the need for procedural formalities that might otherwise 
cause delay. Such a development might be difficult to be accommodated by 
some legal systems because of the ingrained opinion that direct 
communication might undermine the principle that courts in one jurisdiction 
should not interfere in, or seek to influence, decision-making which properly 
belongs to the courts of another.68 For this matter, the courts should always 
have a clear awareness of the judicial functions they need to fulfil; so, as long 
as the communication is conducted applying certain safeguards, there is no 
reason to refuse such direct communication. As a matter of fact, the principle 
of direct communication has been well-established and recognised in legal 
circles, and the Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communication in 
Cross-border Cases, published by the American Law Institute, is a good 
example. 69  The guidelines have been discussed and debated widely on 
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different occasions, and some scholars think they should be applied worldwide 
for cross-border cases.70  
Under the interpretation of the law, UNCITRAL has also provided some 
guidelines on this matter. Firstly, the communication should be conducted 
carefully in order to protect the substantive and procedural rights of the parties, 
and advanced notices should be given to involved parties. Then, there are 
various forms of information which could be communicated using various 
means of communication.71 Additionally, there could be considerable benefits 
for persons involved, if necessary. According to UNCITRAL’s note, a common 
limitation on cooperation between judges from different courts in international 
insolvency cases derives from the lack of a legislative framework, or 
uncertainty, regarding the scope of the existing legislative authority for the 
pursuit of cooperation with foreign courts. The Model law, to some degree, 
could fill the gap found in many domestic laws by clearly giving the court the 
power to extend the cooperation within the areas governed by the Model Law, 
and to communicate directly with foreign parties.72 
3.3.6 Comparison with the European Insolvency Regulation 
The EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, which was entered into force 
on 31 May 2002, is a comprehensive instrument for solving cross-border 
insolvency problems among the member states of the European Union.  The 
historical reason to draft the regulation was that there was no complete and 
ideal treaty on insolvency proceedings to provide enough legal protection for 
insolvent persons and businesses within the internal European market. With 
the rapid development of the European Community, more and more business 
activities have cross-border effects, and it needs a community-level law to 
govern the insolvency proceedings of such business activities.73  In order to 
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achieve the aim of establishing an area of freedom, security and justice, the 
European Union needs a unified insolvency regulation to promote an efficient 
and effective system concerning the mutual recognition of insolvency 
proceedings opened in individual member states. 74   As the two most 
important international regimes regulating international insolvency, there is 
some common ground between the Model Law and European regulations. 
Although the interpretation and application of those ideas could be different 
under the two systems, the aims are the same. 
Both seem to embrace the concept that a fair and effective cross-border 
insolvency regime requires a certain degree of unified procedural rules and 
maximum cooperation, and the idea that one main insolvency proceeding 
plays the main role, with restricted territorial proceedings, has been accepted 
by both systems. Thus, they have both adopted an approach of “modified 
universalism”. 75  However, not surprisingly, since the EC regulation is for 
regional use, the law directly has been adopted by all the Member States 
without any differences in its enactment, while the Model law had to 
incorporate a more flexible regime for a wider circle of countries. It has been 
said that the Model law is less ambitious and more modest than the EC 
Regulation since it leaves more room for the individual states to change the 
original law based on domestic situations,76 and this may compromise the 
intended objectives of the law.  Specifically, one of the main differences is 
that the Model law does not provide clear choice-of-law rules, and the 
individual nation needs to apply its own private international law, whereas 
under the EC regulation, the law of the Member State opening the main 
proceeding will be automatically applied.  In addition, the decisions of the 
main proceeding will be effective in all the Member States, recognition is 
automatic, and the powers of the representative confirmed by the opening 
                                                             
Wessels, European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: An Introductory 
Analysis (American Bankruptcy Institute, 2007), 4-7. 
74 Opinion of A.G. Bobek in ENEFI v DGRFP (C-212/15)) EU:C:2016:841: [2017] 
I.L.Pr. 10; see Gerard McCormack and Hamish Anderson (n 20), 535. 
75 See note 19. 
76 Gerard McCormack (n 21), 140; Irit Mevorach (n 35), 523 
75 
 
court will be recognised by all other Member States.77 Therefore, the system, 
which includes one main proceeding, one law and automatic recognition, 
seems more comprehensive for accomplishing the unitary goal of insolvency. 
One main reason for the significant differences between the two systems is 
the different performance stages. The Member States of the European Union 
have the agreement and intention to build a unified area, which means that 
the political integration of Europe makes the application of uniform rules 
possible. For the Model law, the enacting jurisdiction could be all the member 
of the United Nations, which with various legal systems and national ideology; 
thus, flexibility could be the only way to make the law acceptable by them. On 
the other hand, although the rationales of the two regimes could be the same, 
the focuses are different. The EIR proposes a regime which concentrates on 
the ascertainment of jurisdiction by the court opening insolvency proceedings, 
which is achieved through unified rules.78 The Model law’s framework pays 
more attention to improving the efficiency of the recognition in other 
jurisdictions of insolvency proceedings by regulating the recognition 
procedures, and assistance from foreign courts.79   
Nevertheless, there are more similarities in the details of the two regimes. 
Both the regimes have applied the concepts of “centre of main interests” and 
“establishment”. As a matter of fact, the Model Law borrowed these concepts 
from the EC Regulation.80 The EC Regulation states that the opening court 
should open main proceedings only if the company’s COMI is located in that 
Member State.81  Otherwise, if the company only has an establishment in 
that jurisdiction which can be defined as a physical place of business, the court 
can only open secondary proceeding, which will be limited to the assets 
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located in that state, and may only be liquidation proceedings.82 Under the 
Model law, as aforementioned, the recognition of main and non-main 
proceedings also builds on the same notions.83 Therefore, the application of 
those ideas under both laws follows the model of modified universalism.  
Furthermore, both systems include an exception article which allows countries 
to deny recognition or relief if granting it will be contrary to their public policy. 
As international regimes, this could be a further “safety valve” when 
determining whether or not to grant recognition or assistance.84 According to 
the EC Regulation, the recognition of insolvency proceedings from another 
member state can be refused if “such recognition or enforcement would be 
manifestly contrary to that State’s public policy, in particular, its fundamental 
principles or the constitutional rights and liberties of the individual.”85  The 
Model Law had a similar article and pointed out the interpretation should 
consider the international perspective of the law.86 The situation could be 
more complicated under the Model Law since the definitions of “public policy” 
in enacting states could be different due to their legal and political 
backgrounds. It is not possible to standardise the public policy rules and most 
nations are unwilling to give up such a “safety device”.87 Yet, the UNCITRAL 
encourages the policy to be used narrowly.  
Importantly, it seems that the application of the exceptional article should be 
extra narrow under the European regime since the intention is to achieve a 
unified result in all Member States. The European Court of Justice explained 
that the public policy exception was reserved for only exceptional cases, and 
the recognition or enforcement “would be at variance to an unacceptable 
degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought since 
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it infringes a fundamental principle”. 88   Additionally, from the macro 
environment, the European Union is a highly integrated politico-economic 
union, and its single market policy and comprehensive European Union law 
system at certain levels provides stable economic and legal conditions for 
applying a unified insolvency proceeding. No other regional organisations or 
international treaties could provide such a uniform environment. Hence, a 
broad interpretation of the exception article would create a conflict with both 
the objective of the EIR and the development of the European Union itself. 
 
3.4 The Implementation at National Level 
As the Model Law is not a mandatory law, the UNCITRAL had suggested that 
enacting countries should make as few modifications as possible in order to 
achieve harmonisation and certainty. Professor Wessels said the effective 
operation of the Model Law “is heavily dependent upon whether, and in what 
manner, countries choose to enact it”.89 However, some states did not take 
the advice and made significant changes to the original articles of the law, and 
some of the changes could be considered inconsistent with the intended 
objectives of the law. In this part, the analysis will focus on some examples of 
those deviations from the Model Law.  
3.4.1 The Understanding of Relief 
There is no exact definition of “any appropriate relief” in the Model Law or 
other official documents from the Working Group, the application of Article 21 
has caused some debate in practice, which mainly focuses on the scope and 
power of this article. Specifically, one main issue is whether “any appropriate 
relief’ allows the recognising court to grant relief based on the law of the state 
in which the foreign proceeding was opened. On this matter, the courts in the 
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US and the UK have taken different interpretations.  
In Fibria Celulose S/A v Pan Ocean, Co Ltd,90  the UK judges held that 
although the meaning of the article 21(1) is wide, it would not be appropriate 
to allow the recognising court to grant relief based on the law of the state in 
which the foreign proceeding was opened. Pan Ocean was a shipping 
company incorporated under South Korea Law which was in an insolvency 
proceeding opened in South Korea (an enacting state of the Model Law). The 
proceeding was recognised as a foreign main proceeding under CBIR 2006. 
The company had a long-term contract with a Brazilian exporter, Fibria 
Celulose SA, and their contract was governed by English law. The Brazilian 
party sought to terminate the contract based on clause 28, which provided the 
right of termination with immediate effect, with notice in writing for default, 
including insolvency. The administrator of the Korea Company tried to keep 
the contract alive since it was still profitable, and such termination provisions 
could be overridden under the Korean insolvency system. Fibria contended 
that the Korean law was irrelevant here. Therefore, the Korean administrator 
made application to the English court and asked the court to issue an order 
restraining Fibria from relying on clause 28 to terminate the contract, under 
article 21(1) of CBIR to grant ‘any appropriate relief’.  
The problem here was whether the term “any appropriate relief” allows the 
recognising court to grant relief based on the laws of the state which the 
foreign proceeding was opened. The court agreed that the meaning of “any 
appropriate relief” is wide; however, the wide literal meaning does not mean 
that the court should give it a broad interpretation. Morgan J explained that it 
would be odd to think that there existed power for a recognising court to grant 
relief which it would not be able to grant under the laws of the recognising 
court.91 He also pointed out that even if he had such a right, it would not be 
appropriate in this case to apply it since the parties specifically agreed their 
contract should be governed by English law.92 By reviewing relevant reports 
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from the Working Group, judges could not find any exhaustive choice-of-law 
rule under the Model Law. Therefore, the court focused on the wording of 
Article 21 and stated that sub-paragraph (g) restricted the power of 
recognising courts within the laws of its state. 
‘(g) Granting any additional relief that may be available to a British insolvency 
officeholder under the law of Great Britain’93 
The court also referred to US case laws, including cases that were decided 
based on foreign laws, but the judge did not follow the US approach because 
there was no legislative history in the UK, and the Model Law had not been 
implemented identically in those two jurisdictions.94 Thus, the decision was 
reached that “any appropriate relief” would not allow the recognising court to 
go beyond the relief it would grant in relation to domestic insolvency law. 
The judgment of the UK case claimed that the wording of Article 21(1) (g) 
provides clear limitations regarding “any appropriate relief”. However, it is 
necessary to note the explanation in the Guide to Enactment of the Model law: 
“The court is not restricted unnecessarily in its ability to grant any type of relief 
that is available under the law of the enacting state…The “Under the law of 
the enacting state” reflects the principle underlying the Model Law that 
recognition of a foreign proceeding does not mean extending the effects of the 
foreign proceeding as they may be prescribed by the law of the foreign state. 
Instead, recognition of a foreign proceeding entails attaching consequences 
envisaged by the law of the enacting state.”95 
This explanation makes it clear that recognition of foreign proceeding does 
not mean the foreign laws have extraterritorial effect in the enacting country, 
and it also does not restrict the court to applying their own private international 
law to give effect to foreign insolvency laws. There is no clear choice-of-law 
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rule under the Model Law system, and the Working Group intentionally 
adopted a neutral position on choice-of-law matters. Furthermore, Article 2 (1) 
(q) of CBIR, ”reference to the law of Great Britain include a reference to the 
law of either part of Great Britain including its rules of private international law”, 
gives the courts the power to decide the applicable law, which provides the 
statutory source for courts to apply foreign law when it is appropriate.96  
In contrast, the US case, Re Condor Insurance,97 can be a good example to 
show the different approaches applied by the UK and the US courts mentioned 
by Morgen J in the English case. In this case, the debtor was an insurance 
company incorporated under the law of Nevis and was the subject of a 
winding-up order in Nevis in 2007. The United States court recognised the 
proceeding as foreign main proceedings under Chapter 15. The foreign 
representative applied to recover a certain amount of assets belonging to the 
debtor by seeking relief under section 1521 of the bankruptcy code (which is 
Article 21 of the Model Law) since those US-located assets were fraudulently 
transferred to the defendants. The causes of action were all governed by 
Nevis law. The bankruptcy court held that it had no subject-matter jurisdiction 
over the foreign representatives’ action since section 1521 and section 1523 
were intended to exclude all the avoidance powers. However, the court of 
appeal did not agree with the decision and held that although the avoidance 
powers have been excluded by section 1523, the court had the power to apply 
Nevis law based on the “appropriate relief” article under section 1521. The 
court of appeal also made reference to the purpose and structure of the Model 
Law, and affirmed that Chapter 15 did not intend to prevent US courts from 
applying the relevant foreign law when it was appropriate.98   
One of the main reasons for the different interpretations of the Model Law is 
the influence of national law traditions. The UK judgment regarding Article 21 
followed similar opinions of the scope of common law powers under modified 
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universalism mentioned at the end of chapter 2, which emphasised that the 
power to cooperate and assist foreign proceedings should be limited within 
the scope of local laws. The US approach has focused on the international 
origin of the Model Law; additionally, the prior international insolvency law 
section 304 also had a good experience when applying foreign law, and the 
willingness is reflected in the application of chapter 15.99 
The system of discretionary relief is a good example of the flexibility proposed 
by the Model Law. This kind of flexibility requires the courts to consider all the 
circumstances and factors that may influence foreign proceedings in order to 
make the most suitable decisions which are fair to both the creditors and 
debtors. The cautious common law opinions from English judges have been 
treated as a major setback in developing a universalism approach, and 
apparently, it has also limited the flexibility of the Model Law it intended to 
achieve.100      
3.4.2 Reciprocity 
Some may argue the flexibility of the Model Law may compromise its intended 
objectives, and some countries may take the freedom too far and adopt the 
law with many articles altered in order to be more protective.101 One reason 
causing this concern is that several countries have adopted the Model Law 
with reciprocity requirements, although there is no such requirement in the 
original law.102 The intention may be to avoid cooperating with the insolvency 
proceedings from jurisdictions whose judicial systems might not be reliable 
and substantively just, or to restrict the use of the Model Law to foreign 
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proceedings from the jurisdictions that have also adopted the law.103  
The South African approach to reciprocity appears to be the most limited 
because its Insolvency Act applies only to countries that are designated by 
the Minister.104 The condition is that the Minister must be satisfied by the law 
of the foreign proceeding seeking recognition would offer the same treatment 
and assistance to South African proceedings. This act was without practical 
application for a decade, although the country was one of the first few states 
who chose to adopt the Model Law. In Romania, article 18 of their international 
insolvency law stated that foreign proceedings would be recognised only if 
there is a reciprocal arrangement with the foreign country concerned, which 
rules out most other countries.105  
Before New Zealand decided to incorporate the Model Law, the law 
commission suggested that the law should not be applied until its major 
trading partners, especially Asian countries, had chosen to enact it. So, both 
developing and developed nations have similar concerns. 106  It is 
understandable that domestic laws try to protect their own benefits and 
interests, so finding the balance point between international cooperation and 
local protection would be crucial in deciding whether an international regime 
is efficient or not. Adopting reciprocity policy could be the major barrier that 
limits the development of cross-border cooperation in the future. Countries, 
including major emerging markets, seem hesitant and apply a wait-and-see 
attitude towards the Model Law; the trend of the reciprocity requirement may 
have given them an impression that the application of the law is unreliable, 
which would discourage the motivation to reform their cross-border insolvency 
laws.  
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In fact, based on the analysis of the main features above, the Model Law is 
capable of ensuring equality and justice on its own.  Article 6 is a good 
example. Recognition or assistance can be refused based on public policy 
grounds if the foreign proceeding is a breach of natural justice or fairness. 
Another example is that the law specifically stated that certain reliefs might 
only be granted when the local interests are “adequately protected”.107 The 
fact is that most major jurisdictions who adopted the law did not include any 
reciprocity restrictions, which set good examples for other countries, and 
showed their willingness to build a cooperative framework. The US evidently 
stated that “the United States was one of the leading countries opposing the 
inclusion of a reciprocity requirement.” in the Report of the Committee on the 
Judiciary House of Representatives.108 Similarly, the UK Parliament shared 
the same attitude to not imposing any reciprocity requirements in order to send 
encouraging signals to other countries for adoption. 109  The Singapore 
Insolvency Law Review Committee pointed out imposing reciprocity rules 
“would not achieve fully the purpose of having a clear, predictable and 
comprehensive legal framework for managing all cross-border insolvencies” 
when it was considering how to incorporate the Model Law.110  
3.4.3 Exclusionary Rules 
As mentioned above, the “public policy” article provides the safeguard to 
refuse foreign proceedings that violate recognising a state’s fundamental 
interests. Article 6 does not define public policy because the notion could be 
different in national laws. The national laws’ definitions of public policy can 
vary in different states. In a broad sense, it can relate to any mandatory rules 
of domestic laws; in a restricted interpretation, it may be limited to fundamental 
policies, such as constitutional principles. 111   Some have criticised this, 
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claiming that such an article potentially gives states more opportunities to 
avoid recognising foreign proceedings.  Furthermore, the Guide to 
Enactment pointed out that the term “manifestly” is to emphasise public policy 
exceptions, and it should be narrowly interpreted, and only should be applied 
under exceptional circumstances.112  
However, some countries intentionally did not apply the original wording. The 
Romanian court could refuse the recognition if the foreign proceeding infringes 
on “Romanian principles of public order”; similarly, violation of the fundamental 
principles of Mexican law could prohibit the recognition of any foreign 
proceeding under the Mexican Commercial Insolvency Law of 2000. Article 
21(3) of Japanese Law on Recognition and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency 
Proceeding states “contrary to the public order or good public morals in 
Japan”.113 One point is that all those modifications used the term “public 
order”, which is commonly found in domestic private international laws, 
especially in civil law countries, and it refers to exceptions that allow a court 
to refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment on the grounds that such 
judgment conflicts with fundamental policies. 114  One fact also can be 
observed: there is no mention of the word “manifestly” in those examples. It 
would be unfair to say those countries deliberately have the aim of broadening 
the meaning of public policy exception by ruling out the term; for some 
countries, such as Canada, Greece, Serbia and South Korea, the omission of 
the word is just a semantic decision to remove all adjectives and adverbs from 
legislation.115  But it cannot be denied that without the word “manifestly”, 
domestic courts will have more opportunities to manipulate its interpretation. 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that international public policy should 
be restrictively interpreted, and broadly applying public policy exceptions 
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would hamper international cooperation.116  
3.4.4 The Rights of Foreign Representatives 
Articles 9 and 11 of the Model Law give foreign representatives direct access 
to enacting courts and permission to commence proceedings under local 
insolvency laws. However, a number of enacting states made such rights 
conditional upon the recognition of the foreign proceeding. South Korea’s 
Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act requires that foreign proceedings need to 
be recognised first for the foreign representative to commence local 
bankruptcy proceedings, which deviates from the intention of the original 
Article 11. 117  Under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code, a similar 
condition has been applied. It provides that the rights to commence insolvency 
proceedings or bring proceedings in other courts in the US will be granted 
after recognition by US law. 118  Additionally, the US Code adds more 
restrictions under the direct access section. For instance, section 1509 (d) 
forbids other courts in the US from providing comity or cooperation to foreign 
proceedings if the recognition is refused by the bankruptcy court. Such 
requirements make the bankruptcy courts gatekeepers for foreign 
representatives seeking assistance from other courts in the US.119  
The powers of foreign representatives could be more restricted after the 
recognition. The Working Group considered the concern in respect of the 
influence of foreign representatives’ powers on the protection of local creditors; 
hence, Article 21 (2) was introduced as another safeguard, which provides 
that local interests should be “adequately protected” before the courts entrust 
the foreign representative with the distribution of the local assets. Again, it 
could be predicted that the safeguard article had a good chance of being 
manipulated by enacting countries. Japanese law on Recognition of Foreign 
Proceedings put another level of protection on this section, which requires that, 
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where the local assets have been entrusted to a foreign representative, he 
must explicitly ask for approval of the court before turning over the assets to 
the foreign state. The court needs to ensure the local creditors are not unfairly 
prejudiced before granting the approval.120 Such requirement could give the 
court more opportunities to refuse to submit local assets to a foreign court; 
besides, such approval process might not meet the efficiency the Model Law 
required.  
US law implemented Article 21 (2) with a slight modification. Subsection (b) of 
1521 under the US Bankruptcy Code states that after the court recognises the 
foreign proceeding as the main or non-main proceeding, the court may turn 
over the US assets to a foreign representative, “provided that the court is 
satisfied that the interests of the creditor in the United States are sufficiently 
protected.” 121 This change has been criticised as a territorialism section 
which allows the court to provide extra protection to local creditors by adopting 
the word “sufficient”; it also conflicts with the US claims for encouraging 
international cooperation and promote the application of the Model Law.  
The condition is one of the controversial changes that Chapter 15 drafters 
added to the original provisions of the Model Law. Jeremy Leong criticised this 
condition as it jeopardised the universalism essence of the Model Law being 
a universal system to assist insolvency businesses.122   Since the decision 
regarding which forum is allowed to distribute the debtor’s assets affects 
whether and how many individual creditors will receive compensation in the 
distribution, and the priorities of creditors for distribution under different 
national laws could be very different, this provision seems to treat the local 
creditors over the administration of the foreign proceeding. Professor LoPucki 
also pointed out in his article that because of the wide differences in insolvency 
regimes in different jurisdictions, modified universalism may lead to a refusal 
                                                             
120 Act on Recognition of and Assistance for Foreign Insolvency Proceedings, Article 
35 (Japan). 
121 The US Bankruptcy Code, Ch 15, S 1521 (b). 
122 Jeremy Leong, ‘Is Chapter 15 Universalist or Territorialist? Empirical Evidence 
from United States Bankruptcy Court Cases’ (2010) Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 110. 
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to cooperate.123  
However, the change of wording is not as protective as it seems to be, and it 
did not change the intention of the original language of the Model Law. 
According to the explanation regarding the change of wording given by 
Congress, the term “adequate protection” has conceptual baggage in US legal 
history; therefore, the change was to avoid confusion with a much specialised 
legal term in US Bankruptcy history.124 In Re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd,125 
the court discussed the relationship between “sufficient protection” and the 
discretionary relief and stated that “the need to tailor relief and conditions so 
as to balance the relief granted to the foreign representative and the interests 
of those affected by such relief, without unduly favouring one group of 
creditors over another”, 126  which followed the Model Law intention, and 
clarified that the degree of sufficient protection does not mean to overprotect 
certain groups of local creditors. The aim of this provision was introduced to 
avoid seriously and unjustifiably injuring US creditors. In addition, the US court 
applied a cautious attitude when explaining this provision in practice. In Re 
Artimm,127 the court provided that sufficient protection of US creditors under 
1521 (b) involves three factors (connected to the old section 304 (c)):128 
(1) The just treatment of all holders of claims against the bankruptcy estate 
(2) The protection of US claimants against prejudice and inconvenience in 
the processing of claims in a foreign proceeding, 
(3) The distribution of proceeds of the estate substantially in accordance with 
the order prescribed by US law  
                                                             
123 Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist 
Approach’ (1999) CORNELL L.REV. 696, 710. 
124 Ksenia V. Proskurchenko, ‘Chapter 15 Cross-Border Insolvency: Is It True to Its 
Universalism Aspirations?’ (2008) 5 Rutgers Business Law Journal 96. 
125 Re Tri-Continental Exchange, 349 B.R. 627, 634 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006). 
126 ibid, 20; the UNCITRAL Guide, at para 196. 
127 In re Artimm, 335 B.R. at para 159. 
128 The section was about the conditions the court should be consider when decide 
whether to grand relief and assistance. 
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The first and third requirements both aim to emphasise the basic premises of 
the proceeding, which are just treatment and a legal distribution process. Only 
the second factor includes the element of local creditor protection, to 
safeguard against prejudice and inconvenience that the US creditors may face 
in the process of resolving claims in foreign proceedings. The court also 
clearly stated that the US courts should provide fair treatment to all claim 
holders in the insolvency context. Therefore, it could be seen that the US 
courts minimised the protection afforded to local creditors under the provision, 
and it offers much less protection than US creditors would have received in a 
domestic proceeding. This kind of protection has also been built into other 
articles of the Chapter. For example, under section 1507, which is about 
providing additional assistance to a foreign representative, the second 
limitation on the availability of additional assistance is for “protection of claim 
holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the 
proceeding of claims in such foreign proceeding”. This limitation could also be 
interpreted as that if foreign representatives want to get additional help from 
the US courts; they might have to offer US creditors additional protection. 
However, the language of this provision should have the similar intention of 
offering “sufficient protection”, which is to prevent local interests from 
prejudice and injustice in foreign proceedings. Therefore, the change under 
the US regime could be a terminological modification to retain consistency 
with former insolvency rules and avoid potential confusion in its legal history.  
 
To sum up, as a legislative instrument, the Model Law allows alterations for 
incorporating it into domestic law, and it is good for its worldwide acceptance. 
However, it is natural that national laws would protect the interests of local 
citizens and businesses, so it is impossible to ask the national law to eliminate 
all its territorial elements. Based on the examples analysed above, the major 
objectives of those changes are to protect local creditors and interests. Since 
there are still a large number of countries that have not adopted the Model 
Law, those issues seem to have a good possibility of being considered when 
they are ready to reform their cross-border insolvency system. For some 
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countries, especially those who do not have a comprehensive legal system, 
adding certain extra protections for local interests seems necessary. The 
problem left to individual countries to answer is how far the protection could 
go without interfering in international efficiency and cooperation.  Article 8, 
which emphasises the need to promote international uniformity in its 
application when interpreting the law, should always be remembered.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, since it is impossible to unify all domestic insolvency laws and 
a harmonised system is needed, the UNCITRAL Model Law intends to provide 
an instrument for individual jurisdiction to effectively solve cross-border 
insolvency cases. It was necessary, for the law to be acceptable in most 
jurisdictions, to leave some spaces and flexibilities so that domestic courts 
could make their own decisions on certain matters. As long as the decisions 
were made within the guidelines of the Model Law, the outcomes should be 
effective and acceptable for most of the involved parties. As a result, the 
negative influences of the flexibility also should be borne in mind I am in the 
application of the law. One of those influences is the divergent explanations 
of certain concepts of the law. The decision in the Eurofood case has had a 
significant impact on how to find the correct COMI location of an international 
company; however, the more flexible method adopted by the US court in this 
matter could reflect the objective of the Model Law. Taking into consideration 
various elements of the debtor in question would improve the correctness, and 
reflect the true COMI location. Furthermore, the US and the UK courts also 
interpreted “the appropriate relief” in different ways. While the UK court took a 
conservative attitude to limit the courts’ powers within the domestic laws, the 
US courts believe applying foreign law in certain circumstances is necessary 
for multinational matters. From those examples, it can be observed that both 
the UK and the US support the application of the Model law, but the US 
approaches are open-minded, which might be consistent with the objectives 
set up by the UNCITRAL. Also, some jurisdictions might manipulate the 
safeguard articles in order to protect local interests, which would compromise 
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the nature of cooperation; so, with such freedoms allowed by the law, finding 
the balance point between local protections and international cooperation is 
the key for the success of the Model Law. For other jurisdictions that have not 
adopted the Model law, current enacting countries’ versions of the law will be 
their references; however, extra protection rules, as well as such reciprocity 
requirements and exclusive rules, might send the wrong signals and 
undermine the effectiveness of the law. Other countries should believe in the 
Model Law itself has efficient safeguards to avoid unfair situations. The EC 
regulation and the Model Law both adopted modified universalism; however, 
since they have different focuses and natures, mandatory international 
regulation can only work regionally, as in the European Union. Therefore, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, working as a legal instrument under domestic laws, 
could be the appropriate international regime for solving cross-border 
insolvency.  
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Chapter 4 The Chinese Insolvency System and Its Approach 
to Solve Cross-Border Issues 
The essential role of a formal insolvency procedure is to provide a collective 
mechanism for all individual creditors to collect their debt. Without such a 
system, individual creditors would rush to pursue their debts on their own and 
probably cause damage to the value of the debtor’s assets as a whole, which 
might harm their own interests, consequently.1 As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, such an insolvency mechanism should be “effective and efficient”, 
which means it should maximise the value to creditors and ensure equitable 
distribution. Based on this internationally recognised idea, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress passed a new version of the 
corporate insolvency law in 2006, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (“EBL”)2. To 
serve the developing market-oriented economy and the rapid globalisation of 
business trade, the new law includes a ground-breaking article dealing with 
issues of cross-border insolvency. However, the vague and imprecise 
language addressing cross-border insolvency issues could cause 
uncertainties in practice.  
This chapter evaluates the Chinese cross-border insolvency system based on 
discussions of historical and political influences on the new bankruptcy law. 
The first part analyses the cultural and political influences on the bankruptcy 
system in China. Based on those influences, Part 2 briefly reviews the 
development of the Chinese bankruptcy system, focussing on the main 
features of the EBL, 2006. Part 3 considers how the new cross-border 
insolvency law under the new bankruptcy law was formed. Then, Part 4 
focuses on the evaluation of the only article concerning cross-border 
insolvency issues, and its application in practice against the international 
principles and standards in solving international bankruptcy analysed in 
previous Chapters. The final section compares the Chinese system with the 
                                                             
1 Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ 
Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal 857, 861-868. 
2 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China 2006. 
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UNCITRAL Model law to examine possible improvements in the Chinese 
cross-border insolvency system.  
 
4.1 The Cultural and Political Influences  
The concept of bankruptcy or insolvency has never been seriously recognised 
in the Chinese legal system. The traditional cultural thinking -“Son should pay 
the debts of the father” - has been the main solution for generations. The 
notion of bankruptcy or insolvency is always treated as ‘bad luck’ or ‘broken 
fortune’. The traditional Confucianism beliefs have also had a significant 
influence on the development of the insolvency system.3 The Confucianism 
ethic promotes balance and harmony in society; therefore, people believe that 
court intervention should not be necessary until there are no other options.4 
Creditors prefer to rely on friendship and personal relationships with the debtor 
to solve debt issues, rather than forcing someone into involuntary insolvency. 
Cultural thinking leads to low regard in judicial solutions for insolvency, which 
could be one of the fundamental reasons why the development of a Chinese 
insolvency system has been so slow.5  
Apart from cultural reasons, historical influences play a substantial role in the 
Chinese insolvency system. Following feudal times, the first official document 
regulating bankruptcy issues, called the Provisional Statute Governing the 
Liquidation of Merchants’ Debt, was published by the old Chinese 
government.6 The system of regulation was modelled after Japanese and 
                                                             
3 Pauline Ma, ‘A New Chinese Bankruptcy System: Made for Business or for the 
State?’ (2000) 11 Austl. J. Corp. L. 192, 205; Traditional Chinese thinking is based 
on Confucian beliefs. Confucius philosophy was developed based on four elements: 
humanity, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, and its purpose is to build a 
harmonious society. See more detailed discussion: Tim Ambler, Morgen Witzel and 
Chao Xi, Doing Business in China (4th edn, Routledge 2017). 
4 ibid. 
5  Pauline Ma (n 3), 206; Nathalie Martin, ‘The Role of History and Culture in 
Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ 
(2005) 28 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 1, 72. 
6 The old government means the government of The Republic of China (1925-1948), 
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German bankruptcy laws, and there was very little evidence for the application 
or effect of the law. 7  After the communist party established the new 
government, all the laws passed by the previous government were abolished, 
and all private enterprises became state-owned. For a long period, the state-
planned economy system restricted the existence of an insolvency law 
because it was difficult to place a state-owned enterprise (SOE) into 
insolvency, as this would be treated as a failure of the government.8 More 
importantly, the stability of SOEs is connected with public and social stability. 
Therefore, to analyse the development of the Chinese insolvency system, it is 
important to examine the role of SOEs in the Chinese economy first.     
4.1.1 The Role of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the communist 
party moved quickly to take control of real property, banking, industry, and 
commerce; during this process, private property was seized, and major 
factories and enterprises were nationalised or shut down.9 The reason that 
the central government did this was to reorganise the limited amount of social 
recourses after a long period of war, and to start nation-rebuilding tasks as 
soon as possible.10 As a result, all commercial businesses and industries 
came under the ownership and control of the central government as state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), which became the backbone of the Chinese 
economy.11 During that time, SOEs played a dominant role in the Chinese 
economy, producing 80% of the national income for the manufacturing 
industry, with almost 70% of all industrial employees being hired by those 
enterprises.12 There was no competition pressure or requirements for SOEs 
                                                             
which was controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guo Min Dang 国民党).  
7 Leslie A. Burton, ‘An Overview of Insolvency Proceedings in China’ (2000) 6 Annual 
Survey of International & Comparative Law 113, 118. 
8 Nathalie Martin (n 5), 73. 
9 Ravi Bendapudi, ‘People’s Republic of China Bankruptcy Law’ (2008) 6 Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law 205. 
10 Fan Gang and Nicholas C. Hope, ‘The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the 
Chinese Economy,’ China-US 2022 (2013), Chapter 16, 7. 
11 Ravi Bendapudi (n 9). 
12 NR Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington DC, Brookings, 
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to produce commercial profits; their only task was to meet planned production 
goals set by the central government.13 SOEs could hardly go bankrupt under 
such a system. The political intention behind the idea of being without a 
bankruptcy system was to show “an attribute that made a socialist economy 
superior to its capitalist counterpart”.14 ‘However, many SOEs suffered from 
enormous economic and social burdens, and this was one of the main reasons 
why the central government conducted economic reform in the 1980s.The 
reform partly opened up China’s market by eliminating certain socialist 
characteristics, and started the marketisation process of SOEs. While the core 
strategic industries, such as oil, electricity, and banking, were still tightly 
controlled by the central government, other industries were gradually or 
partially opened to private entrepreneurs and investors. In particular, the 
reform incorporated profit-oriented motive and corporate autonomy into 
Chinese SOEs, which provided the basis of the system for its significant 
economic growth after 1978.15 
Even when there were a few industrial SOEs liquidated during 1990s, the 
government had tight control over the whole proceedings. It means that the 
limited number of bankruptcy cases during the planned economy period had 
mainly been solved through administrative orders, instead of adhering to legal 
legislation. Because of the political intervention, the number of SOEs entering 
into bankruptcy proceedings is extremely small compared with the number of 
SOEs that were actually insolvent during that period in time.16  
                                                             
1998) 25. 
13 Weijing Wu, ‘Commencement of Bankruptcy Proceedings in China: Key Issues in 
the Proposed New Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reorganisation Law’ (2004) 35 
VUWLR 240. 
14 ibid, 243. 
15 Jewellord Nem Singh and Geoffrey C. Chen, ‘State-Owned Enterprises and the 
Political Economy of State-State Relations in the Developing World’ (2017) Third 
World Quarterly <https://doi.org/10.108/01436597.2017.1333888> accessed 25 
September 2017. 
16 Lan Cao, ‘The Cat that Catches Mice: China’s Challenge to the Dominant Private 
Model’ (1995) 21 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 97, 172-173. 
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Table 1: State Sector Employment as a Share of Total Urban 
Employment 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007, 2010, 2016) 
Maintaining social stability was one of the main reasons to have tight control 
of the number of insolvencies among SOEs. “Social stability overwhelms 
everything else” was and probably still is a frequently voiced quote in Chinese 
political life.17 Because of the dominant position of SOEs in Chinese society, 
they are the major employers for the urban population; from the 1950s to 
1970s, around 80% of urban employment was offered by SOEs.18 According 
to Table 1, it can be seen that the situation of SOEs as main urban employers 
                                                             
17 ibid, 243. 
18  Xiangfeng Liu, ‘Response of SOEs (Stated-Owned Enterprises) to Economic 
Liberalisation in China’ (2006) V.R.F. Series No.415 
<http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Vrf/pdf/415.pdf> accessed 12 July 
2016. 
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Year 
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Employment 
(% of total 
urban 
employment) 
 
1978 78.3 1997 53.1 2007 21 
1980 76.2 1998 41.9 2008 20.1 
1985 70.2 1999 38.2 2009 19.3 
1990 60.7 2000 35.0 2010 18.8 
1991 61.1 2001 31.9 2011 18.7 
1992 61.0 2002 28.9 2012 18.4 
1993 59.8 2003 26.8 2013 16.6 
1994 60.1 2004 25.3 2014 16.1 
1995 59.1 2005 23.7 2015 15.4 
1996 56.4 2006 22.7   
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did not change until the late 1990s. Therefore, in addition to their main function 
of rebuilding the national economy, Chinese SOEs have been playing a vital 
role in providing a livelihood for the Chinese population.19 Since there was no 
mature and separate social welfare system, for a period, working for SOEs 
was connected with social benefits including housing, medical care, pension 
and education services.20 Under the socialist system, such a situation was 
called the “iron rice bowl”, which meant guaranteed employment with free 
benefits.21 The government did not establish national pension and healthcare 
systems until the late 1990s; and during the same period, the SOEs provided 
75% of urban housing and medical service for over 1/5 of the Chinese 
population.22 Under such circumstances, the bankruptcy of SOEs was more 
about how to take care of unemployed workers and deal with other social 
issues connected with the bankruptcy, so it was more political than legal. The 
government’s big concern was that an unemployed and unprotected labour 
force might lead to strong political disaffection should the SOEs go into 
bankruptcy.23  Hence, the government was extra careful when developing 
bankruptcy progress, and only allowed a small number of troubled SOEs to 
enter bankruptcy proceedings.24 
Furthermore, another fact about Chinese SOEs during that time was there 
was a considerable amount of debt owed among different state enterprises 
since their businesses were traded on credit within connected enterprises.25 
So, the concern was that liquidation of one SOE would cause its creditor SOEs 
                                                             
19 Fan Gang and Nicholas C. Hope (n 10), 2. 
20 Ronald Winston Harmer, ‘Insolvency Law and Reform in the People’s Republic of 
China’ (1996) 64 (6) Fordham Law Review 2563. 
21 Hui He, Feng Huang, Zheng Liu and Dongming Zhu, ‘Breaking the “Iron Rice Bowl" 
and Precautionary Savings: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises 
Reform’ (2014) Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper Series, 2014-
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22 World Bank, Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China: a Case and Agenda for 
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23 ibid, 35. 
24 ibid, 35-36. 
25 Ronald Winston Harmer (n 20), 2582-2583. 
97 
 
to become insolvent as well, which would be disastrous for the Chinese 
economic system.26 The domino effect would also influence State-owned 
banks, which could be major creditors of many SOEs. The loans issued by 
banks in this period were usually based on compulsion from state orders 
rather than commercial operations, and the potential for enforcement was 
limited. 27  Since the debt would be written off by the government, the 
irrecoverable loans would cut down the assets of banks. It is estimated that 
one-fifth of state-owned banks’ assets would disappear if all insolvent SOEs 
entered into bankruptcy proceedings.28  
4.1.2 The Role of Government in Insolvency Cases 
The government interference in legal issues is another important feature in 
China. The notion is that government is the administrator of the socialist 
market economy, so it has the right to control and guide its development.29 
Traditionally, the government would have three different roles in the case of 
corporate insolvency.30 Firstly, the government is a public administrator for 
general social activities. So its job is to coordinate the proceedings, and 
provide assistance that the courts require. The second role is as a participant 
in business activities. For instance, the government could be the major 
creditor of insolvent companies, or the actual manager of state-owned 
corporations. If those companies started insolvency proceeding, the 
government would have advantages in control of the whole proceedings, 
which could occasionally impair the role of the courts. 31  Lastly, the 
government could become the actual controller of the whole proceedings by 
                                                             
26 ibid. 
27 NR Lardy (n 12), 83. 
28 Shirley S Cho, ‘Continuing Economic Reform in the People’s Republic of China: 
Bankruptcy Legislation Leads the Way’ (1994) 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 739.  
29 Jianxin Huang and Feng Ding, ‘The Research on the Role of Government in 
Insolvency Proceedings’ (Tai Zhou Court Report 2016) 
<http://www.tzcourt.gov.cn/e/action/ShowInfo.php?classid=64&id=3108> accessed 
20 September 2017. 
30  ibid, see also Feiyue Shan and Daifu Lu, The Necessary of Government 
Intervention: The Discussion based on Economic Laws (Law Press 2005). 
31 Jianxin Huang and Feng Ding (n 29). 
98 
 
using its administrative power, and thus replace the courts. This might occur 
if the insolvent company is a big-scale business with a large number of 
employees and economic or social influences. The government wants to solve 
the insolvency as quickly as possible to protect employees’ interests and 
reduce the negative influence in the market.32 In practice, the government 
plays two, or even all three, roles in an insolvency proceeding, and the high 
level of interference in the legal proceeding reflects the long history of the 
government-planned economy in Chinese history.33 During the period of the 
planned economy, both the Chinese legal system and the market system were 
just starting to develop, so the reality required the government to be part of 
the market regulation process.34 Even today, since government-controlled 
investment or capital still play a very important role in the Chinese economy, 
it is difficult to expect that the government would give the court complete 
control of the insolvency proceedings. This is another main reason that the 
development of the Chinese insolvency system has been slow.35 
 To sum up, there are two main justifications for government interference in 
legal proceedings. Firstly, the development of the Chinese market economy 
needs direction and guidance from the government, and this is necessary to 
maintain the well-being of the market environment. Secondly, fostering a 
socialist society is the main purpose of the government, and the essence of 
such a society is harmonisation.36 So the role of the government is to find 
solutions that will protect public interests. For those reasons, the theory of 
government intervention was developed and has played an important role in 
making the laws for the economy. The basic idea of the theory is to keep the 
balance of supply and demand through government intervention, and the non-
                                                             
32 ibid. 
33  Dongxia Huang, ‘The Analysis of the Relationship between Socialist Market 
Economy and Legal Culture’ (2004) 9 Information Review 149. 
34 ibid. 
35 Weiwen Yang, Feitao Jiang and Mingqing Li, ‘Government Behaviours and Roles 
in Corporate Insolvency’ (2001) Journal of Central South University of Technology 50 
36 Xiaoping Jin, ‘The Study on the Role of Local Government in Corporate Insolvency’ 
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market-driven balance is necessary for developing a healthy economy.37 It is 
clear that the Chinese insolvency law and its application in practice could be 
a good example of the influence of the theory.  
It should be noted that the balance does not mean that the government would 
make all the insolvent companies disappear as soon as possible. In some 
cases, the intervention of government might help some companies get a 
second chance. For example, the business of the insolvent company may be 
related to some government projects or in the industry that the local 
government is trying to encourage, and the government would be willing to 
rescue such companies with flexible standards. Since their financial difficulties 
and bad loans make it impossible to get any help from financial institutions, 
the government would persuade local banks or new investors to help.  
 
4.2 The Overview of Chinese Insolvency System  
4.2.1 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and Other Relevant Regulations  
The communist government did not produce its first formal corporate 
bankruptcy law until the early 1980s, during the period of China’s transition 
from a government-planned economy to a market-oriented economy, which 
led to the approval of 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. 38  This law was 
designed with the specific purpose of only applying to SOEs, and it was 
officially implemented in 1988 after the reform of the state-owned enterprise 
sector. The process of making the Chinese first bankruptcy law caused one of 
the most furious debates in Chinese legislative history.39 Overall, excessive 
regulations and state intervention were the two major features of the first 
                                                             
37  Changlin Li and Maoqin Huang, ‘The Spatiality of Economic Law’ (2002) 24 
Modern Law Science 3. 
38  The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China (trial 
Implementation), 1986. 
39 Donald C Clarke, ‘What’s Law Got to Do with It? Legal Institutions and Economic 
Reform in China’ (1991) 20 UCLA PAC Basin LJ 51. 
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bankruptcy law in China.40 
Under this law, an SOE could only apply for insolvency with the approval of 
the government,41 and it was impossible for certain enterprises that had a 
close connection with the national economy and public interests to enter into 
insolvency proceeding. 42  The most important positive effect of the 1986 
Bankruptcy law was to bring in the necessary changes in attitude towards 
corporate insolvency among Chinese SOEs.43 Such changes were deemed 
to be essential to create a socialist market economy. Heavy social obligations 
and a lack of commercial basis made it difficult for them to achieve 
profitability.44 SOEs with poor financial performance had gradually become a 
huge burden on the government as the government and state banks always 
had to be responsible for their debts. The introduction of the bankruptcy law 
made the SOEs realise that insolvency could be possible, and the underlying 
aim was to encourage SOEs to be more productive and self-sufficient.45 Also, 
by forcing the SOEs to be more responsible for their debts, the law 
encouraged mergers and takeovers among SOEs, which facilitated the 
modernisation of the Chinese market. 
However, although the government had realised that bankruptcy reform was 
relevant to the entire economic system, social stability and political concerns 
were still the top priorities.46 So, the adoption of the law was more for symbolic 
reasons rather than its power to solve economic or legal issues. 47  Its 
                                                             
40 ibid; Rebecca Parry and Haizheng Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws, 
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41 Article 17, The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 1986 (China). 
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language and application were mainly focused on political objectives, and not 
on fairness and efficiency.48 For this reason, there were very few situations 
that allowed an SOE to apply for insolvency proceedings under that law. Even 
if an insolvency proceeding was permitted, the government would usually 
place the employees at the top of the creditors’ priority ranking for purposes 
of social stability; as a result, some major creditors with security, such as 
banks, could only recover a small number of their claims.  
Apart from the 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the issues of private 
corporate bankruptcy were regulated in other commercial or civil laws over 
this period. The Code of Civil Procedure Law was passed in 1991,49 and 
Chapter 19 regulates the procedure for bankruptcy repayment of enterprises 
as legal persons; the aim was to provide some private sector bankruptcy 
legislation, and to remedy the lack of coverage for non-SOEs under the 1986 
Bankruptcy law. However, the Chapter contains only seven brief articles that 
could not solve specific issues. Because of the restricted development of non-
state-owned businesses during that time, the application of Chapter 19 was 
limited.  
Another type of bankruptcy regulations should be mentioned; those created 
as provincial laws. Regulation concerning bankruptcy was made for the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.50 This regulation reflected some features 
of a modern bankruptcy law system, stating that the purpose of the regulation 
is to protect the market economy in the economic zone.51 Other relevant 
regulations and administrative documents related to bankruptcy issues 
offered some general explanations, but political statements were also included, 
emphasising the dominating position of state-owned enterprises, and making 
                                                             
48 John J Rapisardi and Binghao Zhao, ‘A Legal Analysis and Practical Application 
of the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law’ (2010) 11 Bus. L. Int'l 49. 
49  Chapter 19 Procedure for Bankruptcy and Debt Repayment of Legal Person 
Enterprises, Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 1991. 
50 Shenzhen was the first Special Economic Zone of China following the “opening 
up” policy, which established to attract foreign investment and multinational 
companies.  
51  Article 1, Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Enterprise 
Bankruptcy 1993 (Repealed in 2012). 
102 
 
sure political objectives came first in solving bankruptcy. For example, State 
Council Directive 1994 required that the priority in a case of enterprise 
bankruptcy was to “resettle the employees to maintain order and stability in 
the society”.52  
Figure 1: Corporate Bankruptcy Cases Heard by PRC courts 
                                                                                    
(Source: The World Bank 2000) 
To sum up, the bankruptcy system during this period included one primary law 
for state-owned businesses, the 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, with other 
policy documents that regulated the application of the law; other minor laws 
directed other types of bankruptcy. All those laws were very diverse and could 
not form a unified system for solving bankruptcy, with political objectives being 
the main cause of the situation. With the significant discretion of the authorities 
in the bankruptcy process, it can be observed from the chart that there were 
only a few filed corporate bankruptcy cases between 1989 and 1993, which 
amounts to around 277 cases per year, based on the research from the World 
Bank.53 Although the bankruptcy system was flawed during that time, the 
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53 The World Bank, Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China: a Case and Agenda 
for Reforming the Insolvency System. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/e 
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number of corporate bankruptcy cases increased rapidly in 1996-1997, to 
around 5000 cases per year.  
Moreover, there were no provisions in that law to address the insolvency 
issues with foreign elements. The legal development of insolvency provisions 
for foreign-related businesses originated in some province-level regulations. 
At that time, most of those regulations were more about the permitted 
business models that the private or foreign enterprises could use, or the 
conditions for starting such businesses, which were too ambiguous to deal 
with specific foreign insolvency proceedings.  
4.2.2 The Development of the New Law  
Under the tight control of the government, SOEs were not independent 
economic entities but more like production units owned by the state.54 To 
facilitate further development of the market economy and globalisation, the 
Chinese government conducted the corporatisation of State-owned 
Enterprises in the 1990s. In essence, the process made the state become the 
sole shareholder, and private investors were allowed to invest in certain 
industries. 55  Most companies transferred to corporations with an 
independent legal personality through this process; consequently, the 
Bankruptcy Law 1986 was no longer applicable after the transition. Moreover, 
due to the reduced restrictions and encouragement policies on private 
enterprises, the Chinese private sector had expanded considerably since the 
1990s. The private sector started to develop during the 1980s, and by 2005, 
before the new bankruptcy law was introduced, the number of private 
                                                             
n/2000/09/14451105/bankruptcy-state-enterprises-china-case-agenda-reforming-
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Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006. 
54 Rebecca Parry and Haizheng Zhang (n 40), 115; Jiangyu Wang, ‘The Political 
Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-owned Enterprises’ (2014) 47 
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55 Lilian Miles and Zhong Zhang, ‘Improving Corporate Governance in State-Owned 
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enterprises accounted for 61% of a total number of registered enterprises.56 
The major banks, as the important financers for most private enterprises, 
required a more effective corporate insolvency system to protect their interests. 
Apart from those internal developments, economic and political pressures 
from other countries also pushed the reform in the area of commercial law. 
Foreign investment had significantly increased in both public and private areas 
since the 1990s, as shown in figure 2. One example of political pressure was 
from the World Trade Organisation. During the negotiation for joining the 
organisation, many member states indicated their concerns about the Chinese 
economic model and the commercial law system, and refused to recognise 
China as having market economy status. 57  In light of both internal and 
external pressures, reform of the bankruptcy regime to govern all different 
types of corporations, and reflect the global developments, was unavoidable.  
Figure 2: FDI Inflow in China from 1984-2004 
     
                                                                  
(Source: China Ministry of Commerce)                
                                                             
56 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, Main Data 
Report of the First Economic Census (2005) <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/jjpcgb/ 
/qgjpgb/201407/t20140731_590160.html > assessed 21 September 2017. 
57 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 
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From the first mention of bankruptcy law reform in a national conference in 
1993 to the final approval by the People’s Congress in 2006, it took thirteen 
years to make the EBL 2006.58 The major difficulty of the long process was 
how to deal with financially troubled enterprises in order to satisfy both the 
need of supporting the developing market economy and the aim to protect 
social and welfare interests during the political transition period. The 
arguments were focused on problems such as whether the SOEs should be 
governed by the new law, or whether the employees’ claim should take priority 
over secured priority. However, facing both internal and external pressures in 
needing a modern bankruptcy system, the government put more efforts into 
the reform, and put more pressure on involved parties, so compromises were 
achieved.  
The new bankruptcy law received positive comments from western 
commentators, and was hailed as a market-oriented statute. Professor 
Charles Booth stated that the new Chinese bankruptcy law had significantly 
clarified and simplified the insolvency regime in China, and the goal of 
providing a harmonised and unified law for various processes had been 
accomplished. 59  Professor Parry believes that the reform of the law 
potentially could have a huge impact in contributing to the development of the 
socialist market economy following the reduction in government interference 
in the market and bankruptcy process. Since the reform of the law was 
promoted by both Chinese scholars and global forces, the process of drafting 
the law received active assistance from major international organisations such 
as the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, WTO and the UNCITRAL. 
The World Bank and UNCITRAL were the key forces in pushing the global 
trend of bankruptcy law reform. The final formation of EBL 2006 was 
developed based on Chinese cultural and national conditions, and also drew 
references from established experiences of other countries and international 
                                                             
58 The law was passed by the National People’s Congress on August 2006, and 
came into effect on June 2007. 
59 Charles Booth, ‘The 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait Is Finally 
Over’ (2008) 20 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 275, 283. 
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organisations.60 Professor Jingxia Shi emphasised that the drafter took a 
“made in China” approach, and had not directly  relied on foreign insolvency 
regulations.61 
4.2.3 Major Improvements under the EBL 2006 
The objective of the law was set down in Article 1, as “fairly settling claims and 
debts, safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of creditors and debtors, 
and maintaining the order of the socialist market economy”.62 Compared with 
the 1986 version, the EBL had made major improvements. 
One main objective of the new law was to harmonise the disconnected 
bankruptcy systems under different laws, and it was accomplished, to a great 
extent. According to Article 2, the law applies to all enterprises with legal 
person status, which replaced and simplified the system that state-owned and 
non-stated-owned enterprises were governed by different legislation. 63 
However, because of the dominant position of state-owned enterprises in the 
Chinese market, there were long-lasting discussions and research about how 
the new law should be applied to SOEs. In practice, certain SOEs that 
engaged in businesses that have a major connection with national security or 
social stability, such as mining or military, are excluded from the scope of the 
new law. Additionally, the basic filing criteria are clearer than in the previous 
law, which now provides that a bankruptcy application can be filed in the 
People’s Court in the debtor’s place of residence if the business entity is either 
unable to repay the debts that fall due and assets are insufficient to repay 
debts in full, or it is obviously insolvent.64 The criteria adopted a combination 
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62 Article 1, EBL 2006. 
63 Article 2, EBL 2006. 
64 Article 2, EBL 2006. 
107 
 
of the balance sheet test and cash-flow test.65 
Another major improvement during the reform of the new law was the 
introduction of the role of the administrator, which should be a professional 
and independent individual or organisation appointed by the court from the 
date the case is accepted.66 In the past, the relevant government department 
always played the administrative role during bankruptcy, and for cases of non-
SOEs, the professionals usually played a minor role during the proceedings. 
The administrators play a major role in the bankruptcy processes under the 
new law; they have the power not only to manage the daily expenses of the 
debtor, but also to decide, distribute and dispose of the debtor’s assets. 
Furthermore, the administrator can ask the court to revoke transactions 
conducted up to one year before the filing of bankruptcy, if such transactions 
involved situations listed in the law. With a wide range of responsibilities, the 
efficiency of those processes will depend on the performance of the 
administrator.67  
Following the international trend, corporate rescue was one important topic in 
the reform of bankruptcy law.68 There were some provisions about corporate 
reorganisation in past laws, but most of them were very general, and not 
practical in practice. 69  Under the new law, there are two chapters for 
regulating the procedures for reorganisation and conciliation. 70  Both the 
debtor and creditor have the right to apply for reorganisation, which only 
applied to SOEs with government approval in the past. The chapter on 
conciliation has more detailed regulations about the process and the 
agreement. In designing those procedures, the lawmakers used the 
                                                             
65  Samuel L. Bufford, ‘China's Bankruptcy Law Interpretations: Translations and 
Commentary’ (2017) 91 America Bankruptcy Law Journal 1, 15. 
66 Chapter 3, EBL 2006. 
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insolvency systems in advanced jurisdictions as references. For example, the 
reorganisation proceeding shares similarities with the reorganisation 
procedure set by the US Bankruptcy Code, and the administration under the 
UK Insolvency Act; the conciliation process reflects the voluntary 
arrangements for settlement from English law, which is about reaching an out-
of-court solution between the debtor and creditors. Although these chapters 
still need judicial interpretations and more supporting laws, it is a noticeable 
improvement in the Chinese law. 
The other evident improvement under the new law is the provision of unified 
priority rules for distribution. Although the 1986 bankruptcy law regulated that 
secured creditors enjoy priority over unsecured creditors, which was followed, 
in order, the employees’ salary and insurance, taxation, and other unsecured 
claims, some government orders might require a different priority scheme 
during that time. For example, some might regulate that some workers’ 
resettlement rights, or certain pension and medical interests, should be 
satisfied before secured claims. The new law made it clear that the secured 
rights would be protected before the payment of employees’ claims. 71 
Nevertheless, the law still added some further extra protection for employees. 
For instance, one of the general principles is the protection of employees’ legal 
rights.72 It also requires a provisional plan that explains the resettlement plans 
for employees, and the repayment plans of salaries and social insurance when 
the debtor submits the bankruptcy petition. Furthermore, if the creditor has 
filed the bankruptcy petition, such documents should be submitted to the court 
within 15 days by the debtor.73  
Cross-border insolvency constituted another major improvement, and the 
detailed discussions and developments about the issue during the reform will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  
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4.2.4 The Inherited Factor: Government Interference 
Although the Chinese government has been active in pushing legal reform in 
the business sector in support of the rapidly expanding economy, it is 
unrealistic to expect a total market-oriented legal system being adopted in the 
foreseeable future. Historically, Chinese governments have not encouraged 
private commercial activities because of the policy of national isolation and 
centralised governmental control.74 It means that there has not been enough 
protection for private businesses, which has led to the situation where the 
public commercial sector has always been tightly controlled by the state, and 
private enterprises operated on the secure basis of family connection or social 
relationship rather than formal bodies of law.75 Therefore, it might be naive to 
think that the scope of government intervention in the bankruptcy system 
would be eliminated by just reforming some laws.  
Under the previous law, government approval was required at every stage of 
the bankruptcy process, especially by the local government in the city or 
province where the insolvent company was located. The bankruptcy 
committee appointed by the court included officials from local relevant 
government departments. Although there is no doubt that the EBL 2006 is a 
major improvement in Chinese corporate law history, the factor of state 
interference has been inherited.  Since this was the first modernised 
insolvency regime in China, and not all industries have been commercialised 
like western countries, it was expected that the state would want to leave 
some space to balance commercial and political considerations. 76  Even 
though some concepts of the EBL were borrowed from advanced regimes 
such as Germany and the US, its application depends on what role is assigned 
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to the law. 77  While developed jurisdictions apply insolvency law as the 
instrument to achieve effective distribution for creditors as a whole, China 
sometimes takes political considerations over efficiency.78 As stated at the 
beginning of the new law, maintaining the order of a “socialist” market 
economy is the main role of the law, so the government role stands for the 
socialist part. Consequently, there is some vague language in the law which 
could be used by the state to influence the legal proceedings. 
The first example of this is the commencement of the insolvency proceedings 
under the law.79 Unlike some advanced jurisdictions where an insolvency 
case formally commences upon the application to the court, under the EBL, 
an insolvency case starts when the court decides to accept the application. 
There is a 15 day gap between filing the application and the court making a 
decision. Therefore, there is space for intervention since the law does not 
provide the conditions the court will consider in deciding whether to accept the 
case. Apart from the commencement of the process, the government can also 
influence the bankruptcy by directly participating in the process. The law 
states the administrator can be an interim liquidation committee, consisting of 
qualified lawyers, certified public accountants, or other social intermediary 
agencies.80 Based on interpretation, the members of the committee can be 
appointed from relevant departments of the government, and from 
intermediary social agencies, including financial asset management 
companies, the People’s Bank, and financial regulatory institutions, under 
relevant laws and administrative regulations. 81  A similar article and 
application can also be found under the old bankruptcy law.82 
The court’s decision can be influenced by the government for different reasons. 
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In some cases, government involvement will be used as an instrument during 
the bankruptcy.83 The local government may be willing to pay some part of 
the debtor’s debts, or force the debtor to conduct reorganisation, if the 
bankruptcy could cause serious influences on local employment and the 
economy. In some other cases, local governments get involved in bankruptcy 
cases simply because they do not want negative appraisals or reputation 
since the local economy is connected to their political performance. However, 
even though the interferences might have positive intentions in some cases, 
it still disrupts the functioning of the market mechanism, and can conflict with 
the principle of fairness and equality enshrined in the bankruptcy law. 84 
Specifically, the creditors’ interests are usually damaged; for example, the 
government may force creditors to accept an unfair reorganisation plan to 
reduce the disruption to the local community.  
In summary, there is a long history and tradition that government plays an 
important role in bankruptcy cases for economic or political purposes. Such a 
tradition will not be changed in the near future, and it is important to find a 
balance between political objectives and legal fairness in a market-oriented 
environment. Obviously, the government would be more cautious in dealing 
with bankruptcy cases with international elements; therefore, for this research, 
the government factor will be an essential consideration in this and following 
chapters.  
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4.3 The Development of a Cross-Border Insolvency Law in 
China  
4.3.1 Slow Development at Regional Level 
The legislation on cross-border insolvency issues was a total blank before the 
introduction of the EBL 2006. The bankruptcy chapter under the Civil 
Procedure Law may apply to a foreign-related legal person, but it did not 
address any detailed issues. 85  Other regulations on the enterprise with 
foreign elements were also quiet in this area. Traditionally, the Chinese courts 
conducted the territoriality approach when facing inbound cross-border 
insolvency issues.86 In an early case, Liwen District Construction Company,87 
the Chinese court refused to recognise the appointment of a Hong Kong 
representative, and as he could not represent the Hong Kong company in the 
Chinese proceeding, so the representative could not be granted powers that 
a liquidation committee would have had under EBL 1986. The intention was 
to protect Chinese parties’ rights and control the assets located within China, 
which reflects the protective tradition for dealing with international issues in 
Chinese courts.  
Regarding outbound transactions, the first effort to address the problem with 
foreign elements at the national level was conducted by the Supreme People’s 
Court in 2002. 88   The judicial interpretation was passed to clarify 
uncertainties of insolvency provisions under various national laws, and to 
avoid possible conflicts in insolvency proceedings.89 Article 73 simply stated 
that a liquidation team would be appointed to pursue the assets of insolvent 
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Chinese debtors that were located outside the borders of China, which 
confirmed the extraterritorial power of the Chinese law. But, there was no 
detailed explanation about how the system would work. Although the 
document was the official interpretation of the EBL 1986, there was no 
matching Article about extraterritorial effect under the law. In practice, the 
recovery of foreign assets would have to depend on the application of foreign 
law, so the effect of this article was in doubt. The intention of article 73 was to 
be a facilitating assistant article for Chinese liquidators recovering overseas 
assets, and was an early demonstration that the government had noticed the 
issues of cross-border insolvency.90 Nevertheless, those traditional attitudes 
and territorial approaches to solving inbound and outbound cases have been 
inherited in the development of the cross-border insolvency law under the new 
bankruptcy system.  
Interestingly, the early development of the cross-border insolvency law started 
at the provincial level, after the government introduced an opening-up policy 
and established Special Economic Zones. Those regional approaches and 
regulations reflected the features of protectionism and territorialism mentioned 
above. There was one article addressing the issue of foreign-related 
enterprises in the Bankruptcy Regulation of the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone which stated that the intermediate people's courts of Shenzhen province 
had jurisdiction over any assets of foreign debtor located within the area, and 
bankruptcy proceedings opened by Chinese courts within the area should 
have jurisdiction over all the assets of the debtor, wherever they are situated. 
91  
4.3.2 The First Case of Recognising Foreign Judgment 
In the same year of the introduction of the judicial interpretation, an important 
case, known as the B&T case92, was heard by Guangdong (SEZ) Foshan 
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Intermediate court, and it was the first case in which a Chinese court granted 
recognition of a foreign insolvency judgment. In this case, Nanhai Pioneer 
Mould was a joint venture formed in 1993 by a Chinese company, Nanhai Jili 
Ceramic Industry and its Italian partner, Nassetti Ettore s.p.a. The Italian 
company was declared bankrupt according to No. 62673 judgment issued by 
the Milan court. B&T, another Italian company, won the bid on purchasing the 
assets of the insolvent debtor, so the Civil and Penal Court in Milan issued an 
order requiring the administrator to transfer all assets to the purchaser, B&T, 
for its freedom of control. However, after the bankruptcy, the Italian company 
reached an agreement on share transfer with a Hong Kong company, which 
became the foreign partner of the joint venture after the Nanhai Foreign 
Economic and Trade Bureau approved the agreement.  B&T filed a petition 
to Chinese court applying for recognition of the Italian bankruptcy judgment 
and claimed itself as the only legitimate holder of the shares of the joint 
venture; so the transfer was illegal since it was conducted by the debtor after 
the bankruptcy. During that time, the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgment were governed by Civil Procedure Law,93 and the foreign party had 
the right to apply directly to the intermediate court of China, which had 
jurisdiction. After examining the facts of the case, the court stated the 
recognition of the Italian judgment would not violate the basic principle of 
Chinese law or damage its sovereignty, safety, and social interests; 
furthermore, the recognition met the requirements set by the Treaty on Judicial 
Assistance in Civil Matters between China and Italy. 94  Therefore, the 
bankruptcy order made by the Milan court would be honoured in China.  
Because this was the first recognition of a foreign insolvency judgment, it is a 
significant landmark in Chinese legal history, and could be treated as an 
indicator for cross-border insolvency issues; and although the Chinese courts 
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do not have the principle of binding precedent like a common law system, the 
courts’ considerations towards recognition of foreign insolvency still could be 
observed. Firstly, one of the important bases for recognising a foreign 
judgment is the presence of international treaties, which is the foundation of 
recognition in this case. The ideal situation would be there is a treaty or 
relationship based on the treaty (such as the principle of reciprocity) between 
the jurisdiction concerned and China. Otherwise, it could be difficult for a 
Chinese court to recognise without such an arrangement since mutual respect 
and assistance is one of the essential requirements when Chinese courts deal 
with international issues. The second point the court would focus on is the 
effects following the recognition. If the recognition were to infringe on the 
public values of China, such as state sovereignty, security or social interests, 
the court would not grant it. However, there are no detailed interpretations of 
terms like social interests or basic principles of Chinese law under the Civil 
Procedure law, or other laws.  
4.3.3 The Making of Article 5 under EBL 2006 
The first draft of the new bankruptcy law was submitted to the National 
Congress in 1995, but it did not pass because of a lack of supplementary 
regulations and an effective social insurance system.95 Under this draft, there 
was one simple sentence addressing cross-border insolvency, which stated 
the bankruptcy proceedings initiated in foreign jurisdictions should have no 
effect on the debtor’s assets located in China, and the bankruptcy proceeding 
commenced by Chinese Courts shall have an effect on the debtor’s assets 
located outside of the territory of China.96 This proposed article sticks to the 
purely territorial approach, and the straightforward language reflects the lack 
of understanding of complicated problems linked to cross-border insolvency.97  
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With recommendations from advanced jurisdictions and international 
organisations, it was suggested that a territorial approach was not consistent 
with the international trend. Hence, the article on cross-border insolvency 
received more attention after 2000. The 2002 draft adopted certain principles 
of universalism. Article 8 of the 2002 draft kept the extraterritorial effect of the 
Chinese law, which provided that the new law would apply to debtors’ assets 
outside of China too.98 Relying on this effect, the Chinese representatives 
would have a legal basis in seeking recognition and cooperation overseas.99 
Also, this draft also addressed the conditions on recognition of foreign 
proceedings, which states:  
if a foreign bankruptcy proceeding is seeking recognition or enforcement in 
China, the Chinese court may grant the approval of the subject in the following 
situations: 
1) If there is no relationship based on treaties or reciprocity agreements 
between China and the foreign jurisdiction where the proceeding is 
opened   
2) If the recognition will violate the public interests of China 
3) If the recognition will violate the lawful interests and rights of Chinese 
creditors 
4) Other necessary factors that Chinese courts recognise ought to be 
taken into consideration 
 
The language of this article would be likely to give the court a greater level of 
discretion in deciding whether to grant the recognition.100 Specifically, even if 
the foreign proceeding meets the first three requirements, the court could still 
reject it based on the “necessary factors” in subsection 4. The ambiguous 
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choice of the words would also give the government an opportunity to interfere. 
Therefore, to avoid the uncertainties and facilitate better international 
cooperation, subsection four was deleted in the final version. Besides this, the 
sentence “Chinese court may grant approval” was changed to “Chinese courts 
shall grant approval”, which was intended to encourage international 
cooperation.  
So, in the final version, cross-border insolvency was addressed in Article 5, 
stating:  
“Article 5: 
Once the procedure for bankruptcy is initiated according to this Law, it shall 
come into effect in respect of the debtor’s property outside of the territory of 
the People’s Republic of China. 
Where a legally effective judgment or ruling made in a bankruptcy case by a 
court of another country involves a debtor’s property within the territory of the 
People’s Republic of China and the said court applies with or requests the 
people’s court to recognise and enforce it, the people’s court shall, according 
to the relevant international treaties that China has concluded or acceded to 
or on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, conduct an examination thereof 
and, when believing that the said judgment or ruling does not violate the basic 
principles of the laws of the People’s Republic of China, does not jeopardize 
the sovereignty and security of the State or public interests, does not 
undermine the legitimate rights and interests of the creditors within the territory 
of the People’s Republic of China, decide to recognise and enforce the 
judgement or ruling.” 
 
4.4 Cross-Border Insolvency under the EBL 2006 
4.4.1 The Meaning of Article 5 
It has been acknowledged that Article 5 under EBL 2006 is a gap-filling law in 
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Chinese bankruptcy law history, and which addresses legal issues for both 
inbound and outbound bankruptcy cases.101  The understanding of cross-
border insolvency in Chinese legal society has been mainly influenced by 
advanced jurisdictions, and Chinese scholars have agreed that most 
multinational insolvency cases involve two main issues: the recognition and 
repayment of foreign creditors’ claims; and the management of debtors’ 
foreign assets. In general, the wording of Article 5 seems to pay more attention 
to the issue of foreign assets. The first paragraph deals with the extraterritorial 
effect of Chinese bankruptcy law over the foreign assets of the debtor under 
Chinese proceeding, and the second regulates the conditions that foreign 
proceedings need to satisfy in order to get control of foreign debtors’ assets 
located within China’s border.  
As mentioned previously, the article has been discussed and re-drafted 
several times during the process of the reform of Chinese bankruptcy law, so 
the lawmakers have put enough political and legal considerations into the final 
form. Since the underlying policy of the law is to boost the Chinese market 
economy and encourage capital flow into China,102 it is necessary to analyse 
the legal principles behind the language of Article 5 to see whether a single 
article could provide a certain and effective cross-border bankruptcy system. 
Firstly, for any insolvency proceedings opened in Chinese courts, the law will 
be applied to all the debtor’s assets, both within and outside of the territory of 
China. Since the law did not give a detailed procedure for managing foreign 
assets, following the logic of dealing with domestic cases, the article implies 
that, after the Chinese court accepts the bankruptcy application: all the 
insolvent assets should be put into the pool of assets for distribution based on 
Chinese law; individual actions against the debtors’ assets shall be stopped; 
and other civil actions or arbitrations related to the debtor that have not been 
concluded should be discontinued until the administrator takes over the assets. 
Moreover, it also means that the repayment to individual creditors made by 
the debtor using foreign assets after acceptance in the Chinese court should 
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be invalidated. 103  The demonstration of the Chinese bankruptcy law’s 
extraterritorial effect reflects the basic concepts of universalism in regulating 
cross-border insolvency. The similar effect also can be found under the US 
Bankruptcy Code. The definition of bankruptcy estate includes all the assets 
within the US or abroad, wherever they may be located.104 Although the 
realisation of such an effect usually involves recognition and assistance based 
on the law of the foreign jurisdictions related, it provides a legal basis for 
Chinese administrators seeking assistance and cooperation abroad. 105 
However, unlike the US bankruptcy system which has adopted the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, which offers detailed procedures for seeking foreign cooperation, 
Chinese law is silent on this matter.  
Following the spirit of universalism in the first part, the second paragraph of 
Article 5 states that foreign insolvency judgments can be recognised and 
enforced based on an examination conducted by Chinese courts. There are 
two types of examination implied by the language of Article 5, and a successful 
recognition requires the satisfaction of both. 106  The primary examination 
should be on the grounds of existing international treaties or the principle of 
reciprocity between China and the involved jurisdiction. Since China has not 
entered any international agreement or conventions on cross-border 
insolvency or judicial assistance, international treaties here mainly refer to 
bilateral treaties on judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters. 
Additionally, the principle of reciprocity has often been included in bilateral 
agreements in civil and commercial matters. Therefore, it means that if there 
is no such agreement, it would be very difficult for a foreign insolvency 
judgment to get recognition in China as Chinese courts usually apply passive 
attitudes toward the application of reciprocity.  After it has been proved there 
is an international treaty or reciprocity between two countries, the examination 
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will be moved into the second stage. The courts need to make sure the 
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment would not violate the basic 
principles of Chinese law: sovereignty, public interests and the Chinese 
creditors’ legal rights. This part has been criticised for being vague and 
imprecise because it allows for broad discretionary powers, despite the article 
having been redrafted several times to limit such powers.107 
4.4.2 Uncertainties in Practice 
In practice, Article 5 did not receive a comprehensive analysis of its application 
until 2010. Because of the increasing amount of both inbound and outbound 
insolvency cases, Chinese legal society started to realise the huge gap 
between the Chinese law and international solutions in this area.108 There are 
two cases which could illustrate the essential issues of Article 5. For inbound 
cases, Taizinai 109  was the changing point since it was the first Chinese 
enterprise to receive a bankruptcy order from a foreign court. The dramatic 
development of the Taizinai case was widely reported by the media, and 
caused much discussion about the application of Article 5 under the new EBL.  
For outbound cases, the reorganisation proceeding of Zhejiang Topoint 
Photovoltaic Co. Ltd110 is a good example. Based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law system, the Chinese proceeding got recognition under the US Bankruptcy 
Code for the first time.  
Taizinai111 
Taizinai Group was a dairy company incorporated in Hunan Province. In 2006, 
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as part of a restructuring and development plan, three international investors, 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Actis Capital, agreed to pay 73 million 
USD for a 31.4% shareholding in the enterprise; additionally, for a better 
taxation policy, the company’s ownership was transferred to a holding 
company registered in the Cayman Islands. To support the expansion plan, 
the company got another loan from Citigroup. However, in 2008, the company 
ran into financial difficulties under the influence of the global financial crisis, 
and the safety scandal in the Chinese dairy industry. Because the company 
could not meet its financial targets, based on the valuation adjustment 
mechanism agreed in 2006 between the company owner, Li Tuchun, and the 
three investors, Li transferred the ownership to those foreign investors. Since 
Taizinai was one of the largest enterprises in Hunan province, the large 
number of unpaid employees forced the local government to intervene. Thus, 
the local government reached an agreement with the foreign investors, and 
invested almost 100 million RMB to repay some of the creditors. Li also got 
the ownership back. 
Although the temporary problem was solved by the government, the company 
was still unable to repay its debt to Citigroup. Hence, Citigroup applied for 
liquidation in the Cayman Islands, and successfully obtained a liquidation 
order in 2010. The court also appointed a Hong Kong accounting firm as the 
provisional liquidator to deal with the insolvent assets in China. The 
management group of Taizinai refused to accept the judgment of the Cayman 
Islands and claimed it had no legal effect in China. Under this difficult situation, 
the local government intervened again. The local court reached an agreement 
with the foreign liquidator which decided that the local court would start a 
reorganisation procedure. In 2011, the reorganisation administrator signed an 
agreement with two enterprises, including a major state-owned dairy 
enterprise, and they agreed to take over Taizinai for reorganising and repay 
its debts.   
The first noticeable issue of the case was that the local government had 
played a very important role in the rescue process. It is clear that the central 
or local government has a good tradition of intervention in bankruptcy 
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cases. 112  In the process of solving the case, the government invested 
significant capital to repay the foreign creditors, and also played the main role 
in negotiating with foreign creditors and the liquidator. The legal basis for 
government intervention, which is to protect the order of the socialist market 
economy, was outlined in the new bankruptcy law.113 Therefore, it could have 
been predicted that government involvement would still play a significant role 
in both domestic and international bankruptcy cases under the EBL 2006. 
Regarding the international elements of the case, there are two main issues 
relating to this research. Firstly, one of the main issues the Chinese legal 
scholars argued is whether the Cayman Islands has jurisdiction to open the 
insolvency proceeding against Taizinai. The enterprise was an off-shore 
company registered in the Cayman Islands, and its management centre and 
all businesses were located in China. When creditors filed an insolvency 
application against the Cayman Islands holding company, the court naturally 
had jurisdiction. Furthermore, according to the law there, the insolvency court 
has the right to appoint a liquidator to deal with the insolvent debtors’ assets, 
wherever they are located. Therefore, the liquidation order made by the 
Cayman Islands was legally correct. The second issue is whether the foreign 
judgment could be recognised under the new Chinese bankruptcy law.  
Following the local government’s interference, it was unclear whether the 
foreign liquidator had applied for recognition of the Cayman Islands judgment 
according to Article 5. However, if the liquidator had, the Chinese court would 
probably not have granted the recognition under Article 5. Based on the 
examination process mentioned above, there is no reciprocity relationship or 
bilateral agreement about judicial assistance between China and the UK or 
the Cayman Islands. Thus, the recognition would be rejected at the primary 
examination stage. Also, the enterprise had businesses in many different 
locations within China, and a large number of creditors and employees in 
different provinces. The Chinese court would also have refused the 
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recognition based on the reason that the liquidation of such large-scale 
enterprise would be harmful to social stability and the interests of Chinese 
creditors.  
Zhejiang Topoint Photovoltaic Co. Ltd114 
The company was a large-scale enterprise engaged in the solar and 
photovoltaic energy industry, located in Haining, Zhejiang Province. In 2013, 
because of the industry’s continuing poor performance influenced by the world 
economic environment, the company met financial problems and could not 
repay its debt (around £11 million) to a local Rural Credit Cooperative. Later 
that year, the government launched supportive policies to encourage the 
development of the solar energy industry. Therefore, because of the positive 
prospect of the industry and its better interests, the Credit Cooperative 
decided to file a reorganisation application against the debtor. AS the local 
court confirmed that the debtor met the conditions for bankruptcy, and thought 
that reorganisation would be in the best interests of the creditors, so the case 
was accepted. During the proceeding, the court noticed the debtor had 
substantial assets (around £15 million) in the US, which mainly comprised of 
solar panels in a warehouse located in New Jersey. On July 2014, the 
administrator appointed by the Chinese proceeding filed a petition to the 
bankruptcy court of New Jersey for recognition of the Chinese reorganisation 
proceeding as a foreign main proceeding. In August, the court granted the 
recognition since the Chinese proceeding met the conditions set by section 
1517 of the US Bankruptcy Code for granting recognition. Additionally, 
according to Articles 1519 and 1521, all the individual actions against the 
debtor’s assets within the US were stayed or suspended.  
This case is significant in Chinese bankruptcy history because it was the first 
one recognised by the US Bankruptcy Court.115 Since China and the US are 
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mutual trading partners, commercial disputes and bankruptcy cases between 
the two states have increased significantly in recent years. For Chinese 
enterprises, the case would be a legal precedent under the US law and offer 
help to future cases. However, for cases from the US, the possibility of 
recognising foreign judgments under Chinese law could be limited; and 
currently, there is no international or bilateral agreement regulating 
multinational insolvency that has been reached by both countries. Although 
China does not apply a case law system, the Topoint case would provide the 
possibility for a Chinese court applying the reciprocity principle to recognise 
the US bankruptcy proceedings. On the other hand, the case also showed 
Chinese legal practitioners the essential role the cross-border insolvency law 
played in multinational businesses, and the effectiveness of the international 
cooperation system. For the Zhejiang debtor, it took less than one month from 
filing the petition to receiving the recognition order. Such a system would 
undoubtedly provide valid and timely protection for Chinese debtors’ foreign 
assets. Consequently, the case forced Chinese lawmakers and practitioners 
to review the current system and look for detailed guidance.116  
According to the analysis of the two cases, it could be said that the cross-
border insolvency law in China is far from clear. Chinese professionals have 
also realised that mutual respect and cooperation could be the best way to 
solve these complicated questions.117 Since Chinese courts did not have 
enough experience dealing with international insolvency matters, the 
application of Article 5 would be impractical without detailed interpretations 
and procedures. From the legal perspective, the current law has set limited 
and strict conditions for granting recognition of foreign judgments. In an 
environment of commercial globalisation, when foreign creditors’ interests 
could not be fully protected, this would hurt the reputation of the Chinese 
market in the eyes of international investors.118 Furthermore, foreign courts 
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may refuse to assist Chinese proceedings as retaliation. It is obvious that the 
Chinese courts do not want to see situations in which Chinese creditors’ legal 
rights cannot be protected in foreign proceedings, or justified judgments made 
by Chinese courts cannot get assistance in foreign courts. It also should be 
realised that government intervention cannot always be the solution to 
international insolvency cases. Even if it could be justified to protect local 
employment and creditors, influencing the market self-adjustment process 
would probably increase the economic burdens of the government, and 
eventually hurt the market order. From the economic point of view, it requires 
a friendly international insolvency law to attract more foreign investment. Also, 
Chinese enterprises have tended to expand their businesses onto the 
international stage in recent years, and the Chinese government has also 
been encouraging them to do so. Since China has the ability and desire to 
play a more important role in the international market, the state should also 
bear the responsibility of building an effective and fair insolvency system for 
solving international business problems. 
 
4.5 Comparative Analysis of the UNCITRAL Model Law  
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency is one of the main 
international regimes, and Chinese insolvency professionals have realised the 
advantages of the system. The comparison in this part aims to analyse the 
essential differences between the Chinese legal system and the Model Law 
regime in solving international insolvency issues. Two points need to be 
stressed about the two objects. Firstly, since the UNCITRAL Model Law is a 
legal instrument to be adopted by individual jurisdictions, the comparison 
involves other countries’ insolvency law systems and their implementation of 
the Model Law as examples and explanations about the Model law’s intentions. 
Secondly, because there is only one article under Chinese law regulating 
cross-border insolvency, other Chinese laws, such as Company Law and Civil 
Procedural Law, will be involved to explain the legal principles and intentions 
behind the simple article, and to examine the cross-border insolvency law 
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under the overall Chinese legal system.  
4.5.1 Universalism or Territorialism? 
As analysed in Chapter 2, universalism and territorialism are the two distinct 
principles that reflect basic attitudes toward cross-border insolvency. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law has adopted universalism, providing that only one 
main insolvency proceeding will play the main role and manage the overall 
process. On this basis, the law modified the principle by allowing territorial 
proceedings. Such modification aims to encourage cooperation and 
coordination; also, it shows respect to the differences among national 
insolvency laws, and gives national courts opportunities to protect local 
interests when needed. 119  Although universalism is the growing trend in 
solving international issues, territorialism is still the historical philosophy.120 
Some evidence illustrates that China is moving away from a strict territorial 
method to some extent through Article 5, under which the international effects 
of Chinese proceedings are claimed, and the cooperation and assistance with 
a foreign proceeding may be possible. However, those conditions for 
recognition could be very restrictive and uncertain, since the vague language 
would give Chinese courts greater discretionary powers in deciding whether 
the foreign judgment is a breach of national interests or creditor’s rights. 
Potentially, it leaves room for local protectionism.  
Therefore, both Chinese law and the Model Law adopted universalism with 
some adjustments. While the Model law is aiming to encourage cooperation, 
the Chinese law possibly conducts double standards for inbound and 
outbound cases; Arsenault described the law as being modified universalism 
in character. 121  It has been disclosed that during the drafting stage, the 
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Chinese team agreed with the UNCITRAL advisors that universalism would 
be adopted into the new law.122 Frankly speaking, the principle which Article 
5 adopted is universalism with features of territorialism.  
4.5.2 Jurisdiction 
As analysed in Chapter 2, one of the three main issues of cross-border 
insolvency is to decide which country’s court has the jurisdiction to open the 
insolvency proceeding. The national insolvency laws were designed based on 
the individual state’s legal philosophy and principles to protect national 
interests and local creditors in international disputes, so there are different 
standards in deciding jurisdictions of cross-border insolvency; furthermore, 
conflicts can be caused when involved countries are competing to claim 
jurisdiction. Domiciliary insolvency is the basic standard many countries have 
applied in regulating jurisdiction issues of international insolvency.  
The principle has been adopted by both the Model Law and Chinese law. 
Under the Model law, the starting point of Article 16 is the debtor’s registered 
office, which is presumed to be the centre of the debtor’s main interest, and 
the proceeding opened in the country of the COMI should be recognised as 
the foreign main proceeding. In addition, the presumption can be rebutted if 
there is clear evidence showing the debtor’s COMI and registered office are 
different.123 On this basis, secondary proceedings are also allowed for the 
purpose of assisting the main proceeding, and the jurisdiction of non-main 
proceedings is limited to local assets. Chinese law also applied the domiciliary 
standard, which regulated that the People’s courts at the place where the 
debtor resides shall have the jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings 
under the EBL 2006.124 The General Principles of the Civil Law pointed out 
that the debtor’s residence means the location of the debtor’s major business 
operation, and the Supreme Court offered further explanation, stating that if 
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there was no clear location of the major business operation, the courts in the 
place of registration have jurisdiction.125 Therefore, although Chinese laws 
did not apply the concept of centre of main interest (COMI), the basic ideas of 
Chinese jurisdiction rules for insolvency cases are similar to those of the 
Model Law. Both of the systems applied the system that place of registration 
has presumed jurisdiction, and it can be challenged if obvious evidence 
proves the location of the place of registration, and management of the 
business or centre of operations is different. It is necessary to use the 
registration location as a start point for insolvency proceeding because such 
a location is predictable and accessible to all creditors. However, in the 
situation that a company is registered in one place and its business operation 
is located in different place, which is very common in commercial practice and 
multinational business activities, it is more reasonable for the court where the 
major business activities and management are conducted to have the 
jurisdiction. The problem here is that there is no clear definition of the meaning 
of “major business operation” under the Chinese Supreme Court’s 
interpretation.     
However, unlike the Model Law which limits the jurisdictions in secondary 
proceedings to a debtor’s local assets, Chinese laws offer the courts broad 
powers to apply jurisdiction over companies that do not have a residence in 
China. According to Article 265 of the Civil Procedural Law, Chinese courts 
can apply jurisdiction over a foreign company if the company has assets or a 
representative body in China.126 Such broad jurisdiction rules for cases with 
international elements are not uncommon under national insolvency laws; 
countries like the US and the UK have similar rules. The purpose is to give 
better protection to local creditors when it is necessary since they do not need 
to learn foreign insolvency laws and file the case in a debtor’s home country.127 
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It should be noticed that such protection reflects the territorial philosophy and, 
for cross-border insolvency, abusing such protection could be an obstacle to 
achieving a better result to satisfy creditors’ claims as a whole.  
The early cross-border insolvency case decided by Shenzhen SEZ is a good 
example, which shows that the territorial solution gave local creditors quick 
repayment, but lowered the recovery rate. In The Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) case,128 BCCI was a banking group with 
numerous subsidiaries and branches all over the world, and was declared 
bankrupt in more than 70 jurisdictions in the early 1990s. Since BCCI has a 
branch in Shenzhen, the Intermediate Court claimed the jurisdiction on the 
grounds that certain amounts of debtor’s assets were located in Shenzhen. 
The Chinese court accepted the case and started liquidation proceedings; 
accordingly, Chinese creditors only participated in the Chinese proceeding 
and did not join the global liquidation of the banking group. The Chinese court 
found that the branch’s assets in China amounted to US$ 20 million, but 
against almost US$ 80 million in liabilities.129 Based on the Chinese law, the 
local assets were distributed among Chinese creditors, and the rate of return 
allegedly was around 25%. 130  On the other hand, on the global level, 
provisional liquidators in different jurisdictions, including Luxembourg, the 
Cayman Islands, London, New York and Washington, successfully agreed to 
a Pooling Agreement whereby the liquidation of the BCCI Group would be 
undertaken together by a team of liquidators.131 Although relevant cases have 
lasted for decades, the repayment rate is much higher than 25%.132 There 
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are two possible reasons why Chinese creditors chose not to participate in the 
global agreement. Firstly, both Chinese creditors and legal practitioners had 
relatively limited experiences in dealing with insolvency matters at that time; 
secondly, compared to the international agreement, the Chinese proceeding 
provided a much quicker result with a certain repayment rate, and it is true 
that the global liquidation required decades to complete. 
In Professor Shi’s word, ‘the case could serve as a typical exemplification on 
China’s adherence to the territoriality principle in dealing with cross-border 
insolvency cases.’ 133  In terms of the modern trend of commercial 
globalisation, the case proves that participating in international proceeding 
could have a better result for creditors in a multinational insolvency. However, 
it seems that Chinese laws give courts excessive jurisdiction powers over 
foreign companies that have a connection with China. Furthermore, Chinese 
laws show a negative attitude toward parallel proceedings, since the Supreme 
Court stated that if there are foreign proceedings opened against the same 
debtor under the Chinese proceeding, the foreign proceedings and judgments 
shall not be recognised in China unless there are bilateral agreements 
between China and the foreign country in question. 134   Since flexible 
jurisdiction is necessary at the national level to protect domestic creditors, the 
Model Law approach provides a good solution to deal with the relationship 
among various proceedings again the same debtor.  
By introducing the concept of COMI, it confirms the jurisdiction of the debtor’s 
home country, and puts limitations on the jurisdiction of ancillary proceedings. 
Allowing the local proceedings not only shows respect to the local jurisdiction 
rules but also give domestic creditors the opportunity to learn comprehensive 
information of the debtor’s case in other countries, which would help them 
cooperate with and participate in the main proceeding. It has been discussed 
how the Model law approach illustrates the spirit of international cooperation; 
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the EC regulation on cross-border insolvency also adopts a similar system.135 
The potential problem of the Model Law approach is that enacting countries 
may have different rules about the domestic proceedings since the Model Law 
is not mandatory law. Some countries may take the opportunity to make sure 
secured local creditors get paid before submitting the assets to a foreign 
representative, which would possibly cause some unfair issues in some cases.  
In fact, although Article 5 of EBL 2006 states that all the insolvency 
proceedings opened in Chinese court have jurisdiction over the debtors’ 
assets all over the world, the recognition of Chinese proceeding in foreign 
courts will depend on the national law of the foreign country in question. If the 
Chinese court applies jurisdiction over foreign companies on the ground of the 
presence of assets in China, such proceedings will only be recognised as 
foreign non-main proceeding in enacting countries of the Model Law, and its 
effects are only restricted within China. Therefore, the jurisdiction rules for 
cross-border insolvency in China could be chaotic and conflict with the trend 
of international cooperation since there are no detailed rules in the new 
insolvency law, and other related laws are still conducting rules with territorial 
protection purposes.  
4.5.3 Choice of law 
The choice-of-law rules related to cross-border insolvency include problems 
of both substantive and procedural issues. 136  From the opinions on 
territorialism, some countries and scholars think that applying the law of the 
jurisdiction where the insolvency proceeding was opened should be the best 
solution, since the single law proceeding would be more convenient and 
effective; it would also be good for the protection of local creditors. 137 
                                                             
135 Article 3 (1), Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of European Parliament and of the Council 
on Insolvency Proceeding (Recast). 
136 Hannah L. Buxbaum, ‘Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of 
Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory’ (2000) Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 395. < 
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1396&context=fa
cpub > accessed 10 September 2017. 
137  Zuofa Wang, ‘The Legal Conflicts and Choice-of-Law under Cross-Border 
Insolvency’ (2005) 6 US-China Law Review 69.  
132 
 
However, the problem is much more complicated in the case of universalism. 
In general, for procedural issues such as jurisdiction, the requirements of 
submitting insolvency application, the process of appointing qualified 
administrators, or the rules of submitting creditors’ claims, the applicable law 
should be the national law in which insolvency proceedings are started, which 
expresses the judicial sovereignty of individual countries and avoids 
conflicts.138 For substantial problems, since it is directly related to the legal 
rights and contractual relationships between creditors and debtor which were 
formed before the commencement of insolvency, where proceedings are 
based on other applicable laws, such as civil and commercial laws, it is 
reasonable that those applicable laws should still be used to determine the 
relative position of each of those rights and relationships.139 
Under the Model Law system, there are no unified choice-of-law rules for 
countries to adopt: countries need to decide the issue based on their private 
international law. But the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 
provides some recommendations on this matter concerning the 
characteristics of universalism. The UNCITRAL stresses that the issue of 
validity and effectiveness of rights and claims against the debtor is not an 
insolvency problem, but a matter of other applicable laws. 140  The 
recommendations state that: 
“30. The law applicable to the validity and effectiveness of rights and claims 
existing at the time of the commencement of insolvency proceedings should 
be determined by the private international law rules of the State in which 
insolvency proceedings are commenced. 
31. The insolvency law of the State in which insolvency proceedings are 
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commenced (lex fori concursus) should apply to all aspects of the 
commencement, conduct, administration, and conclusion of those insolvency 
proceedings and their effects.”141 
Additionally, there are further recommendations that include a list of 19 
detailed examples of procedural issues, and certain exceptions in respect to 
recommendation 31.  
Although the UNCITRAL did not give a specific choice-of-law rule, it does not 
mean that the problem was ignored by the Working Group. In fact, the problem 
was left open on purpose by UNCITRAL in order to achieve a balance 
between countries’ preferences and international cooperation. 142  When 
deciding the effects of the foreign law in the recognising country, the Model 
Law specifically rejects the approach that the recognising court only applies 
the local law or the foreign law where the insolvency proceeding was 
opened.143 Instead, the law finds the middle ground, which specifies that the 
effects should be automatically applied upon recognition. Furthermore, the law 
also requires that those effects only apply to the foreign main proceeding, and 
subject to the law of recognising countries.144 By using these automatic stays, 
the recognising court does not need to decide the applicable law, and could 
also protect debtor’s assets quickly. For both foreign main and non-main 
proceedings, the recognising courts have great discretionary powers to make 
any appropriate replies based on their conflict of laws rules.145 Therefore, 
combining the Legislative Guide and the Model Law, it seems that UNCITRAL 
intends to encourage the recognising courts to make a comprehensive 
assessment of the situation following the recommendations listed above when 
facing choice-of-law issues.  
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Under the Chinese legal system, the limited language about choice-of-law 
issues seems to comply with the recommendations promoted by UNCITRAL, 
but the practical application illustrates a very different situation. There are no 
clear choice-of-law rules regarding situations with international elements 
under EBL 2006. However, the law states that if there are no provisions in this 
law to govern the process of bankruptcy cases, the relevant provisions of Civil 
Procedural Law shall be applicable.146 Accordingly, the Civil Procedural Law 
implies that civil proceedings opened within Chinese territory shall be 
governed by relevant provisions of this law.147 This article reflects the Chinese 
law attitude, that procedural issues should be governed by law where the 
insolvency proceeding is opened. 
For substantial matters, another law, called Law of the Application of Law for 
Foreign-Related Civil Relationships of PRC, includes one article about the 
choice-of-law rule of contract.148 It provides that the parties concerned may 
choose the applicable law by agreement to govern the contract; if parties do 
not choose, the law at the habitual residence of the party whose fulfilment of 
obligations can best reflect the characteristics of the contract, or other laws 
which have the closest connection with the contract, should apply. In practice, 
it could be difficult to have unified standards for deciding location that can 
reflect the contract’s characteristics or have a close connection with the 
contract in question; therefore, such law gives the judge a great level of 
discretionary power to make a comprehensive judgment.149 Several legal 
scholars have pointed out that Article 41 has a supplementary nature since it 
guides courts to decide applicable law when there is no clear statement about 
the issue under contract.150  
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However, when Chinese courts apply this law in practice, the choice of law 
issues are always decided based on the jurisdiction decisions. It means that 
if there is no choice-of-law agreement in the contract and the Chinese court 
applies jurisdiction because the performance of the contract was in China, the 
court would have a good chance of deciding that the Chinese law has a close 
connection with the contract, and thus apply Chinese law.151 One piece of 
empirical research demonstrates that Chinese law was the applicable law for 
all the sample cases decided based on Article 41.152 Using such a close 
connection rule as a unilateral rule is not the intention of that rule since it is 
supposed to increase the flexibility and accuracy in deciding choice-of-law for 
international disputes. This article could be an example to show that Chinese 
laws or courts have not paid much attention to choice-of-law rules in 
international cases, and the application of domestic laws is still the 
mainstream in Chinese courts. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that 
Chinese courts prefer to apply local laws to both procedural and substantial 
laws in international cases.  
Additionally, the Model Law of International Private Law of the PRC, which is 
published by the Chinese Society of Private International Law and serves as 
recommendations and reference for courts and legal professionals, has 
mentioned the choice-of-law rules of insolvency situations for the first time.153 
The law states that the applicable law should be the law where the debtors’ 
business operation centre or debtors’ assets are located.154 The law further 
explains that if the debtor or creditor apply for insolvency in the court where 
the main business operation centre is located, the applicable law should be 
the law where the court is located; if the creditor applies for insolvency in the 
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court where the assets are located, the applicable law should be the law where 
the court is located. So the logic is to connect the applicable law with the 
commencement location of the proceeding. This law is more advanced and 
complies with the concept of modified universalism for international insolvency. 
According to the law, the proceeding opened in the court where the business 
operation centre is located would apply the local law of that jurisdiction. It has 
been addressed previously how the concept of the business operation centre 
under Chinese law shares common principles with the COMI under the Model 
Law so that such a proceeding would be recognised as the main proceeding 
under the Model Law system. In other words, the concept of the business 
centre would be used to decide both the jurisdiction and the applicable law. 
Internationally, this approach has been supported by universalists. Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook pointed out that international rules for regulating 
multinational insolvency cases concentrate on the COMI, and to achieve the 
goal of universalism, it is necessary to use the concept for both choice-of-
forum and choice-of-law rules.155  Hence, although the provisions of Chinese 
academic law does not address the concept of the COMI, the principles reflect 
the international trend. It shows that Chinese legal scholars have realised the 
importance of choice-of-law rules in multinational insolvency cases. In fact, 
the academic law was one of the main sources for the draft of the Law of the 
Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relationships, but the final version 
excluded many specific issues, including articles concerning insolvency 
issues. 
In summary, neither the Model Law system nor the Chinese law has unified 
choice-of-law rules for multinational insolvency cases; however, there are 
essential differences between the two systems. For Chinese laws, there are 
only limited provisions under different laws which are related to choice-of-law 
rules. When applying those rules to cases with international elements, the 
Chinese courts tend to make decisions based on jurisdiction and usually fail 
to make a comprehensive judgment by assessing the whole situation. As a 
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result, Chinese laws would be the applicable laws for most international cases 
heard in China. On the contrary, the Model Law adopts the middle ground for 
the issue on purpose. Instead of making separate rules, the Model Law 
intends to connect the choice-of-law rule with the COMI. As Jenny Clift stated: 
“(COMI) as a choice of principal forum, it has important implications for the 
choice of insolvency law applied to main proceedings and the substantive 
outcomes for stakeholders.” 156  Those automatic stays, triggered by 
recognition of the main proceeding, would protect a debtor’s assets and also 
provide flexibility for recognising courts to deal with cases based on practical 
considerations and circumstances of the particular case.157 Following the 
recognition, discretionary reliefs are allowed to be granted to both main and 
non-main proceedings based on the local choice-of-law rules. Therefore, it is 
clear that every step in applying the Model Law is connected with the 
determination of the debtor’s COMI. With the encouragement of international 
cooperation and coordination, the law is a framework for regulating cross-
border insolvency based on the choice of forum rule, and it is reasonable to 
believe such a system encourages a certain degree of deference to the foreign 
law of the main proceeding.158  
However, without written provisions under the Model Law, the disadvantage is 
that enacting jurisdictions may adopt different interpretations and approaches 
to solving a single issue. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 3, the courts 
of the US and the UK have a contrary attitude towards granting discretionary 
relief by applying foreign law. With the condition that the foreign proceeding 
has been recognised as the main proceeding, the UK law thinks the relief 
should be restricted to relief that would be available to domestic proceedings, 
and foreign law should not be applied.159 US law believes that refusing the 
possibility of using the law of foreign main proceeding would protect and 
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encourage forum shopping, which is not the intention of the Model Law.160 To 
harmonise transnational insolvency proceedings, the US approach seems 
more consistent with the Model Law.  
4.5.4 Recognition and Cooperation  
One of the essential objectives of the Model Law is to provide a simplified 
procedure for recognition of qualifying foreign proceedings that would avoid 
time-consuming processes and improve the certainty of recognition. Following 
the aim, the recognition procedure under Model Law is simple and clear: it 
provides that if the foreign proceeding satisfies the requirement concerning 
the nature of foreign proceeding, and the evidence required by Article 15 has 
been submitted by a foreign representative appointed by a foreign court, the 
foreign proceeding shall be recognised as either a main proceeding or non-
main proceeding.161 The recognition can be refused if such recognition would 
be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the recognising jurisdiction.162  
Article 5 under Chinese EBL 2006 also states the possibility of recognising 
foreign insolvency proceedings based on the bilateral agreements and rule of 
reciprocity. The article complies with the basic attitudes of Chinese courts 
towards foreign-related civil cases under the Civil Procedure Law. A foreign 
judgment needs to meet three requirements for recognition in Chinese courts. 
The first one is that the foreign judgment should be a judgment with legal effect, 
and the second is there is a bilateral agreement or reciprocity relationship 
between China and the jurisdiction in question regarding judicial 
assistance.163 The last requirement is that the foreign judgment shall not be 
recognised if it violates the basic principles of Chinese laws or sovereignty, 
safety, and public interests.164 Furthermore, based on the Supreme Court’s 
opinions, the recognition should be granted by Chinese intermediate courts 
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that have jurisdiction over the dispute; if there is no agreement or reciprocity 
rule in existence, the party concerned may file a separate lawsuit in the 
competent intermediate courts. 165  For cross-border insolvency cases, it 
means that the foreign representative has to file a separate application based 
on the Chinese civil law for judicial assistance if the recognition cannot be 
granted based on EBL 2006.  
Therefore, it could be argued that the basic attitudes of Chinese courts for 
recognising and assisting foreign proceedings share some similarities with the 
Model Law system. Firstly, the recognition could be granted if the foreign 
proceeding fits the requirements under the laws. Secondly, the recognition will 
be rejected if it does not comply with the public policies or laws of the 
recognising country. However, the detailed requirements of the two systems 
are very different. While the Model Law is trying to simplify the process, the 
Chinese civil procedures and Article 5 of the EBL impose some obstacles in 
respect of international cooperation. Since there are fewer than 30 countries 
who have made judicial assistance agreements with China, the international 
insolvency cases from other jurisdictions need to open separate cases in 
China. In that case, it seems the introduction of Article 5 has no practical 
significance since the solution still goes back to the same approach as under 
Civil Procedures Law. Another result would be that foreign creditors may 
choose to directly file insolvency cases in China in order to avoid the 
complicated recognition process with foreign judgment, which would be time-
consuming and inefficient for creditors as a whole. Additionally, it should be 
noticed that the list of jurisdictions that have already signed agreements with 
China does not include China’s major trading partners such as the US, the UK, 
and Germany. Since it is highly possible a great number of multinational 
insolvency cases would involve jurisdictions that have frequent business 
activities with China, the current laws obviously cannot provide efficient 
solutions.  
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 Table 2: The List of Countries Having Signed Judicial Assistance 
Agreement in Civil and Commercial Matters with China 
                                                                                       
(Source: Ministry of Justice P.R.C)166 
Public Policy 
The notion of public policy is included in both the Model Law and the China 
EBL 2006. As the UNCITRAL mentioned that the notion is grounded in 
national law, the meaning may differ from state to state. Although there is no 
uniform definition of public policy, it has been addressed that, for the purpose 
of international cooperation, the understanding of public policy under the 
Model Law is more restricted than domestic public policy. 167  In practice, 
although there were some changes of wording when only a few countries 
adopted the Model Law, most of the enacting countries have narrowly 
interpreted the rule of public policy on a consistent basis with a UNCITRAL 
guide.168 For instance, the decisions from the US suggest the fact that the 
application of foreign law causes a different result than US law is insufficient 
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1.France 7. Morocco 13. Mongolia 19. Belarus 25. Tajikistan 
2.Italy 8.North Korea 14. Romania 20. 
Kazakhstan 
26. Uzbekistan 
3.Spain 9. Tunisia 15. Russia 21. Egypt 27.Vietnam 
4. Bulgaria 10.South 
Korea 
16.Turkey 22. Greece 28. Lithuania 
5.Thailand 11. UAE 17. Ukraine 23. Cyprus 29.Lao  
6.Hungary 12. Poland 18. Cuba 24. Kyrgyzstan  
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to invoke article 1516 protection under the Model Law system.169 Further 
explanations provide two factors which may trigger the protection. The first is 
if the foreign proceeding was procedurally unfair, and the second is if the 
application of foreign law or recognition of foreign proceeding would severely 
impinge the value of a US statutory or constitutional right, or granting the relief 
would hinder the ability of a US bankruptcy court to implement fundamental 
policies.170    
Under Chinese laws, although the concept has been applied in both civil and 
commercial laws, neither the Supreme Court nor the legislature has provided 
an interpretation of the meaning of public policy. The EBL 2006 states that 
foreign judgment must not contradict “the basic principles of Chinese law “or 
violate “China’s state sovereignty, security or public social interests”.171 The 
same language is also used in other Civil Procedure Law in provisions relating 
to assisting foreign cases.172 Other laws, such as Contract Law and Private 
International Law, employed the wording “do not contradict China’s social 
public interests”.173 All these terms mentioned above are treated as public 
policy principles in China. In an old Supreme Court case from the 1950s, the 
court pointed out that when deciding the issue of the recognition of foreign 
judgments, the recognising court shall examine whether the judgment is 
contrary to China’s substantive and procedural laws. 174  Generally, the 
characteristics of the concept of public policy are its vagueness and 
uncertainty, which offers flexibility to courts in its application. The courts have 
the discretionary power to refuse foreign judgment or the application of foreign 
law, which leaves room for the abuse of power. Therefore, it is necessary to 
limit the scope of the notion; otherwise, the basis of the conflict of laws system 
                                                             
169 ibid. 
170 ibid; Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547,567 (E.D Va. 2010). 
171 Article 5, EBL 2006. 
172 Article 266, Civil Procedural Law of PRC. 
173 Article 5, Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-related Civil Relations of PRC 
2010. 
174 Hu Zhenjie, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China: Rules, 
Interpretation and Practice’ (1999) 46 Netherlands International Law Review 291. 
142 
 
would be frustrated.  
Specifically, it has been pointed out that although the spirit and function of 
public policy are similar under the private international law and domestic civil 
law, the application should be narrower and more limited for legal matters 
involving international elements. Chinese courts should treat the foreign law 
with respect, and only invoke an exception when the application of foreign law 
or foreign judgment would violate some legal, moral, social or economic 
principles so fundamental to China. The academic suggestion is consistent 
with the explanation of UNCITRAL, which states that broadly defining public 
policy would hamper international cooperation. Notably, the attitude was 
adopted in the Model Law of Private International Law of China, and the article 
about public policy employed the word “manifestly incompatible with the public 
policy of China”.175 The term “manifestly” was introduced by Chinese scholars 
in order to comply with international custom, as UNCITRAL explains that the 
term is commonly used under international legal texts to emphasise the 
restricted application of public policy exception.176  
The principle of Reciprocity in China 
Under the EBL 2006, reciprocity is one of the requirements for the recognition 
of and assistance for foreign insolvency proceedings. The language of Article 
5 for determining the enforceability of foreign judgments can also be found 
under Civil Procedural Law, which provides that in the absence of a treaty 
obligation, Chinese courts may consider the principle of reciprocity. 177 
However, both the EBL and CPL did not offer a detailed explanation of 
reciprocity. The basic principle of the CPL states that if a foreign country 
imposes restrictions on the civil litigation rights of a Chinese citizen, enterprise 
or organisation, the Chinese courts shall adopt the principle of reciprocity 
regarding those rights of the citizen, enterprise or organisation of that foreign 
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country.178 Thus, under the Chinese legal system, reciprocity is used as a 
method of retaliation that punishes the attitude of the foreign states for not 
honouring Chinese judgments. 179  The laws give Chinese courts the 
discretionary power to decide whether there is a reciprocity relationship with 
the foreign country. In judicial practice, China has one of the most restrictive 
reciprocity systems. In determining the existence of reciprocity, Chinese 
courts do not seem to give importance to the actual recognition practice of the 
foreign court in question; all that matters is the proof of the existence of judicial 
precedents according to which Chinese judgments were given effect.180 This 
restrictive interpretation has made the recognition of foreign judgments in 
China almost impossible. In the past decades, the principle of reciprocity has 
been the most frequently applied instrument in refusing to recognise foreign 
judgments.181  
In fact, the instances of successful applications for recognition of foreign 
judgments in China are still rare. Although there are few successful ones, such 
as B&T case mentioned in this chapter, the principle of reciprocity never 
played any striking role in those decisions.182 The Gomi Akira case would be 
a good example to show the attitude of Chinese courts on this matter since 
the intermediate court case was instructed by the Supreme People’s Court.183 
In this case, the Japanese applicant applied to the Chinese court for 
recognition and enforcement of Japanese judgments ordering a Japanese 
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defendant to compensate him out of his properties in China. The opinion of 
the Supreme Court was quite simple and clear: it stated that the application 
should be dismissed since neither the reciprocal relationship nor the relevant 
international treaties existed between China and Japan, and there was no 
direct mention of other requirements for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments under Chinese Law. The Supreme Court’s opinion did not 
bring any clarification to the principle of reciprocity, but it illustrated that 
reciprocity tends to be one of paramount concern to Chinese courts, and all 
other requirements appear to be eclipsed by it.  
Therefore, according to the restrictive interpretation, when foreign creditors 
present a foreign insolvency judgment to Chinese courts for recognition under 
the EBL 2006, and there is no bilateral agreement in existence, they will not 
be able to collect debt simply because there has been no previous recognition 
of a Chinese insolvency judgment beforehand in that foreign state. It could be 
predicted that this would be the situation in a majority of cases. In the context 
of globalisation and the on-going advancement of the opening-up policy in 
China, such narrow application of “principle of reciprocity” could cause 
obstacles in developing an effective international insolvency system.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
In conclusion, because of the historical factors of the centrally planned 
economy and state-owned enterprises, the early development of the Chinese 
corporate bankruptcy system has been mainly for political purposes. The 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 1986 was more like a political instrument, and the 
application of it was mainly based on government orders rather than a court 
judgment. Although the power of SOEs in the Chinese economy is decreasing 
and the government is trying to promote the development of the private 
business sector, SOEs are still a relatively important part of China. Therefore, 
a certain degree of the tradition of government intervention has been kept 
under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006. The ambiguities in the language 
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of the new law probably provide space for the government to interfere in the 
proceedings of both SOEs and private enterprises. Article 5 concerning cross-
border insolvency under the new law can be a good example of those 
ambiguities. Although adding the article was a big step forward for China in 
building an effective bankruptcy system, it still has a long way to go to be clear 
and practical in application. Specifically, the fact that Article 5 put strict 
restrictions on granting recognition and assistance to foreign proceedings 
seems not to be fair to foreign creditors or debtors. Under the development of 
commercial globalisation, such restrictions could be harmful to Chinese 
parties’ interests in the future.  
The bankruptcy law cannot function well on its own. By examining different 
Chinese laws related to international insolvency issues, it can be found there 
are basic ideas concerning international insolvency shared by the Chinese 
legal system and the Model Law regime. In deciding the jurisdiction of opening 
insolvency proceedings, the Chinese law applies similar principles as the 
concept of the COMI, which states that proceedings should be opened in the 
court where the debtor’s major business operation is located. Although the 
basic concepts in China for choice-of-law and recognition issues have 
something in common with the Model Law, their application in practice have 
caused uncertainties. Chinese courts tend to connect the choice-of-law issues 
with jurisdiction. When deciding whether to provide assistance and 
cooperation to foreign insolvency proceedings, the definition of public policy 
exception in Chinese needs to be clarified. The tricky problem is the 
requirement of the existence of judicial assistance agreements and the 
principle of reciprocity. In particular, the limited number of judicial assistance 
agreements between China and other jurisdictions does not include any of 
China’s major trading partners. Considering the size of everyday trading 
between China and different countries, and the fact that many Chinese 
enterprises are expanding their business overseas, it is possible that such 
restrictions on the requirements for judicial assistance will eventually backfire 
on Chinese parties. At least for bankruptcy and commercial matters, judicial 
assistance should be more attainable. Based on the issues under current 
Chinese insolvency system, Chinese legal scholars have suggested that 
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Chinese laws should involve more principles of universalism. Overall, with 
certain modifications and clarifications, the Chinese legal system has the 
potential, and could provide a solid foundation to apply the UNCITRAL Model 
Law system.  
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Chapter 5 Hong Kong: Insolvency Law and Its Approach to 
Solve Cross-Border Insolvency Issues 
During the 1970s and 1990s, the economic development of many Asian 
countries accelerated in pace and started to play a more important role in the 
international trading platform. With Hong Kong as one of the most significant 
examples of the development, its annual GDP growth rate being around 10% 
during that period.1 Hong Kong’s role as an international financial centre also 
developed significantly during that time. Benefiting from its geographical and 
economic advantage, Hong Kong has become an investment hub attracting 
capital from all over the world.2 More importantly, another reason why Hong 
Kong attracts vast amounts of foreign investment is that the small island has 
been the main access route for foreign investors seeking business expansion 
in mainland China.3 Similar to its financial position, Hong Kong's legal system 
also has its uniqueness and would draw the attention of both domestic and 
international business people and investors. The legal framework of Hong 
Kong is based on common law, which has been dramatically influenced by the 
English common law system, and also includes numbers of supplementary 
local legislation. After the Chinese government resumed sovereignty over 
Hong Kong in 1997, the legal system became more complicated under the 
“one country, two systems” system invented by former China leader, Deng 
Xiaoping.  
This Chapter examines how this unique legal and political history and 
economic position have influenced the forming of a corporate insolvency 
system, and the attitude toward cross-border insolvency. Section 1 briefly 
explains the historical and political backgrounds of Hong Kong’s legal system. 
Section 2 reviews the corporate insolvency system of the current legal system. 
Section 3 explores the solutions for inbound insolvency cases with 
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international elements under the Hong Kong corporate insolvency framework, 
which mainly includes the recognition of and assistance to foreign insolvency 
proceedings, and the ability to liquidate unregistered companies in Hong Kong. 
Finally, section 4 comparatively analyses the Hong Kong insolvency system 
with the UNCITRAL Model Law regime.  
 
5.1 A Brief History of Hong Kong’s Legal System 
The island of Hong Kong was occupied by the British in 1841. The Chinese 
government of the Qing Dynasty signed the Treaty of Nanking with the British 
government in 1842. After the Chinese government ratified the treaty in 1843, 
Hong Kong was formally ceded to Great Britain. The British government 
passed the Supreme Court Ordinance in 1844, which officially declared that 
English law should be applied in the colony of Hong Kong, and that was the 
first legislation stated in the reception of the English legal system in Hong 
Kong.4 Professor Chen indicated that this was the period of time when the 
foundation for legal pluralism in Hong Kong’s legal system was established.5 
In 1966, in order to resolve the complicated procedure of deciding whether the 
local law or English law will be the applicable law, the Application of English 
Law Ordinance was introduced, which stated that the English common law 
and the rules of equity and English Acts of Parliaments should be in force in 
Hong Kong.6 The ordinance was a milestone in Hong Kong’s legal history. In 
addition, the ordinance stated that the English law should be applied "so far 
as they may be applicable to the circumstances of Hong Kong or its 
inhabitants", which gave the local legislature more discretionary power in 
using English laws.7   
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During the nearly 150 years of British control, most of the local ordinances 
were copies of their English equivalents.8 The majority of judges, magistrates 
and law teachers were British. Hong Kong did not have any law schools until 
1969, and all the law students from Hong Kong had to go to England to get 
trained before the teaching of law started locally. Additionally, the language of 
the court was English. Since the reunification with China, the use of 
Cantonese and Chinese has become more common in courts; but English still 
plays the main role in Hong Kong's courts.9  
In 1984, the UK and Chinese governments signed the Joint Declaration on the 
Question of Hong Kong, in which the Chinese government officially resumed 
the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.10 
According to the declaration, the PRC’s National People’s Congress would 
enact the Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China (HKSAR), which serves as a constitutional 
document in Hong Kong, and regulates the fundamental issues such as how 
the local government is to be formed and operated, and the sources of laws 
in HKSAR.11  The concept of “one country, two systems” was developed 
during the negotiations between the two countries. It was originally invented 
to achieve reunification with Taiwan; it envisaged two systems - a socialist 
system on the mainland and a capitalist system in special administrative 
regions - co-existing in one country.12 The two official documents confirmed 
the implementation of the concept in Hong Kong, which guaranteed “China’s 
socialist system shall not be practised in Hong Kong and that the capitalist 
system shall remain unchanged for fifty years”, along with a high degree of 
                                                             
8 Chen Lei (n 5), 8-9. 
9 ibid, 8. 
10 Full name: Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
on the Question of Hong Kong, signed by Premier Zhao Ziyang of China and Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher of the UK in 1984. 
11  Hong Kong SAR, Some Facts about Basic Law, 
<http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/facts/index.html> accessed 20 September 2017. 
12 Ming K. Chan, ‘Imperfect Legacy: Defeats in the British Legal System in Colonial 
Hong Kong’ (1997) 18 Journal of International Law 133. 
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autonomy.13  
One of the most important articles of the Basic Law stated that “the law 
previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, 
ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law, shall be maintained, 
except for any that contravene this law, and subject to any amendment by the 
legislature of the HKSAR”.14 In preparation for the transfer of sovereignty, the 
government only made systematic changes in the legal system for fitting it into 
the Chinese legal framework. For example, the Court of Final Appeal was 
established to replace the Privy Council as the final appeal court; the Hong 
Kong Supreme Court had to be changed to the High Court of the HKSAR since 
the Supreme Court of China is the People's Supreme Court in Beijing. 
Additionally, some colonial legislation and orders were to be repealed and 
replaced by new HK legislation. The Basic Law provided a solution for the civil 
and commercial law of HKSAR to be developed based on the existing 
common law system.15 The new legal framework includes English laws that 
had been applied and were widely accepted in HK, supplemented by the new 
local legislation. In summary, the application of “one country, two systems” 
provided Hong Kong with a certain degree of autonomy, and the concept has 
been marked as “a significant breakthrough for the Chinese political and legal 
system”.16 It has been able to provide a stable transfer of sovereignty, as well 
as maintain the economic freedom and pluralistic culture of Hong Kong society. 
 
5.2 Overview of Insolvency System in Hong Kong 
Because of historical reasons, the insolvency system in Hong Kong has been 
heavily influenced by English laws. In 1990, the Law Reform Commission of 
                                                             
13 Article 5, Basic Law of HKSAR. 
14 Article 8, Basic Law of HKSAR. 
15 John McDermott, ‘The Rule of Law in Hong Kong after 1997’ (1997) 1 Loyola of 
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 263. 
16 Albert H.Y. Chen, ‘The Theory, Constitution and Practice of Autonomy: The Case 
of Hong Kong’, in Jorge Oliveira and Paulo Cardinal (ed.) One Country, Two Systems, 
Three Legal Orders – Perspectives of Evolution (Springer 2009). 
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Hong Kong conducted insolvency law reform, and the insolvency law 
committee divided the issue into three different parts, being personal 
insolvency, corporate rescue, and winding-up.17 As a result, The Bankruptcy 
Ordinance (BO), which mainly regulates the insolvency of individuals and was 
developed based on the Insolvency Act 1986 from the UK, was passed in 
1996. Matters of corporate insolvency are governed by Winding-up and 
Miscellaneous Provisions under the Company Ordinance (CO), which is 
supplemented by the Companies (Winding-up) Rules.18 Additionally, case law 
is another important source of law for insolvency issues. For the corporate 
rescue part, the Reform Commission proposed recommendations in a 
legislative form of a new chapter ("Provisional Supervision and Voluntary 
Arrangements”) in the CO.19 However, the legislature did not pass the bill. In 
the last two decades, the HKSAR government has continually put efforts into 
drafting the corporate rescue bill and given more attention to the matter. 
Especially after the Asian financial crisis in mid-1997, the idea of having 
statutory corporate rescue provisions has received strong support from many 
professionals and relevant stakeholders. 20  The newly amended bill was 
announced in 2014, and the target is to introduce the new bill into the 
legislative procedure in 2018.21 
5.2.1 Winding-up 
As with other common law jurisdictions, the definition of corporate insolvency 
under Hong Kong Law is based on the company’s inability to pay its debts. 
There are three broad considerations to identify whether a company can be 
                                                             
17 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report of Corporate Rescue and 
Insolvent Trading (October 1996) 1. 
18 Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32) (HK). 
19 The new chapter was proposed in legislative form as Companies (Amendment) 
Bill 2000. Please see details in Legislative Council Brief: Companies (Amendment) 
Bill 2000. <https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/bc/bc06/general/79_brf.pdf> 
accessed 12 May 2017. 
20 John Kong Shan Ho and Rohan Price, ‘Bringing Corporate Rescue Laws to Hong 
Kong: A Reform Too Big to Fail’ (2011) 12 Business Law International 71. 
21  Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs, ‘Consultation Conclusions on 
Corporate Insolvency Law Improvement Exercise and Detailed proposals on a new 
Statutory Corporate Rescue Procedure’ CB (1)1536/13V14 (01), 7 July 2014. 
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wound-up: 
 The debtor fails to pay a debt of a sum in excess HK$ 10000 which is 
due and subject to written demand (known as Statutory Demand) within 
21 days; 
 The debtor fails to satisfy a judgment or order of the court in favour of 
a creditor for a sum of more than HK$10,000; 
 The court believes that it is just and equitable the company should be 
wound up, taking into account any disputes among shareholders or 
creditors, or any contingent and prospective liabilities of the company.22  
When making the decision, the court may apply either the cash flow test or 
the balance sheet test as they are appropriate in all circumstances. Under the 
current insolvency system, creditors have different options if the company 
appears to be in severe financial straits. 
Voluntary Winding-up 
A creditors' voluntary liquidation will occur where the company decides to put 
itself into voluntary liquidation, so there is no certificate of solvency filed, and 
a special resolution has been passed by the directors. 23  A meeting of 
creditors must be held on the same day as the meeting of shareholders which 
passed the special resolution (or the following day), and creditors have control 
over the winding-up proceeding.24  There are various formal requirements as 
to the notice of the relevant meetings of shareholders and creditors. A 
statement of affairs of the company must be laid before the relevant meeting 
of creditors, and any nomination of a liquidator by the meeting of creditors will 
prevail over any contrary nomination by the shareholders. 
Hong Kong legislation also contains provisions which allow the directors of a 
                                                             
22 For detailed conditions: Section 178, Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Ordinance. 
23 Section 233, Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance 
(HK). 
24 Section 241, Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance 
(HK). 
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company to commence a voluntary winding-up without a meeting of members, 
and such an approach is only available when the company is solvent. This 
type of winding-up is initiated by a director's resolution that, amongst other 
things, the company cannot, because of its liabilities, continue its business, 
and that it is not reasonably practicable to commence the winding-up in any 
different manner. A statement signed by one of the directors and covering the 
matters in the resolution must be delivered to the Hong Kong Registrar of 
Companies within seven days of being made.25 A director who makes the 
statement without having reasonable grounds for believing so shall be liable 
to a fine and imprisonment.26  Following the delivery of the statement to the 
Hong Kong Registrar of Companies, a provisional liquidator must be 
appointed.  Subsequently, from the date of the first meeting of creditors 
onwards, a winding-up under this procedure progresses in the same manner 
as a creditors' voluntary winding-up commenced by a meeting of members.   
Compulsory liquidation 
Compulsory liquidation is initiated with the presentation to the Court of a 
petition for the winding-up of the company. The petition may be presented by 
various parties including creditors and the company itself. The party 
presenting the petition must satisfy certain notice, filing and advertising 
requirements. On hearing the petition, the Court will make an order for the 
compulsory winding-up of the company if it is satisfied that one of the following 
grounds for the Court to wind-up a company exists:27 
 the company has by special resolution resolved that the company be 
wound up by the Court;  
 the company does not commence its business within a year from its 
incorporation or suspends its business for a whole year;  
                                                             
25  Section 233 (1), Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Ordinance (HK). 
26  Section 233 (3), Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Ordinance (HK). 
27 Section 177, Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance 
(HK). 
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 the company has no members;  
 the company is unable to pay its debts  
 the event, if any, occurs on the occurrence of which the memorandum 
and articles provide that the company is to be dissolved; or  
 the Court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company 
should be wound up.  
5.2.2 Restructuring and Corporate Rescue 
It is not uncommon for creditors of a large company in financial difficulty to 
attempt to negotiate an informal restructuring agreement with the Company. It 
is important to emphasise that restructurings can take many different forms. It 
could be reaching an agreement with the company's banks agreeing to give 
the company more time to repay its debts; most or all of the creditors need to 
accept that they probably will never be paid 100% of their debts and the 
company needs more time to pay. This requires the co-operation of all of the 
major creditors of the company as, if one of the creditors proceeds to wind up 
the Company, any agreement reached is likely to be set aside. A restructuring 
agreement usually includes asset reorganisation and additional investment 
from the company’s shareholders or outside investors in Hong Kong. Statutory 
procedures such as provisional liquidation and schemes of arrangement can 
also be used to implement a restructuring proposal. 
Despite a large number of restructurings in Hong Kong in recent years, it must 
be pointed out that the law for restructuring is far from satisfactory. Although 
the concept of corporate rescue has been well-recognised and corporate 
rescue regimes have been officially established in many countries, Hong Kong 
is probably the only financial centre in the world without a formal statutory 
corporate restructuring mechanism.  
Schemes of Arrangement 
Currently, since there are no formal laws providing methods of company 
rescue and restructuring, the Scheme of Arrangement, which is governed by 
section 666 to section 675 under the Companies Ordinance, is the only 
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statutory method for creditors to achieve a restructuring arrangement. By 
using such an arrangement, insolvent companies can make a compromise or 
arrangement with its creditors, or any class of the creditors. Arrangements 
may include variations of contractual terms, for example, freezing of payment 
of interest or capital; exchanges of debt for equity in related companies; or 
payment to unsecured creditors to compromise debts outstanding. 28 
Moreover, the using of a scheme of arrangement is not limited to companies 
in financial difficulties or potential insolvency. 29  The shareholders and/or 
creditors of any Hong Kong company are free at any time to attempt to reach 
a binding agreement under the scheme of arrangement procedure.  
Before submitting the formal application of the arrangement to the court, the 
proposed scheme has to be approved by the meetings of creditors or class of 
creditors or shareholders that may be affected by the scheme.30 A successful 
plan has to be accepted by a majority, in number representing 75% in value 
of the creditors and/or shareholders. 31  Then, the Court has an ultimate 
discretion whether to sanction any scheme of arrangement, and will consider 
whether the requirements of the Companies Ordinance have been complied 
with, whether the majority proposing the Scheme is acting bona fide, and if 
the arrangement is fair to all creditors in the circumstances.32 Once the court 
decides to approve the plan, it will be binding on all creditors or class of 
creditors.  
The advantage of the scheme of arrangement is that the proposed plan does 
not have to be approved by all the creditors and the effect of the plan is binding 
on all creditors if sanctioned. However, there are some shortcomings in the 
method. Firstly, there is no statutory moratorium under the current procedure, 
so before the plan is approved by the court, it does not stop individual creditors 
from commencing further actions against the company. For example, secured 
                                                             
28 Patrick Yung, ‘The Law of Corporate Rescue and Reform in Hong Kong’ (2013) 34 
(4) Company Law 126, 131. 
29 ibid. 
30 Section 671-672, Companies Ordinance (HK). 
31 Section 674 (1) (a), Companies Ordinance (HK). 
32 Section 674, Companies Ordinance (HK). 
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creditors can continue the legal action of seizing the relevant property listed 
in the loan agreement. Unsecured creditors can also apply for winding-up if 
the company meets the requirements under the Companies Ordinance for 
winding-up. Hence, without a moratorium in the insolvency system, it is 
possible that the effort of negotiating an agreement could be destroyed by 
individual actions.33 It is understandable that creditors with priority or with 
valid security interests are less willing to support restructuring plans since they 
are already well-protected. Hong Kong practitioners and legal experts have 
recommended adding a statutory moratorium, which allows the company 
more time to negotiate a better plan.  
Provisional liquidation 
Provisional liquidation itself is a part of the compulsory winding-up procedure, 
and a provisional liquidator may be appointed to protect the company’s assets 
in the period between the date of filing petition and the date on which any 
order is to be made. In recent years, insolvency practitioners in Hong Kong 
have also used the method to facilitate restructuring plans. For instance, since 
all legal actions against the company automatically stay when the provisional 
liquidator is appointed, it solves the problem of lack of moratorium in the 
scheme of arrangement.  
The practice of using a provisional liquidator in this particular way was first 
discussed in Re Keview Technology (BVI) Ltd. 34  In this case, the Bank 
(creditor) presented a wind-up petition and subsequently, provisional 
liquidators were appointed. If the company were to be wound up, there would 
be little chance of any recovery for the creditors. However, certain potential 
investors were proposing a restructuring of certain key elements in the 
company, which would result in substantial sums becoming available to the 
company’s creditors. The petitioner and the provisional liquidators applied to 
extend the powers of the provisional liquidators as part of a proposed 
restructuring exercise. The court pointed out that the participation of 
                                                             
33 Patrick Yung (n 28), 131. 
34 Keview Technology (BVI) Ltd, Re [2002] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 290 (CFI (HK)). 
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provisional liquidator in the rescue plan was quite outside the normal powers 
of the job; nevertheless, the court ruled the power of provisional liquidator 
could be expanded. Yuen J stated that: 
“If the proposed restructuring would be in the best interests of the creditors, 
given the level of their support for the provisional liquidators participation, and 
in the absence of any evidence of mismanagement by directors such as would 
require the company to be wound up without delay for investigations to be 
done, I see no reason why the court should restrict the powers of provisional 
liquidators seeking to work out a rescue operation before the court has to 
determine whether the company should be wound-up……the above 
considerations would be consistent with what has been called the rescue 
culture, what is in effect an attempt to maximise recovery for creditors by 
saving the company if it is a viable alternative to a minimised recovery on a 
winding-up”35 
The judge also emphasised that applying for a provisional liquidator to effect 
a freeze on actions against the company and facilitate a rescue plan is not 
abusing the winding-up procedure, thus presenting a positive confirmation of 
the approach. This innovative way of using the existing legal framework is an 
excellent example of the flexibility of the Hong Kong Courts to develop an 
insolvency law where legislation is sometimes too slow to act. 
After this case, the decision was widely applied in different corporate 
insolvency cases in Hong Kong, and courts have become more liberal in 
appointing the provisional liquidators.36 However, the opposite view thinks 
that the appointment of a provisional liquidator is a statutory power and not a 
common law power, so the court has no authority to extend the power; 
moreover, the Companies Ordinance states that the provisional liquidator 
should only be appointed for "conducting the proceedings in the winding-up of 
a company and performing related duties", which do not include the concept 
                                                             
35 ibid, para 13-14, per YUEN J. 
36 Patrick Yung (n 28). 
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of corporate rescue.37  
 
5.3 Cross-Border Insolvency in Hong Kong 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, universalism and territorialism are the two primary 
approaches for solving cross-border insolvency issues, and it has been 
discussed that “modified universalism” could be the most acceptable and 
practical method to be applied by different jurisdictions, since it allows each 
jurisdiction to apply its substantive insolvency law, but also to exercise 
discretionary power to cooperate with foreign insolvency proceedings. Under 
Hong Kong law, since there are no statutory provisions in the Company 
Ordinance that regulate transnational insolvency issues, modified 
universalism has frequently been adopted by the Hong Kong courts based on 
the common law approach.38 Traditionally, the Hong Kong courts have had 
very good tradition and willingness to co-operate with foreign insolvency 
proceedings. The common law power of granting assistance and recognition 
to foreign insolvency proceedings in Hong Kong was established in 1979, 
following English case law.39 The position has been reinforced in recent years 
with the increasing number of cases that have involved international elements. 
In a case decided in 2014, Joint Official Liquidators of A Co v B, Harris J also 
emphasised the application of the approach of modified universalism by 
referencing cases from other common law jurisdictions, saying that 
“universalism” or “modified universalism” is the main trend in solving 
international insolvency problems in the common law world.40 
                                                             
37  Charles D Booth, Stephen Briscoe, and ELG Tyler, Hong Kong Corporate 
Insolvency Manual (3rd edn, LexisNexis 2014). 
38 ibid, 248-249. 
39 Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] H.K.L.R. 512 at 
514–521. . 
40 Joint Official Liquidators of A Company v B [2014] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 374, para 9–10, 
per Harris J. 
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5.3.1 Recognition of Foreign Insolvencies 
In Hong Kong, because of the distinction between the personal bankruptcy 
law and corporate insolvency law, the conditions for recognition of foreign 
bankruptcy and corporate winding-up are also distinguished. Foreign 
bankruptcy cases can be recognised when declared by a court in the 
jurisdiction in which the debtor was domiciled at the commencement of the 
bankruptcy, or the debtor submits to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.41  
Concerning recognition of foreign winding-up, the general principle is that a 
foreign order would be recognised if it was made under the law of the place of 
the company's incorporation.42 However, similar to the English insolvency law, 
there are some exceptions to the recognition being granted, including that the 
debtor conducts business within the jurisdiction of the foreign court and the 
company submits to the foreign court.43 Furthermore, it is held that if winding-
up is unlikely to happen in the jurisdiction in which the company is 
incorporated, recognition is also possible to be granted. 44  That was the 
situation in the case Re Russo-Asiatic Bank.45 The bank was incorporated in 
Russia and had branch offices in Shanghai, London, and Hong Kong. The 
Hong Kong court followed the English approach held that there was no 
winding-up proceeding in the jurisdiction of incorporation, and no other court 
could be regarded as the principal court to govern the winding-up. But the 
court granted the recognition to the English liquidation of the bank’s London 
branch permitting the London appointed liquidator to submit claims of English 
creditors.  
If the foreign proceeding fulfils the conditions discussed above, Hong Kong 
                                                             
41 Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd. v. States Steamship Co. [1979] H.K.L.R. 512, 514-
521. 
42 Re Irish Shipping [1985] H.K.L.R. 437, 439. 
43 Charles D. Booth, ‘The Transnational Aspects of Hong Kong Insolvency Law’ 
(1995) 2 SW.J.L. & Trade Am.1; Charles D.  Booth, ‘Living in Uncertain Times: The 
Need to Strengthen Hong Kong Transnational Insolvency Law’ (1996) 34 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 389. 
44 ibid. 
45 Re Russo-Asiatic Bank [1930] 24 H.K.L.R 16. 
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courts also have the right to refuse the recognition if the recognition would be 
contrary to local public policy, or the foreign insolvency decree has been made 
as a result of fraud or in breach of the rules of natural justice, or the foreign 
proceedings are an attempt to enforce a foreign penal or revenue law.46 The 
Joint Administrators of African Minerals Ltd v Madison Pacific Trust Ltd would 
be a good example to show the grounds for refusing recognition. In this recent 
case, the Hong Kong court refused to grant assistance to administrators 
appointed by the English court on the grounds that there were no equitable 
principles under Hong Kong local law. With an administration order from the 
English court, the administrators sought assistance from the Hong Kong court 
to restrain the enforcement of security over the shares controlled by the 
security agent in Hong Kong. The court held that the purpose of the 
moratorium created by the administration order in the UK was to prevent 
disposal of the company's assets in that jurisdiction, but there is no equivalent 
of the UK administration process under the local law, and no statutory 
provision for providing a moratorium on enforcement of the secured debt.47 
Therefore, the administrator's application for assistance was refused. The 
judge pointed out that although the court can have a generous view of 
assisting foreign proceedings, the power should be limited within the local 
insolvency regime and common law and equitable principles.48 The legal 
reasoning from Singularis Holdings v PricewaterhouseCoopers was applied 
here, which held common law power of assisting cross-border insolvency is 
subject to local statutory and common law rules and public policy.49  
However, Harris J also pointed out that although a moratorium on enforcement 
of security cannot be provided because Hong Kong does not have a similar 
arrangement, a similar effect to recognising an administration order can be 
achieved by way of injunction; for example, if it could be proved that the 
                                                             
46 Charles D. Booth and others (n 37), 249. 
47 ibid, para 12. 
48 ibid, para 11. 
49 Singularis Holdings v PricewaterhouseCooper [2014] UKPC 597, para 19 per Lord 
Sumption. 
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proposed enforcement would improperly prejudice the equity of redemption.50  
This shows that even if the common law powers might sometimes be limited, 
Hong Kong judges are prepared to offer assistance in a pragmatic manner.   
5.3.2 Winding up an Unregistered Company 
It is held that the Hong Kong courts have the inherent jurisdiction to assist a 
foreign representative from any jurisdiction, including recognising their 
appointment and powers over the insolvent company’s assets.51 Therefore, 
commencing a winding-up to reach a foreign company's assets in Hong Kong 
may not be necessary. However, foreign representatives should consider filing 
a winding-up petition in a Hong Kong court if they cannot receive sufficient 
assistance from non-winding up approaches, or if the unsecured creditors 
would benefit from some of the effects of the proceeding that is not available 
under other approaches. Those effects may include that the stay of legal 
actions or proceedings against the company once the winding-up order has 
been made, or a provisional liquidator has been appointed, or the powers to 
conduct a detailed investigation of the avoidance of uncompleted attachments 
or executions.52  
Under the company law of Hong Kong, all the companies incorporated outside 
of Hong Kong are referred to as non-Hong Kong companies, and can be 
wound-up as unregistered companies, according to Part X of the Winding Up 
and Miscellaneous Provisions under Company Ordinances.53 Section 326 
defines the meaning of "unregistered companies," which includes any 
                                                             
50 Administrators of African Minerals Limited v. Madison Pacific Trust Limited [2015] 
4 HKC215, para 12 per Harris J. 
51 Robert-Jan Temmink and Turlough Stone, ‘The Hong Kong Court Looks at the 
‘Sufficient Connection’ Test to Liquidate Foreign Registered Company’ (2016) 13 
International Corporate Rescue 157. 
52 Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance: Section 221 
Power to summon persons suspected of having the property of the company; Section 
222 Power to order public examination of promoters, directors, etc; Section 269 
Restriction of rights of creditor as to execution or attachment in case of company 
being wound up (HK). 
53 Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (HK). 
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partnership, limited partnership, association, and company.54  Section 327 
makes it clear that any unregistered company may be wound up under the 
law, with exceptions such as an unregistered company which may not be 
wound voluntarily, and subsection (3) provides the conditions for winding-up: 
(a) If the company is dissolved, or had ceased to carry on business, or is 
carrying on business only for the purpose of winding up its affairs; 
(b) If the company is unable to pay its debts 
(c) If the court is of the opinion that it is just equitable that the company 
should be wound up. 
Additionally, subsection (4) provides detailed conditions of proving an 
unregistered company’s inability to pay its debts.55 
There is no provision under Part X allowing foreign representatives to open 
winding-up proceedings, but in practice, the court has allowed petitions by 
foreign representatives on behalf of foreign companies. The court held that 
where a foreign representative decides that it would be beneficial to wind-up 
the foreign company in Hong Kong, he must either convince one of the foreign 
company's creditors to file a petition or petition himself on behalf of the foreign 
company. The latter approach is more common and was adopted recently.56  
5.3.2.1 Jurisdiction 
The jurisdictional connection between the foreign company and Hong Kong is 
not required for a Hong Kong court to wind-up the company, so the court's 
decisions on this matter could vary from case to case. Traditionally, the 
jurisdiction to wind-up a foreign company in Hong Kong is based on the 
presence of assets. The basis was discussed in a notable Hong Kong case, 
Re Irish Shipping. 57  The court confirmed that it is sufficient to found 
                                                             
54 ibid, Section 326 Meaning of unregistered companies. 
55 ibid, Section 327 Winding up of Unregistered Companies. 
56 Re Information Security One Ltd [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D 780. 
57 Re Irish Shipping [1985] H.K.L.R. 437. 
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jurisdiction if there are assets in Hong Kong when the petition is heard.58 
Furthermore, after this case, it was discussed that the time for deciding the 
jurisdiction should be the date that the winding-up petition is presented.59 
However, with social and legal developments, it became accepted that the 
presence of assets is not the sole basis for winding-up foreign companies. 
The test of sufficient connection is held to be more effective in resolving 
modern international issues.60 By referencing the English decision on this 
issue, there are three core requirements for courts winding up foreign 
companies.61 In a recent case, Pioneer Iron and Steel Group Co Ltd,62the 
Hong Kong Court confirmed the court's discretionary jurisdiction to wind-up an 
unregistered company under s.327 and reinforced the three core 
requirements: 
1. there is sufficient connection with Hong Kong (in the context of 
insolvency this is commonly indicated by the presence of assets, but 
this is not essential); 
2. there is a reasonable possibility that the winding-up order would benefit 
those applying for it, and 
3. the court must be able to exercise jurisdiction over one or more persons 
interested in the distribution of the company’s assets. 
In addition, the judge also emphasised that the court should apply those 
requirements according to the different facts of specific cases, Harris J said 
that:  
“The significance of each requirement will vary from case to case. An 
exceptional case may arise in which the connection with Hong Kong is so 
strong and the benefits of a winding-up order for creditors of a company so 
substantial that the court will be willing to exercise its jurisdiction despite the 
                                                             
58 Re Irish Shipping [1985] H.K.L.R. 437 at 444. 
59 Charles D. Booth, ‘Living in Uncertain Times: The Need to Strengthen Hong Kong 
Transnational Insolvency Law’ (1996) 34 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 389. 
60 Charles D Booth and others (n 37), 255-257. 
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third criteria not being satisfied.”63 
Such a situation described by Harris J happened not long after the Pioneer 
case was decided. The liquidator appointed by the Cayman Islands liquidation 
proceedings in the China Medical Technologies case sought to wind up the 
company in Hong Kong, and to use the extensive examination powers and 
avoidance provisions under Hong Kong company ordinances.64 While the first 
two requirements were met, the third one was the main issue here. The 
relevant fact was that the debtor owed US$4,139 to a Hong Kong law firm, 
which was only a tiny amount of its total outstanding debts of US$40 million. 
Following his judgment from the previous case, Harris J stated that the 
discretionary power of applying the three requirements could be moderated if 
the circumstances explicitly call for it, and for the current case: "unless the 
connection with Hong Kong is very strong and the benefits to creditors 
substantial, the petition fails.65 In order to prove the very strong connection, 
the court should be satisfied that Hong Kong was apparently central to the 
company's principal activities. The judge held that it failed to prove that, so the 
connection with Hong Kong was not strong enough to ignore the third 
requirement. Nevertheless, the case was re-opened, and the winding-up 
petition was granted because of the submission of important new evidence 
showing the company's strong connection with Hong Kong.   
Based on this case, the judge further clarified the application of the three 
requirements. First, the general rule is that all the three requirements should 
be satisfied for the Hong Kong court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
unregistered company. Regarding the third requirement, it will be fulfilled if 
there are persons with sufficient connection with Hong Kong other than just 
the petitioner or a creditor, and sufficient economic interests in the local 
winding-up: for example, if one creditor or a group of creditors hold a 
substantial portion of the debt owned by the debtor. Secondly, Judge Harris 
also emphasised the role of the three core requirements in determining 
                                                             
63 ibid, Harris J, para 28. 
64 Re China Medical Technologies, Inc [2014] 2 HKLRD 997. 
65 Re China Medical Technologies, Inc [2014] 2 HKLRD 997, para 55, per Harris J. 
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whether to exercise jurisdiction. The core requirements constitute guidance 
for the court to be observed in applying jurisdiction, rather than pre-conditions 
for the existence of the jurisdiction.66 This is relevant when courts need to 
decide whether to use the discretion to wind-up an unregistered company. 
Finally, it would be in exceptional cases that courts were to grant the winding-
up where the third requirement was not satisfied. In order to do that, the court 
should be satisfied that the first and second conditions are sufficiently fulfilled; 
additionally, whether Hong Kong is central to the company's principal activities 
is another issue that the local court will look at.67 
Since the consideration of sufficient connection has been well-developed and 
accepted, one confusion may be raised about the application of the presence 
of an assets test. The argument is about whether the presence of assets is 
still an independent basis for a Hong Kong court to exercise jurisdiction over 
foreign companies, or whether it is an element to be considered under the 
sufficient connection approach. Currently, it seems that the latter opinion was 
adopted by the courts, and the court said the fact that a foreign debtor's assets 
are in Hong Kong is relevant in considering whether there is sufficient 
connection.68  
In the case Zhu Kuan Group Co Ltd, the judge discussed the connection 
between the presence of assets and the test of sufficient connection. The 
judge cited the three core requirements from the English authority while 
discussing the foreign company’s assets located in Hong Kong, saying that “it 
seems to me that the existence of assets within the jurisdiction may……serve 
to demonstrate a real connection between the company whose winding-up is 
petitioned for and Hong Kong, thus satisfying the first core requirement - that 
there should be shown to be a sufficient connection with Hong Kong”.69  So 
it was clear the court treats assets in Hong Kong as an important factor 
regarding satisfying those core requirements. However, the decision was 
                                                             
66 Re China Medical Technologies, Inc [2014] 2 HKLRD 997, para 50, per Harris J.  
67 Re China Medical Technologies, Inc [2014] 2 HKLRD 997, para 58, per Harris J. 
68 Re Zhu Kuan Group Co Ltd [2004] HKCU 1047. 
69 ibid, para 30. 
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criticised by Professor Charles D Booth saying that combining two 
jurisdictional tests into one was an "unfortunate development," and would 
encourage jurisdictional battles. 70  He thinks the Hong Kong courts 
misunderstand the purpose of the sufficient connection test introduced by the 
English authority, which is to provide some flexibility in situations where a 
foreign company does not have assets in England.71 For a certain number of 
cases, foreign debtors’ assets located in the jurisdiction could be self-evident, 
so parties do not need to prove that, and should pay more attention to arguing 
whether the court should exercise its discretion. By applying the approach 
adopted in the case, the need for courts to analyse the significance of debtors' 
assets in Hong Kong would be frequent, which is apparently not an effective 
approach to solving cross-border insolvency. 
5.3.2.2 The New Development of Offshore Companies Cases 
Regarding the winding up of unregistered companies in Hong Kong, one 
problematic situation is related to the filing of offshore holding companies from 
jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands (BVI). It 
cannot be denied that having a holding company in those jurisdictions has 
been a valuable commercial feature in Hong Kong and the global business 
community since such companies offer benefits including assets security, tax-
neutral status, and flexibility in dealing with company matters.72 As a place 
famous for successful family-owned companies, the normal structure of those 
Hong Kong family-owned companies is that businesses and assets are held 
directly or indirectly by a foreign offshore parent company.73 With the unstable 
global economic condition in recent years, the number of cases seeking such 
                                                             
70 Charles D Booth and others (n 37), 259. 
71 ibid. 
72 Mourant Ozannes, ‘Yung Kee – an Offshore Perspective: The Winding up of BVI 
and Cayman Islands Companies in Hong Kong’ (May 2013), Mourant Ozannes, 
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4 September 2017. 
73 Fu-Lai Tony Yu and Diana S. Kwan, ‘Family Business Succession in Hong Kong: 
The Case of Yung Kee’ (2013) 7 Frontiers of Business Research in China 433. 
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holding companies to be wound-up in the Hong Kong courts is increasing.  
Those companies generally do not carry out any principal business activities 
in Hong Kong; therefore, according to the analysis above, petitions to wind up 
those companies would possibly be held unsuccessful on the grounds of 
insufficient connection with Hong Kong. In such a situation, shareholders have 
to focus on seeking remedies from the court of the company’s place of 
incorporation, with sufficient legal expenses and time. However, a case in 
2015 decided by the Hong Kong court, Kam Leung Sui Kwan v Kam Kwan Lai 
(also known as the Yung Kee case), could be a changing point on this matter, 
as it took a noteworthy step forward in allowing local courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over offshore companies under the sufficient connection 
requirement.74    
In that case, Yung Kee was a very famous traditional restaurant in Hong Kong. 
The holding company of the restaurant was called Yung Kee Holding Ltd 
(YKHL), which was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and was not 
registered under the Company Ordinances. Not long after the death of the 
founder, his two sons, who were the two major shareholders of the company, 
ultimately fell out with each other. The son with the minority shareholding 
brought a petition against his brother and YKHL, seeking an order from the 
Hong Kong Court to force his brother to buy out his shareholding, or 
alternatively to order the winding-up of the company, on the grounds that the 
operation of the company had been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial 
to him as a member, which is one of three grounds to wind up unregistered 
companies under s.327.75 Both the first instance and appeal courts ruled that 
the Hong Kong Court had no jurisdiction to make either the order to enforce 
the buy-out or the order to wind-up the foreign company without sufficient 
connection with Hong Kong.  
Although the restaurant and other family businesses are in Hong Kong, the 
                                                             
74 Kam Leung Sui Kwan v Kam Kwan Lai and others [2015] HKCFA 91; FACV 4/2015. 
75  Section327 (3) (c). Company (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Ordinance (HK). 
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court held that the BVI holding company did not directly hold those businesses 
or properties, and it was a parent company of another BVI company which 
was directly holding those assets. Therefore, the judge considered that the 
company in question was an investment holding company with no assets, 
business operations or connections with Hong Kong. The presence of money 
in a Hong Kong account and the use of local banks could not satisfy the 
requirement of sufficient connection. The court further emphasised that, 
although the Hong Kong courts had been generous about assisting foreign 
insolvency proceedings and winding-up unregistered companies, it was still 
an exorbitant power to wind-up a company incorporated in another jurisdiction, 
and this power should only be used in exceptional circumstances.76 The 
courts should not make loose interpretations of the meaning of "sufficient 
connection." The case was appealed to the court of final appeal.   
At the end of 2015, the court of final appeal made a significant ruling, which 
stated that the requirements for sufficient connection had been met and the 
winding-up order was made by the court; however, the court also gave the 
parties 28 days to consider the opportunity of buy-out as an alternative to 
winding-up. The judgment overturned the decision and analysis about the 
discretion of exercising jurisdiction over offshore holding companies and 
explained in detail how to build the connection between offshore companies 
and Hong Kong. 
In order to build such a connection, the crucial first point that should be noticed 
is the differences between the creditor’s petition and the shareholder’s petition. 
The starting point is that:  
“Shareholders, no less than creditors, are entitled to bring winding-up 
proceedings in Hong Kong……and in either case, they must establish a 
sufficient connection between the place of incorporation and Hong Kong."77  
The two factors distinguishing the two different types of petitions are the 
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nature of the dispute and the purpose for seeking the winding-up order. In the 
case of a petition brought by a creditor, the dispute is between the petitioner 
(creditor) and the company.78 But in a shareholder’s petition, the dispute is 
between the petitioner (shareholder) and other shareholders, so the company 
is a subject of, rather than a party to, the dispute.79 With regard to the purpose, 
creditors are looking to winding-up to repay their debts, and the shareholders' 
main purpose is to realise their investment in the company.80 Accordingly, for 
a shareholder's petition, such as in the current case, the presence of 
shareholders in the jurisdiction should be a critical factor to be considered in 
deciding whether there is sufficient connection between the company and 
jurisdiction; as the judge stated, “their presence in the jurisdiction is highly 
relevant and will usually be the most important single factor”. 81 
Secondly, the court clarified that, although the companies and shareholders 
are “separate and distinct legal entities”, which was one of the main reasons 
why the lower courts established an insufficient connection analysis, it does 
not mean there is no connection between them.82 Such a connection could 
be established through shareholders or subsidiaries. The court recognised the 
close connection between a holding company and the assets of its direct and 
indirect subsidiaries, and said that “there is no doctrinal reason to exclude a 
connection through a wholly owned subsidiary”.83 Furthermore, the court of 
final appeal also emphasised that three core requirements are not statutory 
but self-imposed constraints adopted by the court, so the application is not 
about its legal interpretation, but a question of degree. 84 The court should 
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83 ibid; Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo [2008] 11 HKCFAR 370; Paul Apáthy, 
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make decisions based on the specific material facts since the nature of the 
connection will vary from case to case.   
The milestone decision from the Hong Kong court of final appeal extended the 
discretionary power of exercising jurisdiction in the winding-up of offshore 
companies. The judgment will benefit shareholders based in Hong Kong 
looking to wind-up foreign holding companies with assets held in Hong Kong, 
particularly for those offshore companies holding Hong Kong assets through 
wholly owned subsidiaries, which can be a very common corporate structure 
for Hong Kong businesses. In addition, the considerable flexibility in applying 
the three core requirements for the sufficient connection test shows that Hong 
Kong courts are willing to examine all the relevant facts involving foreign 
companies, and to review and consider all possible options with an 
appropriate degree of discretion. Under the principle of modified universalism, 
Hong Kong courts have increasingly shown they are prepared to co-operate 
and assist. 
5.3.2.3 Secondary Proceedings in Hong Kong 
After the jurisdiction requirement has been satisfied, the courts have to decide 
whether to grant the winding-up order. Under common law, the courts have 
the discretion to dismiss a winding-up petition and not make the order. For 
instance, the court might refuse to make the order on the grounds that Hong 
Kong is not the most appropriate forum for the issue. As we discussed above, 
Hong Kong courts have been applying modified universalism under the 
common law to solve cross-border insolvency cases, which allows the 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and the commencement of an 
independent local proceeding in Hong Kong. This should be distinguished 
from the two different secondary proceedings that might proceed in Hong 
Kong. 
The first type is ancillary insolvency, which means that the courts think it would 
be best to act as an assistant proceeding to the foreign proceeding, and would 
like to cooperate with the liquidator in the collection and preservation of the 
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assets in Hong Kong.85 In such a situation, the court considers more about 
what types of cooperation could be provided rather than whether the winding-
up order should be made. Hence, the court will deal with the case by using 
Hong Kong’s substantive insolvency law; after paying the expenses of the 
local proceeding, an order might be made to turn over the surplus assets to 
the foreign proceeding for distributing to all creditors of the foreign company.86 
In Irish Shipping, the court discussed the conditions in which such ancillary 
proceedings could be granted. Firstly, there should be satisfactory reasons 
given by the creditors who oppose the local winding-up order. Secondly, the 
court must consider the interests of the unsecured creditors and public 
interests. Thirdly, the court should consider the “comity of nations whereby it 
is desirable that the court should assist the liquidator in another jurisdiction to 
carry out his duties, unless good reasons to the contrary have been put 
forward”.87   
The second type is concurrent insolvency. Once the court found that the 
connection between the foreign company and foreign proceeding are not 
substantial enough to justify the ancillary proceeding, a total independent 
winding-up proceeding would be ordered. Under such an approach, each 
proceeding will deal with assets located in its jurisdiction, and make payments 
to creditors in a separate proceeding. However, cooperation still can be 
achieved; for example, the liquidator appointed by the Hong Kong court may 
reach an agreement with the foreign liquidator about distribution among 
creditors, and once such an order is approved by the court, worldwide 
distribution is still possible. 
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5.4 Comparative Analysis of the UNCITRAL Model Law  
Hong Kong’s legal community and courts are no stranger to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The first time the official document 
discussing the United Nations proposed system was acknowledged was in the 
Report on the Winding-up Provisions of the Companies Ordinance published 
in 1996.88 The Law Reform Commission stated that harmonising the laws of 
insolvency internationally should be encouraged, and the system introduced 
by the UNCITRAL was favourable to providing a modern, harmonised and fair 
legislative framework to address more effectively instances of cross-border 
insolvency; however, since the development and application of the law was 
still at an early stage, the commission thought Hong Kong should be cautious 
about its adoption and that "watch and wait" was probably a good idea, until 
more leading jurisdictions adopting the law.89 Nevertheless, the commission 
also pointed out that enacting the law would be beneficial to Hong Kong 
business interests, and Hong Kong's decision on this matter would 
undoubtedly influence neighbouring jurisdictions; it also suggested that in 
redrafting the winding-up provisions, the broad definitions provided in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law guide should be considered.90 In recent years, with 
the increasing number of international insolvency cases filed in Hong Kong, 
the local judges have frequently made references to the Model Law 
approaches, or to the cases from other common law jurisdictions where 
decisions have been made based on the Model Law; more importantly, the 
judges generally expressed their agreement over the system proposed by the 
law. 91  Since there are no statutory regulations relating to cross-border 
insolvency and all legal principles are from common law, it seems that the 
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solutions Hong Kong courts applied share some similarities with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.  
5.4.1 Recognition 
Recognition is one of the main features of the Model Law, which aims to 
provide an effective system for recognising foreign insolvency proceedings.92 
Under the law, a local court may recognise the foreign proceedings as foreign 
main proceedings or non-main proceedings, and the concept of centre of main 
interests (COMI) will be applied here to make the decisions. Article 16 
provides the general rule of deciding if the location of the COMI is the debtor’s 
registered office, which can be rebutted if there is clear evidence showing the 
COMI is located somewhere else. Under common law powers in Hong Kong, 
the courts have the right to recognise foreign proceedings opened in the 
jurisdiction where the company is incorporated. Therefore, the starting point 
of recognition under both systems is the incorporation place of the debtor. The 
difference is that there is some automatic relief under the Model Law after the 
recognition is granted, in order to protect local assets, and the relief or 
assistance that Hong Kong courts may be granted are discretionary. 
One of the main reasons that the Model Law applied the COMI was to face 
the modern business development that one company's registered place and 
its main managerial and operational centre are not necessary at the same 
location.93 By using the COMI, it could prevent forum shopping and make sure 
that there is sufficient connection between the debtor and the jurisdiction 
governing the insolvency proceeding. There is no similar rule in Hong Kong 
common law dealing with such a situation, so it is still unclear whether the 
Hong Kong court would recognise a foreign proceeding from the jurisdiction 
where the debtor's central business operation is located, but not the place of 
its incorporation. Since the Hong Kong law allows courts to liquidate foreign 
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companies with extended jurisdiction rules, the local creditors or shareholders 
could apply for winding-up proceedings if such a situation happens; but if the 
proceeding in the most appropriate forum already exists, applying for 
recognition and assistance could be more effective. 
Recognition cases involving offshore companies have drawn a lot of attention 
in the area of cross-border insolvency. As a financial and commercial centre 
in the area, there is no doubt that Hong Kong courts also face a similar 
question. As discussed in the last part, the Hong Kong courts have adopted a 
very pragmatic approach in deciding jurisdiction issues for offshore companies. 
Although there is no reported case in Hong Kong dealing with the recognition 
issue concerning those companies, Hong Kong judges should be made aware 
of a case recently decided in Singapore, which might influence them. In the 
case, Re Opti-Medix Ltd,  a Singaporean judge who decided to grant 
recognition to a Japanese bankruptcy proceeding applied the COMI 
consideration under the common law.94  
The company in question was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, but 
was conducting businesses mainly in Japan. The business activities were 
unprofitable, and the trustee was appointed by the Japanese court. The 
trustee needed to gain access to the bank accounts and funds of the company 
in Singapore, so sought orders that the court recognises the Japanese trustee 
in bankruptcy and provide assistance in collecting the assets in Singapore. 
The trustee argued that it was unlikely that an insolvency proceeding would 
be opened in the BVI, and the Japanese court should be considered the 
principal court of insolvency; moreover, since the idea of COMI has become 
well accepted because of the Model Law, the Singapore court should consider 
that the COMI of the company is in Japan. The court held the COMI of the 
company was in Japan and granted the recognition. 
Since there is no other authority of common law on this matter, and it would 
influence other common law countries which have not adopted the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, the judge gave a careful analysis of applying the COMI in common 
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law. First, the judge made references to the English case HIH Casualty and 
General Insurance Ltd,95in which Lord Hoffmann stated that in some cases in 
which the place where the company is incorporated may be some offshore 
islands with which the company's business has no real connection, using the 
COMI test may be more appropriate.96 Then, regarding whether the COMI 
should be applied under common law, the court agreed with the Model Law 
approach, and stated that the registered office rule is a sound default rule in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary.97 Additionally, the judgment also 
mentioned that Lord Collins in Rubin v Eurofinance doubted Lord Hoffmann's 
approach, saying that it would open a way for the courts to introduce a new 
basis for recognition concerning insolvency proceedings, and such a matter 
should be resolved by the legislature.98 The Singapore judge disagreed with 
Lord Collins, and provided that the development of common law should not 
be "so constrained", and there was no difficulty in applying a broader test 
based on COMI under common law.99 
The case from Singapore sets the precedent of using the COMI test as 
grounds for recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. The approach 
implies that the common law should develop in the face of new developments 
in the commercial and legal world, and the COMI test could be a necessary 
supplement to the traditional approach of the place of the incorporation test. 
More importantly, since the decision may not be that influential in other main 
common law jurisdictions which have already adopted the Model Law, it would 
be interesting to see whether the Hong Kong judge would apply the 
Singaporean approach. The answer would probably be affirmative.  
Firstly, the two jurisdictions share many similarities. Both legal systems were 
established based on the English common law system, and common law 
principles generally are their main source for solving cross-border insolvency 
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issues. 100  More importantly, they are both very important international 
financial centres, so it is common that insolvent companies have assets or 
operations in those locations. The issues relating to offshore companies could 
happen more often under both courts. Secondly, with the reality that there are 
no prospects of the Model Law being adopted any time soon in Hong Kong, 
such an approach would give the court broader powers to recognise and 
assist foreign proceedings. Furthermore, the decision would harmonise the 
results regarding common law and the statutory application of the COMI test, 
which improves the certainty and predictability for cases involving Hong Kong 
and other jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Law. Thirdly, according to 
the Hong Kong approach dealing with jurisdiction over offshore companies, it 
is clear that the courts have realised the issues to which such companies 
could give rise. With co-operative and practical attitudes in dealing with 
international insolvency, the Hong Kong courts seem to have no reason not to 
follow the Singaporean precedent. 
Overall, the basic rule of recognition under the Hong Kong common law and 
the UNCITRAL Model Law are the same. With the new authority of applying 
the COMI in common law, which could easily be applied in Hong Kong, similar 
results under the Model Law could be achieved in Hong Kong.  
5.4.2 Cooperation and Assistance  
Although the Hong Kong courts have been showing willingness to cooperate 
with foreign insolvency proceedings, and this could potentially achieve similar 
results to the UNCITRAL Model Law, some specific issues that could be vital 
to cross-border insolvency are still unclear under Hong Kong common law 
principles; for example, the power of the court to stay and restrain proceedings 
against the debtor at a time after the application of the recognition of foreign 
proceeding and before the decision of the recognition. Under the Model Law, 
Article 19 gives the recognising courts the discretionary power to grant 
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"urgently needed relief" upon application for recognition of foreign 
proceedings, in order to protect the assets of the debtor and the interests of 
creditors before the decision of recognition.101  Under current Hong Kong 
statutory law, such powers only exist when there is an application for local 
winding-up proceedings.102 Since currently, case law has not clarified such a 
matter, to protect local assets or to look for avoidance or investigatory powers, 
the foreign representatives should choose to open a local winding-up 
proceeding. Although the courts have been flexible about the jurisdiction 
connection between foreign companies and Hong Kong, it does not mean the 
winding-up order will be granted for sure with the satisfaction of the jurisdiction 
test. For example, the court could refuse the petition because there is a more 
appropriate forum in which a proceeding should be opened. 
In  one case, an English creditor of a Chinese mainland company filed a 
winding-up petition in Hong Kong, looking for the company to be wound-up 
based on section 237 as an unregistered company.103 The court approved the 
petition and said that sufficient connection could be built because there are 
some individual shareholders of the company in Hong Kong and the 
company's worldwide investment included companies that were located in 
Hong Kong. The decision has been criticised for two reasons. Firstly, the 
proper forum to open the insolvency proceeding should be China since it is 
the company’s place of incorporation and principal place of business. 
Secondly, the dispute between the English creditor and the company had no 
connection with Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong proceeding was only part of 
the creditor’s international debt enforcement strategy. Therefore, opening 
local proceedings in Hong Kong may be not always be guaranteed. 
Furthermore, compared with the UNCITRAL Model Law system allowing 
protective relief before recognition is granted, the legal approach under the 
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Hong Kong law is not that effective.  
Another issue that needs to be clarified is the Hong Kong common law 
principle about the power to grant cooperation and assistance to foreign 
proceedings. As mentioned above, the Hong Kong judges and lawmakers 
have said on different occasions that modified universalism is the main 
approach to solving cross-border insolvency issues, which means the courts 
need to provide assistance for foreign proceedings as they think it is 
appropriate. In the Joint Official Liquidators of A Company,104when discussing 
the common law power to assist foreign insolvency proceedings, the judge 
agreed that foreign liquidators should be empowered to assert in Hong Kong 
whatever claims that are available to them under their jurisdiction of 
appointment if the foreign substantive law to be applied is broadly similar to 
Hong Kong insolvency law, or the specific relief which is sought is available 
under Hong Kong law. However, Judge Harris, who gave the judgments for 
the Hong Kong case, also emphasised the importance of incorporating 
modified universalism principles into Hong Kong legislation regulating cross-
border insolvency, saying “it is highly desirable that the new legislation 
includes provisions dealing expressly with cross-border insolvency…….”105 
Failure to do so would be a regrettable missed opportunity to ensure that Hong 
Kong’s insolvency legislation is consistent with the principles of modified 
universalism and the needs of international commerce. 106  Moreover, the 
judge also said that without legislation, it probably raises concerns and 
indicates that Hong Kong courts would take the restrictive view of the extent 
to which they should assist foreign liquidators, which is not consistent with the 
traditional Hong Kong courts' attitude.107 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Hong Kong has a more advanced and well-structured insolvency system 
because of the historical influences from the UK, and the local legislation and 
common law system supplement each other. For solving cross-border 
insolvency issues, the Hong Kong courts have proved their willingness to 
cooperate with foreign proceedings in practice. Hence, there is good legal and 
practical foundation to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law in Hong Kong. 
Although it remains unresolved whether Hong Kong would adopt the law or 
not, it is not difficult to say that Hong Kong judges have already incorporated 
the spirits of modified universalism into their common law approaches. In 
deciding the jurisdiction issue related to off-shore companies, one crucial 
factor that the court considered was that the offshore registered company's 
assets and commercial activities were all located in Hong Kong, and this is 
the same consideration behind the concept "COMI". Such a development was 
necessary to make sure Hong Kong’s insolvency legal system is consistent 
with the international mainstream. Hong Kong now is the only major common 
law jurisdiction that has not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, after 
Singapore’s implementation in 2017. It could be expected that the lawmakers 
in Hong Kong will focus more attention on the UNCITRAL Model Law in the 
coming years.
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Chapter 6 Cross-border Insolvency Matters between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong 
Chapter 5 was focused on the cross-border insolvency issues between Hong 
Kong and foreign countries, and how the common law principles and local 
legislation could provide a relatively clear cross-border insolvency system. 
Comparatively speaking, the insolvency cases between mainland China and 
Hong Kong can be more complicated because of the political arrangement. 
After the political change in Hong Kong, the central government and Hong 
Kong government signed an economic agreement, the Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), in order to facilitate bilateral trades 
between the two jurisdictions. The agreement is the economic basis that 
capitalist and socialist economics can coexist within the same sovereign state, 
but operate within separate legal and commercial frameworks.  However, the 
development of the legal arrangement between the two separate judicial 
jurisdictions has not closely followed the economic agreement. Especially the 
judicial recognition, which is central to the enforceability of any judicial 
judgment made in the court of a counterparty jurisdiction, is still an unsolved 
problem between China and Hong Kong. This chapter will analyse the general 
difficulties and complexities of cross-border insolvency matters between the 
mainland and Hong Kong, and try to find possible solutions.       
Part 1 argues that it is necessary to have a separate law for mainland and 
Hong Kong cross-border insolvency matters because of the political 
arrangement and close economic relationship; the tradition of the Chinese 
government’s interference in legal proceedings is another main reason, and 
has to be considered in the specialised regulation. Part 2 explores the 
development of judicial recognition and cooperation between the two regions, 
and the application of an interregional judgment recognition arrangement. Part 
3 discusses practical concerns that exist under the current judicial recognition 
regime and their influences on insolvency cases. Part 4 investigates whether 
the UNCITRAL Model Law's principles could be useful in developing an 
interregional solution within China. Part 5 summarises the recommendations 
for the cross-border insolvency law between the two jurisdictions.    
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6.1 Insolvency Issues between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong 
6.1.1 The Necessity for a Separate Law  
The cross-border insolvency issues may arise between the mainland and 
Hong Kong in situations like one court in Hong Kong seeking cooperation from 
their counterparty courts in the mainland in order to validate a claim raised by 
a creditor in Hong Kong against an insolvent debtor in the mainland, or a party 
from Hong Kong maybe wanting to seek judicial recognition from a mainland 
court in order to enforce a judgment made by a Hong Kong court. Similar 
issues with another country would be governed by private international laws 
and laws for cases involving foreign elements. Since the mainland and Hong 
Kong are two totally different jurisdictions within one country, such an 
international approach would no longer be appropriate. 1  Hence, it is 
necessary to have a specially formulated legal tool to govern the interregional 
insolvency issues within China, and such necessity can be justified by political, 
economic and legal considerations.      
Politically, "one country, two systems", which allows two different political 
systems to co-exist within one country, is the foundation of the relationship 
between the mainland and Hong Kong.2 So, the two jurisdictions are relatively 
independent but closely connected at the same time. The policy has created 
a unique political relationship between the two areas. According to the Basic 
Law, the central government in Beijing is the sole authority for both the 
mainland and its SARs, and the degree of autonomy of Hong Kong is higher 
than a state under a federal regime like in the US.3 Consequently, the unique 
political arrangement inevitably causes legal issues, which requires both 
                                                             
1 Lingling Liang and Yuying Zeng, ‘The Difficulties and Cooperation of Cross-border 
Insolvency Matter Between Mainland and Hong Kong’ (2015) 24 Journal of 
Mudanjiang University 22. 
2 ibid. 
3 The high degree is mainly about the judicial power (Article 19 of the Basic Law), 
and it is supported by the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal (Article 81 of the 
Basic Law). Further discussion: Wang Shuwen, Introduction to the Hong Kong SAR 
Basic Law (Central Committee of the CCP Party School Press, 1997). 
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governments to work together closely to find solutions, step by step.4 Since 
economic development is a vital part of all countries’ political tasks, it is 
inevitable that solid and effective policies for all the business-related matters 
between two jurisdictions should be built.5  
Economically, the connection between the mainland and Hong Kong has been 
very interactive since the handover in 1997, especially after the passing of the 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA).6 The arrangement aims 
to promote economic cooperation, and strengthen the trade relationship in 
goods and services between the two places. One substantial content of the 
agreement includes applying zero import tariffs to all imports from Hong Kong, 
and liberalising trade-in services between the two areas.7 Furthermore, the 
agreement also includes an agreement to facilitate investment in various 
areas, including transparency in legal regulations. In order to solve new 
trading problems in practice, the supplementary agreements of CEPA will be 
signed annually between the mainland and SAR.8 CEPA has its own dispute 
settlement system, which is called the Joint Steering Committee. However, 
since the agreement is experimental and developing, this system is not mature 
enough to solve all the inter-regional commercial conflict.9 The current way 
that the Committee works is based on cooperative discussion and consultation 
between representatives or officials from both areas. 10  Therefore, the 
success of CEPA and the close economic partnership requires an efficient and 
predictable problem-solving mechanism when businesses involving parties 
from both places meet difficulties.  
                                                             
4 Shanbin Huang, Xu Zhang and Wenzhi Wen, ‘The Analysis about the Building the 
Cooperation System of Cross-Border Insolvency Between Mainland and Hong Kong’ 
(2012) 33 (1) Journal of Kashgar Teachers College 31. 
5 ibid, 32. 
6 Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (hereafter as 
CEPA) (2003) (HK). 
7 ibid, Introduction. 
8 Since 2003, ten supplementary agreements have been signed, please see the 
latest development: <https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/further_liberal.html>   
9 CEPA, Article 19. 
10 CEPA, Article 19 (5). 
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Legally, the current legal cooperation agreement in commercial matters 
between two areas does not cover insolvency cases, so solutions have to be 
solved by the local laws of each region. The insolvency law systems in the two 
jurisdictions are not clear and effective enough to solve the interregional 
insolvency issues. Most of the relevant provisions relating to cross-border 
insolvency issues have specific application for “foreign” insolvency 
proceedings, and using such provisions is not consistent with the “one country” 
principle. With the increasing number of insolvency cases between the two 
regions, lack of a clear legal instrument may lead to more serious issues, such 
as some parties may take advantage of the differences to avoid legal 
responsibilities, or start proceedings in both jurisdictions for extra payments.11 
Therefore, a clear regulation is needed to clarify those legal uncertainties and 
provide guidance for parties from both the mainland and Hong Kong.  
6.1.2 Local Protectionism and Cautious Attitudes towards Insolvency  
As mentioned in the previous chapters, government involvement in insolvency 
proceedings is not unusual, and this cautious tradition has caused serious 
issues between the mainland and Hong Kong. Social stability and safety is a 
main factor that concerns the local government. If there are a number of 
individual legal actions, such as employment disputes or individual creditors 
proceedings, the local government usually steps in and solves the case 
quickly and locally, which means it distributes local assets to local creditors 
rapidly, and ignores the demands of cross-border matters.12 Such a solution 
is a very typically Chinese legal solution, and usually it would end up 
sacrificing creditors' or debtors' interests. 
Government involvement in insolvency cases may lead to local protectionism, 
especially at the provincial level. Ocean Grand Holdings Limited v Ocean 
Grand Aluminum Industries (San Shui) Ltd,13 which was a case involving both 
                                                             
11 Shanbin Huang, Xu Zhang and Wenzhi Wen (n 4) 31. 
12 ibid. 
13 Ocean Grand Holdings Limited v Ocean Grand Aluminum Industrial (San Shui) 
Ltd, Foshan Intermediate Court, Fu Lingxiao, ‘Analysis of the Accepted Conditions of 
the Creditors’ Application of the Bankruptcy of the Debtor’ 30 March 2010. 
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the mainland and Hong Kong, would be a good example to demonstrate local 
protectionism.  
Ocean Grand Holdings Limited (Ocean Grand) was incorporated in Bermuda 
on 15 May 1997, and was registered in Hong Kong on 8 July 1997. It is a 
holding company whose subsidiaries were mainly located in Nanhai and 
Zhuhai in the mainland, and in Hong Kong. Ocean Grand Aluminium Industrial 
(San Shui) Ltd (OG San Shui) is one of the subsidiaries in the mainland. On 
24 July 2006, Ocean Grand presented a petition for its own winding-up in 
Hong Kong and in Bermuda. Provisional liquidators were appointed on the 
same day in Hong Kong and on the following day in Bermuda. Before the 
application, it had been reported that a total sum of $840 million worth of funds 
in mainland subsidiaries had disappeared.  
To make further investigation and reduce the loss, the provisional liquidator 
appointed by the Hong Kong court went to the mainland, but he did not get 
any cooperation from local banks or courts. So the liquidator on behalf of 
Ocean Grand filed a bankruptcy application to the Foshan Intermediate Court 
against OG San Shui on the grounds that the company was unable to pay 
debts as they fell due and was insolvent. The application was rejected by the 
Chinese court because it held that a clear debtor-creditor relationship between 
the claimant and the defendant, which was the prerequisite of the courts to 
accept the application, could not be verified.   
At the same time, because of the insolvency news of Ocean Grand in Hong 
Kong, the local creditors in the mainland, including banks, suppliers and 
employees, filed a large number of individual lawsuits against the subsidiaries 
of Ocean Grand in the mainland, including the OG San Shui, for repayment of 
their debts. The local court then seized and froze the assets of those 
subsidiaries, and those assets were sold off by auction under the supervision 
of the local court.  
The case was closed by the local court because of a series of individual debt 
lawsuits instead of the insolvency proceeding. The reason that the local courts 
chose this way is probably due to a large amount of employment salary 
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payment cases being filed. Once again, the Chinese court focused on the 
protection of local creditors and refused to cooperate with the Hong Kong 
liquidator. It has been said by the Hong Kong liquidator that it is easier to 
recover assets in a foreign country than in the mainland, even though Hong 
Kong has returned to China. Therefore, if Hong Kong creditors want to 
participate in the distribution in the mainland, they might have to file debt 
lawsuits in mainland courts too. In this case, it was lucky that the remaining 
assets of the subsidiaries were enough to cover the claims of local creditors, 
even though a large amount of the fund had been transferred away. If there 
were not enough assets, the mainland creditors would probably have had to 
have gone to Hong Kong to file lawsuits. Furthermore, without any cross-
border insolvency convergence, the case could be a bad example to other 
companies, encouraging debtors to transfer funds between the two regions in 
order to avoid their debts.14 As mentioned above, it is very common for a 
company to hold assets both in Hong Kong and the mainland, so without a 
better solution, the process will be expensive and time-consuming when 
solving inter-regional insolvency cases between two jurisdictions.  
Local protectionism, which means that Chinese courts are likely to grant 
favourable judgments to local enterprises at the expense of foreign parties, is 
one issue that Chinese courts have always been criticised for.15 Professor 
Huang explains such issue as: "Local protectionism means that in dealing with 
litigation, courts are often biased in favour of parties from their own region. 
This problem is well-known and deeply-rooted in China due to the lack of the 
courts' independence — the local courts are dependent on the local 
government in terms of funding, and personnel decisions relating to the local 
judiciary are also in the hands of the local government."16 Local protectionism 
                                                             
14 Xinyi Gong, ‘When Hong Kong Becomes SAR, Is the Mainland Ready? Problems 
of Judgments Recognition in Cross-border Insolvency Matters' (2011) 20 
International Insolvency Review 57. 
15 Emily Lee, ‘Problems of Judicial Recognition and Enforcement in Cross-Border 
Insolvency Matters between Hong Kong and Mainland China’ (2015) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 439. 
16 Robin Hui Huang, ‘Private Enforcement of Securities ʟaw in Chinaː a Ten-year 
Retrospective and Empirical Assessment’ (2013) 61 Am. J. Comp. L 757,795. 
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has a negative influence on justice, and thus serves as a reason that prevents 
parties from choosing to use mainland Chinese courts to hear their cases. The 
fact that mainland Chinese courts are funded by their local government 
enables the local government to interfere with the judicial process by 
pressuring or instructing the court to make rulings in favour of local businesses 
that contribute to the local economy, such as by paying taxes and providing 
jobs.17 A further reason is that the local economic performance and GDP will 
be part of local officials’ political assets, which will influence their opportunity 
for promotion.18 Because of a lack of an appropriate understanding of the 
concept of insolvency, many local officials would think the word “insolvency” 
or “bankruptcy” equals liquidation.19 So, insolvency of local businesses would 
have negative influences on their political achievements.  Consequently, 
local officials are prepared to use their administrative powers to intervene in 
insolvency cases.   
To sum up, local government are currently involved in insolvency cases, and 
local protectism will continue to happen in the foreseeable future. Even though 
the government and the Supreme Court have issued guidance suggesting that 
legal proceedings should be the main method of solving insolvent businesses 
and reducing the role of local government,20 the situation will not change 
significantly if the insolvent companies are related to local economic interests 
and political performance. For the cases relating to Hong Kong, it could be 
another reason that the central government and Hong Kong government 
should draft an interregional insolvency regulation together. If a clear 
regulation with detailed guidance could provide a solution that will help all the 
                                                             
17 Xiaoping Jin, ‘The Study on the Role of Local Government in Corporate Insolvency’ 
(PhD Thesis, Southwest University of Political Science and Law 2015). 
18 Xinxin Wang and Yangguang Xu, ‘The difficulty and Solution of Chinese Insolvency 
Lawː the Reason of the Decrease of the Number of Insolvency Cases’ (Research 
Report of China Insolvency Forum, 2013) <http://www.yunqingsuan. 
com/news/detail/7702/page/2> accessed 20 September 2017. 
19 ibid. 
20 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Correctly 
Trying Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases to Provide Judicial Protection for Maintaining the 
Order of Market Economy, The Supreme People’s Court [2009] Judicial Interpretation 
No.36. 
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parties to benefit, it will help the local government avoid the kind of chaotic 
situation as happened in the Ocean Grand case, and political interference 
could be reduced.  
6.1.3 The Basic Legal Issues  
This part is to discuss the difficulties when solving cross-border insolvency 
questions between the mainland and Hong Kong based on the three basic 
issues: jurisdiction, choice of law and recognition and enforcement.    
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law  
When facing an insolvency case, the courts in both jurisdictions will decide the 
jurisdiction issue based on their local laws; since both the mainland and Hong 
Kong have broad jurisdiction rules, this may lead to some conflict. There is a 
common argument suggesting that HK-mainland insolvency typically involves 
companies whose assets and/or investors were in both jurisdictions, with 
investors located in Hong Kong, and with the joint venture (JV) investment 
located in the mainland.21 Understandably, the mainland Chinese courts will 
have jurisdiction because China is the JV’s place of incorporation, and is also 
the location of the JV’s assets. Yet the Hong Kong courts can also claim 
jurisdiction, if and when the JV’s investors who reside in Hong Kong 
commence insolvency proceedings in the Hong Kong courts. Furthermore, the 
conditions to be considered for the purpose of jurisdictions can be different in 
both places, which would raise the issue of whether the proceeding is qualified 
to be recognised in the other jurisdiction.22 The insolvency proceedings can 
become even more complicated if, in the establishment of the business, a 
Hong Kong investor incorporated a company in a tax haven jurisdiction, and 
operated most of the businesses in the mainland. As we have discussed in 
the last two chapters, both jurisdictions could claim jurisdiction for such a case 
based on their relevant laws or common law principles. Although the broad 
principles for jurisdiction under the two places share similarities and 
                                                             
21 Emily Lee, ‘Comparing Hong Kong and Chinese Insolvency Laws and Their Cross-
Border Complexities’ (2015) 9 (2) The Journal of Comparative Law 259. 
22 Shanbin Huang, Xu Zhang and Wenzhi Wen (n 4), 35. 
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differences, it is difficult to have a unified rule as those rules under Hong Kong 
laws have been developed based on common law, and those under Chinese 
laws have been separated under bankruptcy law and Civil Procedural Law. 23  
The issue for the choice of law rules could not be more uncertain. For both the 
mainland and Hong Kong, jurisdiction and choice of law rules are closely 
connected together.24 In the mainland, the applicable law will be decided 
based on the jurisdiction, so Chinese law will be automatically applied if 
Chinese courts have jurisdiction. The Hong Kong Courts would be more open 
about applying foreign law in certain cases, but the general rule is to apply the 
local law.  
Recognition and Enforcement  
Since there is no direct way of seeking recognition of a cross-border 
insolvency judgment between the mainland and Hong Kong, the insolvency 
practitioners have to find a detour. Article 5 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
2006 of China provides some basic frameworks for recognition, such as 
reciprocity without violation of China’s basic principles of its laws, sovereignty, 
security and public interests.25  Although Article 5 is still too general and 
impractical, it provides legal justification for recognising foreign insolvency 
proceedings. Further, Hong Kong courts have always applied open and willing 
attitudes for providing judicial assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings. 
Therefore, compared with the issue of jurisdiction, it would be easier to find 
common ground on the issue of recognising proceedings between the 
mainland and Hong Kong. The approach focusing on recognition and 
cooperation can be traced back to the development process of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. Therefore, this could be a starting point for solving the mainland 
China and Hong Kong problem as well. 
                                                             
23 Ling Zhang, ‘The Research on the Trend of Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation’ 
(2003) 21 (4) Tribune of Political Science and Law 177. 
24 Faye Fang and Fei Wang, Internet Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Legal Practices 
in the EU, US, and China (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 184. 
25 Article 5, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of PRC 2006 (China). 
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Furthermore, both jurisdictions have already realised that judgment 
recognition and assistance is important for the “one country, two systems” 
relationship. The Arrangement of Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters between Mainland China and 
Hong Kong was passed in 2006. The arrangement has provided a good start 
and valuable guidance for judicial cooperation issues between the two regions. 
Therefore, it is worth reviewing the general development of the judicial 
recognition area between the mainland and Hong Kong, and seeing how the 
interregional insolvency issue would fit into this area.  
 
6.2 The Development of Judicial Recognition between 
Mainland and Hong Kong   
6.2.1 Judicial Difficulty after 1997  
The problem of judicial recognition between Hong Kong and China has also 
evolved through different historical and political stages. 
Before 1997, Hong Kong was a British colony, so the judicial recognition 
between Hong Kong and China must be based on relevant international 
conventions. The first is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the New York Convention), which provides 
common legislative standards for the recognition of arbitration agreements, 
stating that foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards cannot be discriminated 
against and thus can be capable of entitling court recognition and enforcement 
in the same way as domestic awards.26 The UK government extended the 
Convention to Hong Kong in 1975, but the judicial assistance in the area of 
arbitration between China and Hong Kong did not start until 1987, when the 
Chinese government ratified the New York Convention. 27  Another is the 
                                                             
26 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York, 1958) (the "New York Convention") <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral 
_texts/arbitratin/NYConvention.html>. 
27 The New York Convention introduced by the official document, the Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on China Joining the 
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Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 
Civil and Commercial Matters of 1965, known as the Hague Convention.28 
The purpose of the Convention is to improve the organisation of mutual judicial 
assistance in cases of civil or commercial matters for judicial or extrajudicial 
documents to be served abroad.29  The UK government also extended it to 
Hong Kong in 1970 and China ratified it in 1991. It should be noticed that 
although Article 153 of Basic Law states the international agreements 
implemented in Hong Kong may continue to be effective in the HKSAR after 
the handover, the international conventions cannot be applied between China 
and Hong Kong since the application of international conventions may only be 
used among states as independent subjects of the international community.  
After the handover, Article 5 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong provides that the 
socialist system and policies in China will not be practiced in Hong Kong 
following the return of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong; instead, Hong 
Kong’s capitalist system will remain unchanged for 50 years under the proviso 
of the “one country, two systems” principle.30 However, although the political 
arrangement was relatively clear, there are several legal issues about the 
relationship between the mainland and its special regions caused by the 
political change which have been calling for clarification for many years.31 
Judicial assistance is one of them.       
The Chinese government did not introduce any regulation or agreement on 
                                                             
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards, published in 
1986, and the Convention came into force on April 1987. 
28 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil 
or Commercial Matters. <https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-
text/?cid=17>. 
29 Ying Liu and Guomin Li, Private International Law: Materials (CITIC Publishing 
House, 2004) 422. 
30 Article 5 "The socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall 
remain unchanged for 50 years." The Basic Law of Hong Kong. 
31 Zhenshun Cai and Yunjun Yang, ‘The Discussion about Judgment Recognition 
and Enforcement on Civil and Commercial Matters between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China’ (2008) 19 (5) Journal of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies 
23. 
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the matter of judicial recognition and assistance under the “one country, two 
systems” regime, and the mainland’s courts treated cases from special 
administrative regions as foreign matters. Article 5 of judicial interpretation, 
issued in 2002 by the Supreme People's Court and called "Provisions 
Concerning the Jurisdiction Problems of Foreign-related Civil and Commercial 
Cases", states the jurisdiction of civil and commercial cases involving HKSAR, 
Macao SAR, and Taiwan shall be solved by referring to the Provision. 32 
Apparently, treating legal issues from Hong Kong and Macao as foreign 
matters is not something the central government intended to do. On the other 
hand, from the Hong Kong side, the Basic Law only contains one ambiguous 
article about judicial assistance with the mainland; it states “The Hong Kong 
Special Administration Region, may, through consultations and in accordance 
with law, maintain juridical relations with the judicial organs of the country, and 
they may render assistance to each other", which does not address any 
specific issue for judgment recognition between the mainland and Hong Kong. 
33 This has led to the situation where the only option mainland judges have is 
to apply the laws for foreign matters when they are facing judicial matters from 
Hong Kong. Moreover, the law did not provide any practical guidance about 
the procedure for seeking judicial assistance in the mainland courts. Therefore, 
it seems that the political arrangement caused a legal gap in the area of 
judicial assistance between the mainland and its special administrative 
regions.   
The close economic connection between the mainland and Hong Kong also 
requires further clarification regarding legal difficulty.34 It has been said the 
close economic relationship would inevitably cause disputes between 
participants from both regions.35 If Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction over 
the disputes, the parties prefer to choose Hong Kong courts rather than the 
                                                             
32  Provisions Concerning the Jurisdiction Problems of Foreign-related Civil and 
Commercial Cases, The Supreme People’s Court [2002] Judicial Interpretation No. 5 
33 Article 95, the Basic Law of Hong Kong (HK). 
34 Qiangjiang Kong, ‘Enforcement of Hong Kong SAR court Judgment in the People’s 
Republic of China’ (2000) 49 (4) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 867.    
35 ibid. 
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mainland courts because the fact is that the legal system of Hong Kong is 
more developed and predictable than the relevant laws of the mainland. If 
some properties of a case are located on the mainland, judgment recognition 
and enforcement should be sought in courts of the mainland. Without a clear 
law for such matters, it would not only harm the predictability of commercial 
law in Hong Kong and thus be detrimental to its judicial system. This would 
damage Hong Kong's position as an international economic centre, which is 
important for the economic development of both Hong Kong itself and the 
mainland.36  
6.2.2 The General Rules for Recognition before the Arrangement  
The Mainland China 
As has been mentioned in the last chapter, the general rule for recognition of 
foreign judgments in the mainland is based on treaty or agreement and the 
principle of reciprocity. As for the recognition and enforcement of Hong Kong 
judgments in cases beyond the scope of the arrangement, the general rule 
will be applied. In practice, it could be very difficult to recognise or enforce 
judgments based on those two requirements.  
Recognition cases from special administration regions have always been 
difficult questions for the mainland courts. There are two opinions relating to 
this issue from previous judgments. The first one treats those special regions 
as foreign jurisdictions, so their judgments are not recognisable in the 
mainland-based Article 268 of Civil Procedure Law requiring the existence of 
treaties or reciprocity. Since no relevant agreements exist between Hong 
Kong and China, a Hong Kong judgment will not be recognised in the 
mainland. A case decided by an intermediate people’s court in Fujian province 
applied this opinion.37 The Hong Kong company in this case mortgaged a 
                                                             
36  ibid, see also Zhihong Yu, ‘The Analysis of Judgment Recognition and 
Enforcement on Civil and Commercial Matter between Hong Kong and Mainland 
China’ (2015) Jinan Journal <http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleFullText.Aspx?Arti 
cleId=94958> accessed 12 June 2017. 
37  The Case of Investment Co of Hong Kong to Recognise a Hong Kong Civil 
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piece of real estate located in the jurisdiction of the Quanzhou Intermediate 
People's Court and could not pay the loan on time. The creditor sued the 
company in the Hong Kong high court and received a favourable judgment. 
Then the creditor applied to the Intermediate Court seeking enforcement of 
the judgment on collateral and other properties located on the mainland. The 
court decided to refuse the recognition and enforcement because there was 
no recognition agreement and reciprocity between the two jurisdictions based 
on Article 268 of Civil Procedure Law.  
The second opinion holds that, because Hong Kong has become part of China, 
it is improper to treat its judgments as foreign judgments.38 According to this 
opinion, in a recognition case, the requested Xiamen court held that under 
Article 95 of the Basic Law, interregional judgment recognition should be 
carried out after the competent authorities in the two regions had reached an 
agreement. Since no such agreement existed, the court dismissed the 
application and suggested the judgment creditors bring an action of 
contractual dispute against the debtor.39  
Nevertheless, the two opinions reach the same result in most of the cases: 
Hong Kong judgments cannot be recognised, so the parties have to re-litigate 
their disputes in the mainland, which would be time and money-consuming, 
and may also lead to inconsistent judgment.40 Two factors might explain why 
the mainland courts have been conservative in dealing with recognition issue 
relating to special administrative regions. Firstly, the mainland courts do not 
have broad discretion. The courts appointed to hear the recognition 
application will be intermediate courts, which are subordinate to the Supreme 
People’s Court and High People’s Courts, so they usually adopt conservative 
                                                             
Judgment (Quanzhou Interm People’s Ct, 26 November 2001) <www.lawyee.net> 
(accessed 20 November 2017). See also Jie Huang, ‘Interregional Recognition and 
Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: Lessons for China from US and 
EU Laws’ (2010) 6 (1) Journal of International Private Law 109, 125. 
38 Xinyi Gong (n 14) 58-60. 
39 The Case of Enforcing the Judgment of Li Deng Li Development Co and Fu Fua 
Enterprise (Xiamen Inter People’s Court, 23 February 2000). 
40 Qiangjiang Kong (n 34) 870.   
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solutions until they receive new instructions from higher level courts. Another 
reason would be that there is no reciprocity relationship or agreement between 
the mainland and Hong Kong.  
As for the reciprocity, apart from some old divorce cases, the mainland courts 
have never recognised and enforced foreign judgments under the principle of 
reciprocity.41 It has been suggested that China adopts a passive reciprocity 
approach, which means the mainland courts hesitate to take the initiative 
when other regions do not recognise and enforce the mainland judgments 
under this principle first. Furthermore, the definition of the principle of 
reciprocity and how to apply it under Chinese law is unclear, which would also 
discourage the mainland judges.42   
Hong Kong        
In Hong Kong, a foreign judgment may be recognised or enforced either by 
statutes or common law principles. The coming into effect of the Arrangement 
in August 2008 resulted in the enactment of the Mainland Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, which is now part of Hong Kong law.43 
Other than that, Hong Kong has the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Ordinance, which holds that a final and conclusive judgment 
made by a foreign superior court may be recognised and enforced in Hong 
Kong on a reciprocal basis, subject to that foreign judgment being registered 
with the High Court of Hong Kong. 44  Originally, the Foreign Judgment 
Ordinance closely followed the Foreign Judgments Act 1933 (UK), and it was 
essentially an intra-Commonwealth scheme for reciprocity enforcement. 45 
The non-commonwealth countries that the law also applied to are those that 
the UK already had judgment recognition treaties with, such as Belgium and 
                                                             
41 Qingjiang Kong and Minfei Hu, ‘The Chinese Practice of Private International Law’ 
(2002) 3 (2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 414. 
42 ibid. 
43 Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap. 597), Hong Kong. 
44 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap. 319), Hong Kong. 
45  ibid, “To make provision for the enforcement in the Colony of Hong Kong of 
judgments given in other parts of the Commonwealth and foreign countries which 
afford reciprocal treatment to judgments given in the Colony of Hong Kong”. 
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France. As a result, all the other jurisdictions’ judgments, including those with 
mainland China, are recognised and enforced in Hong Kong based on the 
common law system. Under the Foreign Judgment Ordinance, only foreign 
judgments that concern monetary civil matters can be considered to be 
enforced, and judgments have to be “final and conclusive”. 46  Same 
requirements can also be found under the mainland/Hong Kong Arrangement. 
For insolvency cases, as discussed in the last chapter, there are no statutory 
provisions that regulate recognition or cooperation relating to foreign 
insolvency proceedings.  Consequently, the related principles are to be found 
based on common law. Generally speaking, the Hong Kong courts would 
recognise a foreign insolvency judgment made in the place of the company’s 
incorporation; however, this is not the only criteria for recognition. If the foreign 
court is not in the place of incorporation, other situations to be considered 
include that the company conducts business within that jurisdiction, that the 
company submits to the insolvency jurisdiction in the foreign jurisdiction, or 
that an insolvency proceeding is unlikely to take place in the jurisdiction in 
which the company is incorporated.   
For mainland insolvency cases seeking recognition, the Hong Kong court has 
adopted an open-minded approach, on a case by case basis. Such an 
approach can be shown in the famous case, CCIC v Guangdong International 
Trust & Investment Corp (GITIC) [2005] 2 HKC 589, which involved the issue 
of whether the bankruptcy of GITIC in the mainland should be recognised in 
Hong Kong.47 
GITIC was incorporated in the mainland and registered in Hong Kong under 
Part XI of the Companies Ordinance as an overseas company. Guangdong 
International Trust & Investment Corporation Hong Kong (Holdings) Limited 
("GITIC HK") was incorporated in Hong Kong as a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
GITIC. The case involved a “garnishee order” which is a Court order requiring 
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a third party owing money to the judgment debtor to pay his debt directly to 
the judgment creditor. CCIC Finance, the judgment creditor, had obtained (i) 
a Hong Kong High Court judgment by default against GITIC, the judgment 
debtor, and (ii) a garnishee order nisi against GITIC HK. CCIC Finance applied 
to make the garnishee order absolute, which would require GITIC HK to pay 
its debt directly to CCIC Finance and not to GITIC.  
Deputy Judge Gill acknowledged that it is a rule of international law that where 
there is already pending a process of universal distribution of a bankrupt's 
effects in a foreign jurisdiction, the local court should not allow an action to be 
taken within its jurisdiction which would interfere with that process. It was thus 
necessary to examine the nature of the winding-up of GITIC in the PRC, and 
in particular whether the 1986 Bankruptcy Law was intended to, or purported 
to, apply to GITIC’s extraterritorial assets. It was held that the concept of 
comity of nations alone is not a reason to reject the claim of a litigant where 
the merits of his claim were such that it should otherwise be granted. However, 
where a foreign jurisdiction actively and openly pursues a liquidation in which 
it says that it intends to treat all creditors, domestic and foreign, on the same 
basis, and then it clearly does so, it is not for the Hong Kong Court to interfere 
with that process.  
This was the first significant case to contribute to the debate on cross-border 
insolvency matters between China and Hong Kong, and it was also the first 
case where the Hong Kong court recognised the mainland insolvency 
proceeding. Since the case happened before the introduction of the new 
corporate bankruptcy law, one of the core issues was about whether the old 
Chinese bankruptcy law had extraterritorial effects. Arguably, the previous 
Chinese bankruptcy law did not have much effect since it was designed 
specifically to regulate the insolvency proceedings of state-owned enterprises, 
the issue of the extraterritorial effect being solved by the new bankruptcy law 
in 2006. 48  Nevertheless, the court held that the proceeding should be 
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recognised based on comity, taking into consideration the fact that the 
mainland proceeding was pursuing a universal collection and distribution of 
whole assets of the debtor, and all the creditors were at the same ranking.49 
After this case, it probably would be too optimistic to say it set an example for 
future mainland insolvency cases to be recognised in Hong Kong. However, 
the fact that the court considered all the relevant facts and granted the 
recognition illustrates an open attitude toward cross-border insolvency issues 
with the mainland.  
6.2.3 The Mainland and Hong Kong Arrangement and Its Application 
In order to solve the conflict of laws cases involving the Hong Kong courts and 
the provincial courts in China, the Arrangement of Mutual Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR was signed in 2006.50 The arrangement 
was concluded in 2006 and came into effect after the Supreme People’s Court 
of mainland China promulgated a judicial interpretation, and Hong Kong 
passed the relevant legislation in 2008. As suggested by its name, the 
Arrangement only applies to civil and commercial matters, which need an 
enforceable final judicial judgment requiring payment of money in civil or 
commercial cases pursuant to a choice of court agreement in writing, rendered 
by a people’s court of the mainland or a court of Hong Kong.51 Accordingly, 
this arrangement has been criticised by legal scholars and professionals 
regarding its restricted scope in practice.52 
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Nevertheless, this Arrangement is a milestone for interregional judgment 
recognition between the mainland and Hong Kong.53 It was a significant step 
by the authorities in trying to facilitate legal conflicts between the mainland 
and its SARs; it also provides valuable guidance for future judicial assistance 
in civil or commercial cases between China and other common law 
jurisdictions.54 Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that passing such an 
interregional arrangement involved a certain degree of political consideration. 
For the mainland, it would solve the inconsistency in that the mainland courts 
are treating Hong Kong cases as foreign matters, while the central 
government keeps emphasising all Hong Kong matters are domestic affairs; 
in this respect, it could be considered a symbol of respecting the “one country, 
two systems” arrangement. For Hong Kong government interest, it is 
necessary to have a legal document to safeguard the autonomy provided by 
the Basic Law and to ensure its judicial independence in other jurisdictions 
within the same country.55 These political concerns and legal differences 
between the two jurisdictions perhaps were the main reasons that the 
negotiation and drafting took more than 6 years, and the final version of the 
arrangement has a restrictive scope. There are two issues in the final version 
which reflect its limitations.   
A. Monetary Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters 
One requirement is that only monetary judgments in civil and commercial 
monetary disputes will be covered by the Arrangement. According to the 
explanation from the Hong Kong authority, the Arrangement excludes any 
employment contracts and contracts to which a natural person is acting for 
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personal consumption, family, or other non-commercial purposes. 56  So 
judgments related to matters like marriage, bankruptcy, winding-up and 
consumer disputes are all excluded. Such limited scope has been criticised, 
especially compared with the situation in Macao, which has a similar 
arrangement with the mainland implemented before the Hong Kong one, but 
has a wider scope and fewer restrictive requirements. 57  During the 
negotiation, the Hong Kong government thought it necessary to limit the 
application of the Arrangement as there are significant differences in 
substantive laws between the Chinese civil law and Hong Kong common law 
systems; therefore, in order to maintain the consistency of common law 
principles, the development of mutual recognition with the mainland should 
take small steps.58 A further concern on the Hong Kong side related to the 
soundness of the mainland’s legal system. Since monetary judgment would 
be less controversial than enforcement of orders such as an injunction or a 
specific performance, it would be a good first step. 
B. The requirement of Choice of Court Agreement  
Apart from the basic scope, the requirement for the choice of court created 
further limits on the application of the Arrangement. Article 3 further requires 
that there should be a signed agreement between the parties to indicate that 
either a Hong Kong or mainland court is to be the choice of court. However, 
such a requirement may raise some practical concerns. Generally, creditors 
do not always enter into a Choice of Court Agreement with their debtor 
company before the occurrence of a debt or dispute. This is especially true if 
both parties have a long-term business relationship or when the debtor 
company is still substantially solvent. 59  The official interpretation of the 
Arrangement published by the Supreme People’s Court may provide some 
clarification about this issue, stating that “A ‘choice of court agreement in 
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writing’ referred to in this Arrangement means any agreement in written form 
made . . . for resolving any dispute which has arisen or may arise in respect 
of a particular legal relationship.”60 This paragraph could be interpreted that 
even if there was no Choice of Court Agreement signed before the dispute 
arose by parties and was not a part of the main contract that gives rise to the 
debtor's payment obligation, a subsequent and separate Choice of Court 
Agreement can still be negotiated by relevant parties after the dispute occurs, 
so that the requirement under Article 1 will be satisfied.  
If the interpretation solved part of the concern, the further issue is that whether 
parties are willing to designate mainland courts or a Hong Kong court as their 
choice of court. Some business parties might have deliberately avoided 
designating mainland Chinese courts to solve their cross-border cases. One 
reason would be that judicial uncertainty and corruption is still a serious issue 
in the mainland.61 Although the problem has improved due to recent anti-
corruption and judicial reform efforts introduced by President Xi’s government 
since 2013, it remains a concern for some people who still believe that the 
mainland Chinese courts obstruct justice.62 Concerned parties would thus 
avoid appointing any of the mainland courts as their court of choice. 
Furthermore, in practice, if two business parties need to reach an agreement 
about their future disputes, one could argue that arbitration would be a better 
choice for them since the process would be more effective and time-saving.63 
And the decision of arbitration could be recognised based on the Arrangement 
of Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and Hong 
Kong. So there would be no need to have a choice of court clause. 64 
Consequently, it renders Article 1 of the Arrangement less attractive in practice. 
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6.3 Practical Issues Relating to Insolvency Recognition  
Extending the Arrangement to cover insolvency issues between the mainland 
and Hong Kong would be a possible option to close the insolvency law gaps 
between the two regions, since it is an existing regime that already serves the 
purpose of recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, and the 
arrangement has already laid down a solid foundation for reciprocal judicial 
recognition and enforcement of judgments made by courts of either side. 
However, it has to be noticed that there have been a very limited number of 
cases that have applied the Arrangement since it was passed by both 
governments.65 One of the main reasons for the limited application would be 
the two strict requirements discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, 
more practical issues have to be considered and solved if an effective 
insolvency recognition system is to be built based on the current Arrangement. 
For example, the official interpretation of the arrangement explains that 
employment contracts are not included in the application of the 
Arrangement.66 Employment disputes, like unpaid salaries, are one of the 
important issues that are related to corporate insolvency cases. So, cross-
border insolvency issues between the mainland and Hong Kong cannot avoid 
the issue of employee settlement.    
6.3.1 International or Regional? 
One important aspect of the Arrangement concerns the determination of 
jurisdiction, which is usually the main issue of judgment recognition between 
different countries. Since the legal systems are so different in the mainland 
and Hong Kong, the lawmakers from the two areas have treated recognition 
issues as if they were international ones, and have drafted the Arrangement 
based on relevant international conventions.67 For example, the requirement 
of choice of court agreement was borrowed from the Hague Convention on 
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the Choice of Court Agreements of 2005, which was developed to solve 
jurisdiction issues of international cases and facilitate the recognition of 
foreign judgments.68 International judgment recognition is a very sensitive 
issue since a legal judgment is a reflection of one nation’s judicial sovereignty, 
and foreign-related jurisdiction issues have the potential of disrupting such 
sovereignty. Furthermore, a nation’s economic interests are usually connected 
to such issues as well.69  Therefore, one rationale for those international 
conventions is to protect national sovereignty.  
However, it can be argued that the same solution for international issues may 
be not suitable for the China-Hong Kong issue since it is an interregional issue 
within one country. For international issues, the jurisdiction issue is important 
because national interests always come first. 70  For interregional issues, 
national sovereignty is not the main concern, so a system for recognition 
should focus on the protection of the parties’ interests, and jurisdiction should 
not be the fundamental problem.71 For example, under UK law, a court in one 
part of the UK cannot refuse to recognise a judgment from a court in another 
part of the UK solely on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction; in Australia, the 
federal government passed a unified law for judgments recognition among 
different states, and jurisdiction is not an issue to be considered during the 
recognition process. 72  Although the central government cannot make a 
unified law for judgment recognition as SARs enjoys judicial independence, 
except in the areas of diplomacy and national defence, it is important to raise 
the consideration that solutions for interregional issues should emphasise and 
reflect regional factors, and that a purely international approach under the 
current Arrangement would not be practical.    
For insolvency issues between the mainland and Hong Kong, a recognition 
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system should encourage the courts in both areas to work together for 
maximising the whole value of the assets and increasing the repayment rate. 
In order to do that, the jurisdiction issue could be important as only one main 
insolvency proceeding is preferred. The purpose of deciding the jurisdiction 
here is to find the most appropriate place to open such a dominating 
proceeding, and coordinate all the relevant parties in an effective order. It can 
then be distinguished from the jurisdiction rule under the current arrangement, 
in which the jurisdiction is limited to one place. 73  The purpose of this 
development would be to present a sound justification for having a separate 
jurisdiction rule specifically designed for interregional insolvency issues, and 
the suggestion is to borrow the concept of the COMI from the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, which will be discussed later in this chapter.    
6.3.2 Different Criteria for Final Decision 
The Arrangement further requires that a judgment seeking recognition and 
enforcement has to be final.74 The court of Hong Kong applies quite different 
criteria of finality from the mainland court. In the mainland, according to the 
Civil Procedure Law, all judgments and written orders of the Supreme Court, 
as well as judgments and written orders that may not be appealed against 
according to the law, or that have not been appealed against within the 
prescribed time limit, shall be legally effective.75 That means that mainland 
courts hold that a judgment is not final if it has in fact been appealed or may 
potentially be subject to appeal. Additionally, the procedure of trial supervision 
is also stipulated in the law, which allowing judgment with legal effect to be 
reheard under certain circumstances.76 The retrial can be conducted by the 
court rendering the original judgment or a court at the next higher level, as 
well as a court designated by the latter. 
Both common law and statutory regimes require finality as a condition for a 
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judgment to be recognised in Hong Kong. The judges make a decision based 
on Hong Kong law, and the law of judgment-rendering jurisdiction is 
considered as a reference. Because of the existence of a trial supervision 
process, a mainland judgment may not be considered final in a Hong Kong 
court. 77  For example, Chan Chow Yuen v Nangyang Commercial Bank 
Trustee Limited demonstrates mainland judgments cannot be recognised and 
enforced in Hong Kong because the two regions have different criteria on 
finality. In this case, the Court of First Instance in Hong Kong noticed that 
because mainland judgments were not considered as final in Hong Kong, so 
they were not recognisable and enforceable; consequently, the court 
suggested the parties re-litigate the case in Hong Kong in order to resolve 
their disputes. Nonetheless, in Lee Yau Wing v Lee Shui Kwan,78 the Court 
of Appeal of Hong Kong held that, under the Arrangement, a judgment from 
the mainland could not be treated as not final or conclusive merely because 
of the existence of a trial supervision regime.79 Although it seems that Hong 
Kong judges have taken a flexible approach, it is worth noting that the 
Mainland Judgment Ordinance uses the term “final and conclusive” instead of 
“final judgment with enforceability” which was used in the original document.80 
Therefore, there is still uncertainty on the finality matter. As for the issues of 
cross-border insolvency, such uncertainty and strict requirement would be 
another obstacle to recognition and assistance.   
6.3.3 Grounds for Refusing Recognition 
The Arrangement provides different grounds to refuse recognition of 
judgments from the other jurisdiction; for example, the absence of a valid 
choice of court clause, unfair procedure, fraud and public policy can all be 
refusal reasons.81 Article 9 of the Arrangement states that recognition and 
enforcement of a judgment shall be refused if the Chinese court considers that 
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enforcement of a judgment made by a Hong Kong court is contrary to the 
social and public interests of the mainland. Likewise, the Hong Kong courts 
can also consider refusing to enforce a judgment made by the Chinese court 
if enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of Hong Kong. 
Traditionally, the similar public policy rules are related to national interests or 
public order. Since Hong Kong is part of China, the public interest or order of 
Hong Kong is part of the public interest or order of China. Hence, the public 
policy under the content of the Hong Kong-China relationship is different.82 
There are similar articles about public policy in different international laws, and 
the word “manifestly” is usually added to make sure or encourage that such 
an article will not be invoked so easily as to harm the effectiveness of 
international law. Thus, the interpretation of the public policy should consider 
the benefits shared by both jurisdictions, and reflect the special relationship 
between the two regions under the “one country, two systems” concept.83  
 
6.4 UNCITRAL Model Law: Lessons for Mainland-Hong Kong 
Matters  
As discussed in previous chapters, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
border Insolvency has been recognised as one of the best examples 
promoting the concept of universalism and courts cooperation for solving 
international insolvency issues, and has been adopted by various developed 
countries.84 Although it still has some uncertain issues, it cannot be denied 
that the system offers some factors that improve the efficiency of multinational 
insolvency solutions. 85  The main concept behind the law, modified 
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universalism, has been well-recognised by most of the countries as well.86 
Although the bulk of the world has not been convinced by the law, it does not 
mean that those countries are satisfied with their current insolvency systems. 
Having a comprehensive commercial law system has been a very important 
foundation for developing a country’s economy, and an insolvency system has 
always been treated as one of the essential links.87 The advantages and 
efficiency of the universalism approach cannot be ignored by those reform 
processes, and the reasons that some of the countries keep the territorialism 
approach and remain uncommitted to a universal system is not totally about 
the universalism approach or the UNCITRAL Model Law itself. For instance, 
national sovereignty could be one of the main concerns outside of the scope 
of the Model Law.88 It has been argued that a globalised insolvency system 
should reflect an “optimal blend of competition and cooperation across 
international borders and must take account of local custom, culture and 
history.”89 Because of those non-law concerns, although the advantages of 
universalism are obvious, the debate between universalism or territorialism is 
still on-going when dealing with cross-border insolvency cases among 
different countries. The point is that the universalism approach has to be more 
nuanced, textured and localised if it is to succeed in developing countries.90  
6.4.1 Universalism as Foundation  
Due to the political arrangement between the mainland and Hong Kong, it 
seems that the universalism and territorialism approaches co-exist within one 
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country. The mainland is a good example of a conservative approach towards 
the universal system.91 Although its insolvency system has acknowledged 
some ideas based on the spirit of universalism, such as the possibility of 
recognition and cooperation of foreign proceedings, however, only one article 
under the insolvency system has any practical application, and territorial 
solutions are still applied by the courts. On the other hand, because of the 
influence of the common law tradition, universalism has been well-accepted 
by the courts in Hong Kong. Its statutory regulations have included solutions 
for international issues, which reflect some universalism concepts too.  
The purpose of modified universalism is to find a balance between purely 
territorial and universal approaches. 92  Since it has been proved by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the European Regulation on insolvency 
proceedings that the system could improve the efficiency of cross-border 
cases, the argument here is that the modified universalism approach could be 
used to solve insolvency issues between the mainland and Hong Kong. Since 
neither China nor Hong Kong has adopted the Model Law, the best idea would 
be to borrow some concepts from the universal system and implant those into 
the domestic legal system. The advantages of doing so will be analysed below.  
6.4.2 Applying COMI for Regional Matters 
From the analysis above, it is clear that there are many differences between 
the two jurisdictions’ insolvency systems due to their totally different legal 
systems bearing that in mind, it is not an exaggeration to say that the cross-
border insolvency issues within China are no easier to solve than international 
ones.93 Each issue has to be resolved by using small steps. Such a situation 
is similar to the development of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which focuses on 
facilitating the recognition of foreign proceedings, not on harmonising different 
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insolvency laws.94 It suggests that the starting point for the solution of any 
China-Hong Kong problems should also be the recognition issue.  
There are two paths that are available for seeking recognition between the 
mainland and Hong Kong. 95  The first is to start a proceeding seeking 
recognition directly based on the local law in the other jurisdiction. The 
problem is that it is very difficult for the mainland courts to recognise 
proceedings from other jurisdictions under the current corporate insolvency 
law. The second path is to have a specialised recognition regulation or 
arrangement between the two regions. It has been discussed in this chapter 
that the current recognition system for civil and commercial matters is not 
suitable for insolvency cases, and one of the main issues is to decide which 
jurisdiction is more appropriate to deal with the insolvency. The concept of the 
COMI could be a solution. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law identifies foreign proceedings as main or non-
main proceedings based on companies’ COMI locations. By using the concept 
of COMI, the main insolvency proceeding will be decided by the management 
or operational centre of the company. Currently, both the mainland and Hong 
Kong decide the location of the proceeding based on the domicile of the 
company or its assets, so it is very common that courts from both jurisdictions 
would claim they have the right for opening the main proceeding, which could 
cause conflict when seeking recognition because it could be denied on the 
ground of lack of jurisdiction. With the introduction of the COMI, such a conflict 
would be avoided. For instance, if a judgment from Hong Kong is seeking 
recognition in the mainland, the mainland court would use the COMI to decide 
whether Hong Kong is the COMI of the insolvent company. If it is, the mainland 
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court should recognise the proceedings as the main proceeding and give 
effect to the Hong Kong judgment, subject to the local public policy. If the 
COMI is on the mainland, the recognition should be rejected and Hong Kong 
proceeding should be willing to cooperate with the mainland existing or future 
proceeding against the insolvent company.   
Since both governments have the same intentions to encourage closer 
economic cooperation and movement between the mainland and Hong Kong, 
such solid economic foundation should encourage courts from both 
jurisdictions to trust the counterparty.96 It means that the court for the main 
proceeding should receive full cooperation and assistance from the other 
participant courts. Such a system should be possible within China, and the 
advantages will benefit both jurisdictions separately or as a whole. Legally, a 
solution with the concept of the COMI would solve the recognition issue 
caused by the fundamental differences between two insolvency law systems. 
Since it is impossible to harmonise the two insolvency systems, there has to 
be a new approach facing the increasing number of interregional cases. 
Furthermore, although it is about a solution between two different jurisdictions 
within one country, introducing the COMI would be an important step for the 
Chinese insolvency system. The key significance is that it would be an 
example and practice of universalism under Chinese law, which gives Chinese 
courts more experience dealing with cross-border insolvency, and provides 
references for cases from other foreign jurisdictions.  
Politically, the suggested approach with the COMI solves the current political 
dilemma, and which would stop treating Hong Kong insolvency cases as 
totally foreign cases. In fact, it requires more specialised regulations for 
solving mainland-Hong Kong issues if the two political and legal systems are 
to co-exist and work within one country; since the political arrangement is 
innovative, the legal issues should be solved innovatively as well.97 Hence, 
an effective way for solving insolvency issues would reflect the closeness of 
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the political and economic relationship between the two areas.  
Economically, the barriers to doing business have been lowered because of 
the introduction of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), 
which has led to an increase in the number of corporations having assets and 
creditors in both jurisdictions.98 With such an economic arrangement, it is fair 
to have a corresponding regulation providing an effective solution for those 
companies when they are in financial difficulties. Even more so as foreign 
investors see Hong Kong as an important channel for getting into the mainland 
market. A clear inter-regional insolvency system would improve both places’ 
competitive advantage as a whole. To sum up, the political and economic 
relationship could provide a solid foundation for adopting a COMI-based 
interregional insolvency regime.   
 
6.5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
With the quick growth of globalisation, interregional economic integration 
should accompany such a development so that all participating regions can 
achieve the best comparative advantages. The mainland and Hong Kong's 
relationship requires such an interregional support system. Regarding the 
insolvency issues between the two regions, investors from both regions would 
like to see a clear and predictable legal system for doing business, and an 
effective insolvency system is one of the main parts of such a system. Since 
the millennium, the two regions have made joint efforts to realise the free 
circulation of goods, services, capital and people between them, and the 
mainland has become one of Hong Kong’s most significant trading partners. 
A quick and effective insolvency system would encourage regional economic 
stability and development. Apart from the economic grounds, the legal 
community also has high expectations of having a better interregional 
                                                             
98 Henry Chun Kwok Lei, ‘The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 
and its impacts on the export efficiency of Hong Kong and Macao’ (2017) 15 Journal 
of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 141.  
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insolvency system. The constitutional framework created by the policy of “one 
country, two systems” brings both necessities and possibilities to the 
development of a more efficient legal relationship between courts from both 
regions. Treating cases from the other jurisdiction as a total international issue 
is obviously not beneficial to the regional economy, nor is it the intention under 
the political arrangement. Furthermore, the intervention of the government in 
insolvency proceedings is not always avoidable because of the history of the 
planned economy. Such role can be used as a tool of local protectionism 
where the insolvency case is connected to the economic interests and political 
achievements of the local government. So, an insolvency regulation with 
detailed guidance is required to give the courts powers to solve insolvency 
problems with confidence, and reduce the level of involvement of local 
government.  
The chapter suggests that the recognition of an insolvency judgment should 
be the foundation of the new law. Extending the current judgment recognition 
arrangement between the mainland and Hong Kong to cover cross-border 
insolvency issues would not be possible because of the limited scope and 
application borrowed from international conventions. So, it would be 
recommended that a new regulation that focuses on cross-border insolvency 
and uses the current recognition arrangement as a framework, modifying 
specific sections based on the principle of the UNCITRAL Model Law, be 
introduced.  
Regarding the scope of the proposed arrangement, the requirements of 
monetary judgment and choice of court agreement should both be removed. 
The judgments for insolvency cases are not always monetary. For example, 
specific performance may be ordered to submit some necessary documents 
relating to the debtors’ assets. In Hong Kong, a liquidator may be appointed 
by the court to manage a debtor’s assets located in both the mainland and 
Hong Kong, so the recognition of the Hong Kong judgment may be about the 
recognition and powers of the liquidator in the mainland. Generally, the choice 
of court agreement may not be discussed between debtor and creditor before 
the proceeding.  
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Another suggestion is that the rule of jurisdiction should be modified, and it 
should focus on the protection of parties' interests and finding the appropriate 
court for dealing with the whole insolvency process. Since both mainland and 
Hong Kong agree that universalism is the better way to solve cross-border 
insolvency (although the attitude of mainland China requires further 
observation), the idea of deciding main and non-main proceeding by the COMI 
can be borrowed from the UNCITRAL Model Law for the mainland - Hong 
Kong issues. The COMI should be the operational and managerial centre of 
the company, and the court where the COMI is located should have the right 
to open the main proceeding, so the court in the other jurisdiction should 
provide full cooperation. In order to do that, the proposed arrangement should 
include the possibility of direct communication between the courts. It would be 
useful for the courts to collect all the relevant information for deciding the 
COMI; additionally, such communication would give the courts more powers 
to find a better solution together, and could avoid any potential interference 
from the local government.      
Another issue from the current arrangement is the difference of final judgment 
between the two jurisdictions. It is suggested that the Supreme Court could 
be asked to provide further clarifications about the proposed arrangement. 
The section that is refusing recognition based on public policy should be kept; 
however, the application of such a section should be limited. Taking the Model 
Law as an example, it suggests adding the word "manifestly" before "contrary 
to the social and public interests", which suggests such an article will not be 
easily applied, and run the risk of harming the effectiveness of the 
arrangement. Hong Kong and the mainland are two jurisdictions within one 
country, and there are shared public interests, so the interpretation and 
application should be more careful and restricted.    
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Chapter 7 Corporate Group Insolvency 
Through the review of international development in cross-border insolvency 
based on Chapter 2 and 3, insolvency of corporate group has been actively 
discussed under both the European regulation and the Model Law regimes. 
Although the current provisions of the Model Law do not include rules 
governing enterprise groups, more efforts have been put into this area by the 
Working Group.1 Chinese corporate groups at both national and international 
levels have developed significantly due to a series of reforms of state-owned 
enterprises and investment policies over the years. However, with the 
increasing number of state-owned enterprise groups and multinational 
enterprise groups in China, relevant issues have not been addressed in 
Chinese insolvency system. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to review 
the current status on the subject of corporate group insolvency at both 
domestic and international level, and discuss practical and potential 
developments of Chinese insolvency system accordingly. This chapter is 
continuing discussion following Chapter 4, which connect to the third research 
question for identifying legal gaps under Chinese insolvency law. This chapter 
is necessary     
Therefore, the first part examines the nature of corporate groups and why it is 
becoming a complicated issue under the insolvency law. Then, the second 
part reviews the legal meaning of a corporate group under Chinese law. 
Specifically, the influence of state-owned enterprises reform on the rise of 
Chinese corporate groups will be discussed in detail. The approach adopted 
by Chinese judges for solving corporate insolvency and its potential issues 
are considered in part three. The last part discusses the international 
principles regarding this matter, and possible influences on the future 
development of Chinese law. 
                                                             
1  For example: UNCITRAL Working Group V, Facilitating the Cross-border 
Insolvency of Multinational Enterprise Groups: Key Principles (December 2015); 
Facilitating the Cross-border Insolvency of Multinational Enterprise Groups: Draft 
Legislative Provisions (December 2016). 
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7.1 Corporate Groups and Insolvency  
The UNCITRAL Working Group uses the phrase “enterprise group”, and 
defines it as “two or more enterprises that are interconnected by control or 
significant ownership”, and the MEG Guidelines give the definition of 
“multinational corporate groups” as “those companies established in more 
than one country which are linked together by some form of control, whether 
direct or indirect, or ownership, by which linkage their businesses are centrally 
controlled or coordinated.” 2  The European Regulation on insolvency 
proceedings gives a succinct definition, saying that a corporate group consists 
of parent and subsidiary companies.3 Generally, all those definitions reflect 
the fact that companies within a group are separate entities.  
7.1.1 Benefits of Corporate Groups 
Those distinct legal entities provide flexibility for dealing with business in 
different countries, which is the most significant benefit of corporate groups, 
and which also makes it difficult to achieve a universal system for their 
insolvency.4 The structural flexibility allows the parent company to limit its 
liability for the subsidiaries’ debts; moreover, it gives the parent company the 
opportunity to separate business risks among companies.5  
Risk allocation could reduce the possibility of insolvency of the whole group.6 
The parent company could make sure that each legal entity within the group 
                                                             
2  Working Group V, ‘Facilitating the Cross-border Insolvency of Multinational 
Enterprise Groups: Draft Legislative Provisions’ Working paper 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.146. < https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V17 
/013/64/PDF/V1701364.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 9 September 2017. 
3 Article 2 (13), Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings. 
4  Nora Wouters and Alla Raykin, ‘Corporate Group Cross-Border Insolvencies 
Between the United States & European Union: Legal & Economic Developments’ 
(2013) 29 Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal  < http://law.emory.edu/ebdj/co 
entent/volume-29/issue-2/article/corporate-group-cross-border-insolvencies.html> 
accessed 9 September 2017. 
5 ibid. 
6 ibid. 
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has an easily ascertainable level of risk, which is independent from the other 
subsidiaries.7 If one subsidiary meets financial difficulty, the parent company 
may evaluate the situation and decide whether to save it, or require it to file 
insolvency for the group’s health. Such a risk allocation system is also 
preferred by different types of creditors.8 However, one subsidiary failure 
could lead to group failure. Most cases filed under the European Regulation 
involved corporate groups.9 The reason is that the internal structure within a 
group can be varied, and it could be decentralised or centralised. For 
decentralised groups, the foreign subsidiaries may have little connection with 
their parent, and operate independently. On the contrary, companies within 
centralised groups are deeply involved with each other, and subsidiaries in a 
different country may operate under a single identity even they all have an 
independent legal identity. The parent company will make sure its business 
decisions are fully performed by its subsidiaries, and for the best interests of 
the whole group. So, one failure may cause a chain reaction within centralised 
groups. 
7.1.2 Insolvency of Corporate Groups 
Based on the previous chapters, it is clear that a multinational insolvency issue 
is one of the inevitable results of the increase of business globalisation, and 
the complicated issue requires a specially-designed legal mechanism to 
facilitate those problems with international elements. Some of the 
complexities are caused by the differences in relevant laws of the involved 
jurisdictions, or the legal proceeding itself; sometimes it is possible that the 
insolvency process is more complex because of the structure of the insolvent 
enterprise. The insolvent company may be a single debtor having international 
operations or relations, such as one insolvent company with various branches 
in different countries; or a company holding assets or properties around the 
world; or a company simply having foreign creditors. A more complicated 
                                                             
7  Irit Mevorach ‘Appropriate Treatment of Corporate Groups in Insolvency: A 
Universal View’ (2007) 8(2) European Business Organisation Law Review 179. 
8 ibid. 
9 Nora Wouters and Alla Raykin (n 4). 
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situation is the failure of an international corporate group. Corporate groups 
often have branches or subsidiaries all over the world. Although those 
affiliated companies are legally separated, their business activities can be tied 
together in different ways. For example, a corporate group has a centralised 
structure, and the insolvent member may be deeply connected with the 
activities of another member: then one insolvency may lead to another 
member’s insolvency, and possibly the collapse of the whole group. The 
insolvency issues of those groups could be more chaotic and require 
specially-tailored laws.10 In fact, since the corporate group is the most typical 
organisational structure of multinational enterprises, the discussion for solving 
cross-border group insolvency issues have been going for decades as a result 
of the failure of several large international corporate groups.  
It has been argued that one of the weaknesses of the current UNCITRAL 
Model Law is that it only applies to distinct legal entities. The UNCITRAL 
Working Group did realise the importance of addressing the enterprise group 
insolvency, but the issue was thought to be too difficult to address at that time, 
and further discussions were required. So, their work on corporate group 
insolvency resulted in the publication of Part 3 of the Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law, which provides guidance dealing with enterprise group 
insolvency at both domestic and international level. Currently, the discussions 
and negotiations for drafting a set of provisions on enterprise groups to 
supplement the current model law are still in progress. 
7.1.3 Conflicts with Entity Separateness 
Under most of the insolvency regimes, corporate entity separateness is 
recognised. However, the respect for separateness is the most significant 
difficulty in solving cross-border group insolvency.11 Similar to the individual 
company’s insolvency, one of the main purposes for group insolvency is to 
increase the efficiency and maximise the value of the assets of the enterprise 
                                                             
10 Simona Di Sano, ‘The Third Road to Deal with the Insolvency of Multinational 
Enterprise Groups’ (2011) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 15. 
11 ibid. 
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as a whole. According to the universalism and territorialism debate, the best 
way to achieve this goal would be through a single principal insolvency 
proceeding, which could also ensure procedural fairness and equal treatment 
of all creditors. 12  One centralised proceeding would reduce the costs, 
increase the efficiency, offer a forum for cooperation among all the parties, 
and compare relevant options. The additional consideration for group 
insolvency here is that the courts also have to consider the legal status of 
separate entities as well. Basically, the idea of one single proceeding is a 
conflict with the intention of having separate legal entities for subsidiaries, and 
it would lead to two inherent difficulties. 
The first inherent issue is that it is difficult to ascertain the proper jurisdiction 
to open and govern the principal proceeding since different entities are 
possibly incorporated or operating in different jurisdictions.13 Deciding on the 
centre of main interests for one single debtor has already caused many issues 
under current international insolvency systems; so it can be seen that deciding 
on the most appropriate forum for a whole group could be more problematic. 
Furthermore, the legal principle of a separate entity is at the heart of most 
legal systems, which means it is difficult for countries to accept the possible 
interference in domestic policies if one single proceeding is in charge of the 
group insolvency. 14  The second difficulty is caused by the different 
organisational structures of corporate groups. As mentioned earlier, the 
operation of one group could be centralised or decentralised. It could be the 
case that the group is centrally managed, and the members’ assets and debts 
are linked to each other, and its management and decision-making centre 
could be in one specific country; or it could be the case each subsidiary enjoys 
a high degree of autonomy in business activities within its national regime, 
and the relationship with its parent is only a legal agreement.15 Accordingly, 
                                                             
12 Andrew T Guzman, ‘International Bankruptcy: in Defense of Universalism’ (2000) 
98 Mich.L. Rev. 2177. 
13 Irit Mevorach (n 7). 
14 Irit Mevorach, ‘The Road to a Suitable and Comprehensive Global Approach to 
Insolvencies Within Multinational Corporate Group’ (2005) (PhD Thesis University 
College London 2006). 
15 Nora Wouters and Alla Raykin (n 4). 
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the approach of one single proceeding may be more applicable to those 
centralised groups, but unsuitable to the decentralised ones. Therefore, it is 
important to consider the influence of the degree of integration of control in 
group insolvency as it can drive the debate about whether it is possible to 
have a unified insolvency approach for corporate groups.16 
 
7.2. Corporate Groups in China  
As mentioned in this thesis, the development of the Chinese insolvency 
system has been very slow, and there is only one article addressing cross-
border insolvency issues under the latest reformed enterprise insolvency law. 
The law does not consider the issues of corporate group insolvencies. In fact, 
the regulation of corporate groups is very limited under the current Chinese 
legal system, and obviously, it does not match the significant development of 
the Chinese economy. The numbers of both domestic and international 
corporate groups are increasing with the influence of globalisation and the 
Chinese open-up policies. 17  Domestically, most of the large Chinese 
companies are members of the corporate group. It can seem that many 
Fortune 500 companies indicate their group in their names. State-owned 
enterprises are a big part of the Chinese economy, and the corporate group is 
a very common structure, one that profitable SOEs would choose.18 With the 
implementation of a new, investor-friendly company law in 2013, it can be 
predicted that the number of enterprises will continue to grow as the law 
reduces the barriers for establishing companies. Furthermore, the equal 
development of the private and public sector is encouraged following the 
government strategy of developing a market-oriented economy. Therefore, 
the increase of both state-owned and private-owned corporate groups can be 
expected.19  Internationally, China is in a good position for both inbound and 
                                                             
16 Irit Mevorach (n 14). 
17 Junhai Liu, ‘Regulation of Corporate Groups in China’, in Holger Fleischer et al 
(eds.), German and Asian Perspectives on Company Law (Mohr Siebeck 2016). 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
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outbound international investment. Most international multinational 
companies have their subsidiaries or branches in China, and more Chinese 
companies are trying to expand their business groups globally.20 Therefore, 
urgent action is required to have proper laws specially tailored for regulating 
corporate groups in China.    
The definition of the corporate group under Chinese laws is not clear. There 
are limited provisions from different branches of the law addressing the issues 
between the parent company and its subsidiaries, but none of them gives a 
comprehensive explanation of what corporate groups are. 21  The 2013 
Chinese Company Law has one article for this matter, which only clarifies that 
the subsidiary has a separate legal personality. 22  Contrary to the slow 
development of legislation, Chinese scholars have been trying to clarify this 
concept. For example, Professor Shao noted the purpose of developing group 
structure is to achieve centralised management and improve profitability as a 
whole, and defined corporate groups as organisations consisting of two or 
more enterprises, with all the members having a separate legal identity and 
all accepting integrated control and management in financial policies; Dr He 
also pointed out that the essence of the definition of corporate groups in a 
legal context is whether there is a unified control and management system for 
all the members, as such a system ensures the organisational and integrated 
nature of the group.23 In fact, the meaning of the management and control 
system here can be explained by referencing the work from UNCITRAL. In 
their draft provisions for enterprise groups’ issues, ‘control’ means one 
enterprise’s capacity to determine, directly or indirectly, the operating and 
financial policies of another.24  
                                                             
20 ibid. 
21 Hanjiang, He ‘The Conception of Making Corporate Group Law in China’ HF 
Library <http://www.hflib.gov.cn/law/law/falvfagui2/JJF/LWJ/1069.htm> accessed 20 
June 2017. 
22 Article 14, The Company Law of PRC. 
23 Hanjiang, He (n 21). 
24  Working Group V, ‘Facilitating the cross-border insolvency of multinational 
enterprise groups: draft legislative provisions’ Working paper A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.146. 
<https://documents-dsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V17/013/64/PDF/V1701364.pdf>. 
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Therefore, at least two common characteristics of corporate groups can be 
identified as follow: 1. each member has its own legal identity; 2. all members 
operate for the best interests of the whole group, and are connected through 
a centralised management system. Understanding these two basic factors 
would be the starting point for addressing corporate group issues in a Chinese 
law context.  
SOEs Reform and Development of Corporate Groups  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, insolvency of one company within a group 
could lead to more insolvencies of other members, or even the collapse of the 
whole group; so having a proper system under an insolvency system to help 
such groups to find the best solution is important. The importance for China is 
not just about having a more comprehensive enterprise insolvency system; it 
is also related to building a stable economic and legal environment for the 
further reform of the state-owned enterprises, and the development of the 
market-oriented economy. 
State-owned enterprises are still playing vital roles in the Chinese economy, 
especially in some basic industries, such as energy, construction and 
telecommunications.25 Both state-owned and private corporate groups are 
outcomes of the on-going reform of SOEs, which is a very slow and 
complicated process. The first stage of the reform started in 1980. During that 
time, SOEs accounted for 78% of China’s gross industrial output.26 With the 
marketisation of China’s domestic economy, and the liberalisation of trade and 
foreign investment, the government started to corporatise the SOEs.27 The 
purpose was to reform the management systems to achieve better productivity 
and profitability in the SOEs.28 The second reform period started from the 
                                                             
25 Gary Jefferson, ‘State-Owned Enterprise in China: Reform, Performance, and 
Prospects’ (2016) (working paper, The Sage Handbook of Contemporary China), 8. 
26 ibid, 9. 
27 ibid. 
28 Chong-En Bai, Jiangyong Lu and Zhigang Tao, ‘The Multitask Theory of State 
Enterprise Reform: Empirical Evidence from China’ (2006) 96 The American 
Economic Review 353. 
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mid-1990s and it was largely motivated by the determination to ready China 
for membership of the World Trade Organisation.29 This stage was called 
“retain the large, release the small”, which meant retain large SOEs in 
important sectors, and privatise smaller SOEs. By 2004, the number of such 
SOEs had decreased significantly from 118,000 in 1995 to 24,961.30 The 
ownership of those companies has been transferred to managers, workers or 
private investors. More importantly, the policy also led to growing merger and 
acquisition activity and the early development of corporate groups.31 In the 
new century, the Chinese government started the third stage of reform, and 
one of the main purposes is to restructure the large SOEs and improve their 
competitive advantages in the global market.32 Accordingly, the increase of 
the state-owned corporate groups has been significant during this period. 
Commonly, state-owned groups are formed based on government support or 
administrative orders.33 A typical example would be the Sinopec Group, which 
ranked 4th in the global 500 list.34 The group was formed directly by the central 
government, and it included 12 petroleum companies, 14 refinery companies 
and hundreds of smaller energy companies from different provinces.  
There are inherent issues relating to state-owned corporate groups, and one 
of the remedies would be to have a comprehensive insolvency and 
restructuring system for groups. The first issue of state-owned corporate 
groups is that their business operations mainly depend on government 
strategy or administrative guidance, and continuing funds from the 
government. 35  The result is a lack of creativity and business sensitivity; 
                                                             
29 Gary Jefferson (n 25), 10. 
30 ibid. 
31 Fan Gang and Nicholas C. Hope, ‘The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the 
Chinese Economy’ (2013) China-US 2022: Chapter 16, 5 <www.uschina2022.com> 
accessed 12 July 2017. 
32 ibid. 
33  Dake Yang, ‘Enterprise Group Legislation Mode Selection in China from the 
Perspective of Comparative Law’ (2016) Journal of Tongji University Social Science 
Section 110. 
34 Fortune, ‘Global 500 list’ < http://fortune.com/global500/ > accessed 12 September 
2017. 
35  Dake Yang, (n 33); see also Jin Deng, ‘The Research on the legislation for 
Insolvency of Multinational Corporate Group’ (2013) Politics and Law 5. 
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Chinese scholars describe such situations as “easy to be big, difficult to be 
strong”.36 The second issue is that all the members of state-owned groups 
were connected as a result of the political drive, so the economic connection 
among them is not strong. This means it would be difficult, or take a long time, 
to have a unified management system to fit all the members. One of the results 
would be that the parent company would have to be in charge of everything, 
and members would lose autonomy and motivation.37  
Both issues would lead to an imbalanced development between the parent 
company and its subsidiaries, and the result of such an imbalance is zombie 
companies within a group. Usually, if the group is still getting money from the 
government, those zombie companies will not enter the insolvency process, 
and continue to exist.38 If there is more than one zombie company, it will be a 
big burden on the group and the government. A group insolvency regulation 
would provide a solution for such situations, as a restructuring plan may be 
proposed for a healthier structure. Furthermore, the Chinese government has 
been promoting the further strategy of developing a market-oriented economy. 
This means the intervention of the government in business activities should 
be reduced and the market be allowed to play the main role. Although it would 
be impossible to expect the government role to disappear, it cannot be denied 
that the SOEs have been given more freedom to play on the international 
platform.39 As SOEs are more involved in the market rules, the insolvency 
system should be the appropriate solution for when they are having financial 
difficulties.  
The development of private corporate groups may be steadier since they 
usually expand gradually, playing the rules of the market. However, some 
                                                             
36 State-Owned Enterprises Reform: Stronger, Better and Bigger (Economic Daily 
News, 20,04,2017). 
37 Dake Yang (n 33). 
38 Shaoqing Huang and Yan Chen, ‘The Distribution Characteristics and Solution 
Strategy for Zombie Enterprises in China’ (2017) China Industrial Economics 24.    
39  Yongnian Zheng and Minjia Chen, ‘China’s Recent State-Owned Enterprise 
Reform and Its Social Consequences’ (2007) Briefing Series, China Policy Institute, 
University of Nottingham Issue 23. 
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groups, especially those which used to be state-owned companies, might 
make a risky investment or business decision in the free market. By using the 
connection among the different members, a large-scale financial operation is 
possible through ways such as connected transactions or excessive finance.40 
The result is all the members are closely connected, and one member’s issue 
may lead to the failure of the whole group. In such situations, a group 
insolvency system is required in order to maximise the repayment for creditors.   
 
7.3 Solving Corporate Group Insolvency in China  
Based on the analysis above, the main reason causing the complexities of 
corporate group insolvencies is the application of the separate legal entity 
doctrine. Although the traditional rule should be and has been recognised and 
respected under both domestic and international legal regimes, it cannot be 
denied that with the rapid development of corporate groups, the doctrine can 
be used by group management teams for certain liability or financial reasons, 
which would blur the lines between separate group members. 41  One 
corporate group could be managed as a single commercial entity with 
extensive interchange of assets or funds among group members, so the 
assets and liability may not be clearly separated.42 The highly-connected 
assets and funds among members could be one of the common factors that 
is shared by the insolvency of big corporate groups in recent years. 43 
However, it is important to remember that the management structure could 
vary in different groups. The insolvency could be the whole group, or only one 
or several members within the group. Therefore, the dilemma for regulating 
corporate group insolvency is that it has been realised that solving insolvency 
members individually may be not beneficial to the whole group, but it could be 
                                                             
40 ibid. 
41 Heribert Hirte, ‘Towards a Framework for the Regulation of Corporate Groups’ 
Insolvencies’ (2008) ECFR 213.  
42 ibid. 
43 Arie Van Hoe, ‘Enterprise Groups and Their Insolvency: It’s the (Common) Interest, 
Stupid!’ (2014) ECFR 200. 
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difficult to have one solution to fit all different types of group insolvency cases; 
more specifically, what standards should be used to differentiate the different 
types?44  
Since there are many SOEs existing as corporate groups, and they are vital 
to the stability of Chinese economy, it is important that the Chinese 
commercial law system has an effective system for insolvency of corporate 
groups. At the domestic level, some developed countries have been making 
efforts to build an effective group insolvency system. For example, the New 
Zealand courts have the statutory pooling power for solving group insolvency, 
which allowing the assets of the whole insolvent group to be used to satisfy 
the debts owed by each member of the group.45 The bankruptcy courts of the 
United States have similar powers called ‘substantive consolidation’.46 As a 
matter of fact, although the latest Chinese insolvency law did not mention 
corporate groups, Chinese judges have applied a similar approach in practice 
for solving the increasing number of issues of corporate group insolvencies.   
Court-developed Approach 
Since there is no common law system in China or relevant articles under the 
insolvency law or other commercial laws, the approach of ‘consolidation’ was 
developed by the courts in practice, and has received academic support.47 At 
least 15 case reports can be found in the official judgments publication website 
                                                             
44 Irit Mevorach, ‘Is the Future Bright for Enterprise Groups in Insolvency? – Analysis 
of UNCITRAL’s New Recommendations on the Domestic Aspects’ in International 
insolvency law: challenges and reforms (Ashgate 2012) 363. 
45 Section 271, 272, the Companies Act 1993 (New Zealand). 
46 Sampsell v Imperial Paper and Color Corp 313 US 215 (1941): Supreme Court 
case recognised substantive consolidation “Substantive consolidation can be seen 
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47  Dan He, ‘The Standards for Substantive Consolidation in Corporate Group 
Insolvency: A Comparative View’ (2017) 3 Journal of CUPL 70; also see Yongliang 
Wang, Jieguo Huang and Lihong Gao, ‘The legal Practice of Substantive 
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that have mentioned such an approach.48 By using this approach, the courts 
have denied the separateness of companies within a group, and combined all 
the relevant assets together and made liquidation or restructuring as one legal 
entity. The legal consequences of the solution are that all the creditors from 
different member companies are treated as creditors of the whole group, and 
the debtor-creditor relationships among different members are eliminated. 
Accordingly, the approach has been criticised. Firstly, the principles of ‘limited 
liability’ and independent legal identity under company law are the foundation 
for doing business between debtors and creditors.49 Potential consolidation 
in the circumstance of insolvency would diminish the predictability that 
creditors would expect to have, and put market transactions in an uncertain 
condition. Furthermore, denying the legal identity of a company should be 
done through the formal legal process and not through an insolvency 
proceeding.50 Secondly, when all creditors are treated as the group’s creditors, 
the interests of some creditors may be harmed since creditors of companies 
with fewer liabilities have to share the insolvency loses with the creditors of 
other group members with a high liability rate.51 Therefore, with the fact that 
there is no legal basis for the approach under the Chinese legal system, some 
scholars argue that it should not be applied.  
The supporters of the substantive consolidation approach think that it could 
improve the efficiency and maximise the value of group insolvency, and it 
would reduce the insolvency cost and increase the possibility of corporate 
rescue. Considering the fact that more and more Chinese enterprises are 
choosing to operate as corporate groups domestically and internationally, 
consolidation is the right direction for future insolvency law. Although some 
academic scholars have encouraged it and local judges applied it in practice, 
the approach has not been mentioned or interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
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However, some working papers actually imply the Supreme Court has 
changed their attitude toward substantive consolidation. In the 2002 official 
document regarding some issues of enterprise insolvency proceedings, the 
Supreme Court emphasised the principle of separate insolvency proceedings 
for separate legal entities.52 In 2012, substantive consolidation for the issue 
of corporate group insolvency was one of the official topics for discussion 
during the conference for interpretation of insolvency law held by the Supreme 
Court. The discussion made it clear that substantive consolidation is good for 
improving the efficiency of group insolvency, and legal interpretation and 
guidance should be provided considering the increasing number of group 
insolvency cases.53 Although the interpretation has not been introduced, the 
Chinese lawmakers have accepted the approach, and the problems now are 
about when the approach should be triggered and how to apply it in practice.  
Since the approach was developed under US case law, the judges have 
constantly emphasised that the application of substantive consolidation 
should be cautious. In Owens Corning,54 the court listed five basic principles 
to guide the courts’ determination: (1) entity separateness, which is the 
fundamental ground rule, should be respected; (2) the approach should be 
applied to remedy harm caused by the debtors who disregarded corporate 
separateness; (3) the mere fact that there is benefit to the administration of 
estate is not enough to invoke the approach; (4) this approach should be rarely 
invoked as one of last resorts after considering other options; (5) it only can 
be used defensively and cannot be used offensively for the purpose of altering 
certain creditors’ rights.55 Furthermore, the UNCITRAL legislative guide also 
provides that the general principle is to respect the single legal entity, and 
substantive consolidation could be used in very limited situations. 56  For 
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example, there is a high degree of integration of business operations and 
affairs among group members through control and ownership, and it is difficult 
to distinguish the assets and liabilities among such group members. However, 
the concept of substantive consolidation does not exist in Chinese insolvency 
law, and without official guidance for the application of substantive 
consolidation, the relevant Chinese courts have to decide whether and how to 
apply such an approach themselves. One of the results is its overuse. It is 
possible that judges have decided to use the consolidation approach simply 
because it would be convenient for them to administer the insolvency 
proceeding. Additionally, the court-appointed administrator is usually the one 
to make the application of substantive consolidation to the court, and before 
making the decision, creditors usually do not have the opportunity to express 
their opinions on this matter.  
Future Suggestion 
Since it may not be possible to have a new enterprise insolvency law in the 
foreseeable future and there are many uncertainties for corporate group 
insolvency, having legal guidance addressing the issue of substantive 
consolidation from the PRC Supreme Court would be an appropriate first step. 
It would provide the legal basis since such a document has legal effects, and 
it could provide guidance as detailed as possible; furthermore, it is flexible 
since the approach is still in the exploration stage; the lawmakers could always 
make new documents to supplement the original one, if needs be. It has to be 
clear that the decision to apply the approach should be made based on full 
consideration of all the relevant factors of individual cases. 
Specifically, those principles from US case law mentioned above, and similar 
ones from the UNCITRAL legislative guide, could be borrowed to clarify the 
purpose and limited application of substantive consolidation. This approach 
should only be used in situations where it is difficult or unfair to have separate 
proceedings, and the purposes are to improve the efficiency of insolvency 
                                                             
Groups in Insolvency (2012) 1-3. 
228 
 
proceedings, to ensure fairness, and to protect the creditors’ interests. 57 
Therefore, the courts should be given enough discretionary power to decide 
whether the approach is appropriate for specific cases.  
The most vital issue is to decide the standard for the application of substantive 
consolidation.58 According to the limited number of substantive consolidation 
cases to date, the main reason that judges decided to choose this approach 
was due to the confusion of legal identity among group members.59 The 
confusion could be comprised of different aspects. It could be the confusion 
of finance.60 Although each member has an independent finance system, all 
the financial activities are controlled by the central management company. It 
could be the confusion of assets, meaning it is difficult to identify separate 
member company’s assets and liabilities. The confusion also could be about 
the management teams or organisations, such as different members are 
managed by the same team, or one operation location is shared by different 
members. Other factors may include lack of decision-making powers in 
individual members and financial sponsorship among different members.61 
Since the standard was firstly developed in the field of company law, it is 
important to clarify its application in the field of insolvency law. It has been 
suggested that the potential legal interpretation of the substantive 
consolidation approach could use ‘confusion of legal identity’ as a central 
standard. A clear and detailed list of what situations should be counted as 
constituting the confusion of identity should be given by the Supreme Court. 
However, it also should be pointed out that confusion of identity should not be 
the only standard.62 In certain situations, even when the identities of group 
members are clear and separate, substantive consolidation may still be 
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appropriate. As the Chinese consolidation approach and the US common law 
approach both were court-developed, so references can be made to the US 
case laws for comprehensive standards for applying substantive consolidation.  
For example, the courts should consider the cost of separating assets and 
liabilities among group members. If the process requires a high cost and would 
harm the creditors’ repayment, it may be enough to trigger the substantive 
consolidation.63 Additionally, the approach should be considered if it could 
increase the value of the group’s assets or the possibility of restructuring.64 
As the identity consideration is from the point of view of debtors, the interests 
and expectations of creditors should be considered as well in a situation of 
group insolvency. The UNCITRAL guide also suggested that creditors must 
be involved in the substantive consolidation process, so creditors meetings 
should be held, and relevant plans should be disclosed in detail.65 Generally, 
the decision needs comprehensive consideration of all the circumstances of 
each case. 
 
7.4 Corporate Group Insolvency with International Elements 
in China 
7.4.1 International Trends  
As far as the domestic insolvency system is concerned, only a few countries 
have introduced formal regulations for governing corporate group insolvency. 
Internationally, because of the complexities of group insolvency compared 
with single entity issue, the development is more disappointing. As UNCITRAL 
observed “there is often a clear tension between the traditional separate legal 
entity approach to cooperate regulation and its implications for insolvency and 
the facilitation of insolvency proceedings concerning a group or part of a group 
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in a cross-border situation in a manner that would enable the goal of 
maximising value for the benefit of all creditors to be achieved”.66 Generally, 
the principle of universalism has been recognised as the correct direction, and 
a milder approach developed accordingly.67 Both the UNCITRAL Working 
Group and the Recast European Regulation agreed encouraging coordination 
and cooperation among different proceedings affecting different group 
members would be the most practical method of facilitating group insolvency.    
European Regulation  
The approach was formally legislated by the newly recast European 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings. After years of discussions and reviews, 
a new chapter focusing on “Insolvency Proceedings of Members of a Group 
of Companies” was developed.68 Instead of finding a “one for all” solution, the 
new chapter aims to improve the efficiency of group insolvency through 
encouraging cooperation and communication among the practitioners and 
courts involved in the insolvency of the different members of the group, and 
through coordination among different proceedings when it is possible.69 It has 
to say the chapter was a compromise in order to achieve a politically 
acceptable solution among member states; furthermore, it also reaffirms the 
principle of respecting the separate personality of members of a group.70 
Therefore, the approaches in the new chapter are not all mandatory.    
Cooperation and communication is the first mechanism of the two pillars 
approach, which states that when there are two or more members from one 
corporate group subject to insolvency, relevant courts and practitioners may 
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be obliged to cooperate and communicate to facilitate the effective 
administration of those proceedings. 71  The cooperation could be among 
different parties, such as between insolvency proceedings or between 
practitioners; and it may also take any form, such as agreement or protocol. 
Those new provisions on cooperation offer a legal framework to allow relevant 
parties from different members’ proceedings to communicate. More 
importantly, it also gives parties the flexibility to decide the most appropriate 
form of cooperation based on the circumstances of the case. Such 
cooperation could be very beneficial if the group is highly integrated and the 
relationship among subsidiaries is very close as it is possible to maximise the 
value of involved assets for creditors, or to facilitate the restructuring of 
relevant members of the group, or the reorganisation of the whole group.  
The second pillar is the group coordination proceedings. According to Section 
2 of Chapter V, group coordination proceedings may be requested by an 
insolvency practitioner before any court involved in insolvency proceedings of 
any member of the group.72 Such a proceeding requires a coordination court, 
a coordinator and a group coordination plan. The court first seized should 
have the jurisdiction over the coordination proceeding, and the court can be 
changed if two-thirds of the majority of practitioners involved agree another 
more appropriate one.73 The proposed coordination plan is to recommend a 
comprehensive set of measures appropriate to an integrated approach to the 
resolution of the group members’ insolvencies. 74  Participation in the 
coordination plan is voluntary, so each practitioner has the right to decide 
whether to join and follow the coordination proceeding, and it is also possible 
to join the plan at a later stage even if it was objected to at the beginning.75 
The adoption of the coordination approach is to avoid the inherent difficulties 
of group insolvency cases, and ensure consistency across the proceedings of 
all the members of the group. It could improve the efficiency of all proceedings 
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by saving time and costs since the coordinator would reduce the repetition, 
mediate the conflicts among different parties, and provide relevant information 
to all practitioners involved.  
Overall, cooperation and coordination may contribute to increasing efficiency 
and legal certainty of group insolvency in practice.  The two mechanisms are 
trying to find the middle ground between the traditional principle of a separate 
entity and universalism approach for multinational insolvency; basically, the 
approaches enacted reflect the principles of universalism, but leave room for 
practitioners or courts to decide whether to join the universal solution. 
However, it has been argued that the high level of flexibility under the new 
approach could lead to more uncertainties and unpredictable issues in the 
process.76 Practitioners are not obliged to cooperate or join the coordination 
plan if they are not happy with the proposed plan, or there is a conflict of 
interests among different members of a group, and such conflicts are not 
uncommon.77 The voluntary nature of the law probably means that it will not 
be much used in practice, as noted by Weiss: that coordination can turn into 
a lame duck because of this reason.78  
Addressing the issues of group insolvency is a positive step of the European 
regulation. Since the recast has only been introduced less than two years ago, 
the benefits or drawbacks remain to be observed.  
UNCITRAL Model Law  
Similar to the European system, the UNCITRAL Working Group has further 
developed the recommendations listed under the legislative guide for the 
purpose of reaching general consensus among jurisdictions for coordination 
and cooperation. According to the official papers from the Working Group, it 
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should be a coordinated insolvency solution encompassing all the relevant 
members, if one enterprise group is in financial difficulty.79 The solution also 
should be a flexible concept, taking into consideration the differences in the 
groups’ structure, business model and the level of integration between the 
members.80 Flexibility would be more essential in the Model Law context, as 
it will deal with more jurisdictions with various political and legal systems. 
Regarding the specific solutions, the Working Group recommends the similar 
principles as the European approach, saying that cooperation and 
coordination are required to have efficient group insolvency.81 The level of 
cooperation could be different depending on the circumstances of a specific 
group. It may require cooperation among representatives from different 
members’ proceedings to negotiate and develop the best solution for the 
group, and such cooperation should be extended to the maximum.82  
While respecting the separateness of group members, UNCITRAL also 
recognised the benefits of one proceeding taking a lead role in a group case, 
as it would coordinate other proceedings. Hence, one of the insolvency 
representatives or courts taking the coordinating role could be one form of 
cooperation. Another level of coordination would be through a coordination 
proceeding, and the essential elements would be the proposed coordination 
plan and coordinator. The plan is open to both insolvent and solvent members 
to participate voluntarily. Additionally, another principle states that each 
member’s proceeding would have the jurisdiction to deal with the group plan 
based on applicable domestic law, and the purpose is to preserve the rights 
of local creditors and other stakeholders.83 Based on the solutions from the 
two international regimes, it seems that cooperation and coordination would 
be the best possible solution for now.  There is no doubt that such a system 
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could improve the efficiency and respective interests of different parties, but 
some practical concerns, such as how to ensure a high participation rate or 
which would be the most appropriate coordination court, require further 
guidance.  
7.4.2 Possible Developments in Chinese Law  
For corporate group insolvencies with international elements, Chinese courts 
should follow the current international trend to encourage cooperation with 
other foreign proceedings when it is appropriate. Firstly, since foreign 
enterprises are opening more branches in China and Chinese groups are 
making investment internationally, Chinese courts may face an increasing 
number of group insolvencies, and currently, cooperation could be the best 
solution. For instance, if there is a foreign coordination proceeding for a 
corporate group and one of its subsidiary’s insolvency proceeding is in China, 
the Chinese court should consider participating in the coordination proceeding 
if the outcome would be beneficial to Chinese creditors. Chinese courts would 
expect the same cooperation from relevant foreign proceedings in similar 
situations. Effective solutions to international problems always require the 
willingness to work together with relevant parties.  
Secondly, current international solutions are on a voluntary basis, which could 
be more acceptable to Chinese legislators. It has been discussed that the 
UNCITRAL Working Group adopted a more practical ‘modified universalism’ 
to solve corporate group insolvency.84 One example is that the concept of 
‘group COMI’ was abandoned since it is difficult to reach a well-accepted 
definition. 85  So the current UNCITRAL position reflects a less ambitious 
approach that respects the separateness of legal entities governed by 
different insolvency proceedings. Legal guidance encouraging a voluntary 
approach from the Supreme Court could be passed, and the judges would 
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have the power to decide whether to cooperate with foreign proceedings or 
join the coordination proceedings. As with domestic group insolvency, the 
facts of different group insolvency cases could vary, so the judges have to 
consider all the relevant factors to make a decision.  
The more interesting issue is the regional corporate group insolvency issue 
between mainland China and Hong Kong. The special relationship between 
these two jurisdictions requires a special solution for the issue as the voluntary 
approach concerning international issues may be not suitable for two areas 
with such an intimate economic connection. For instance, one corporate group 
which operates a business in both jurisdictions and with several members has 
started insolvency proceedings. The question is whether there is an effective 
approach to coordinating all those relevant proceedings. Following the 
discussion in the last chapter, which suggested that the concept of COMI 
could be used to solve recognition issues between the mainland and Hong 
Kong, it is argued that the concept also could be used for corporate group 
insolvency between the two jurisdictions.  
The concept “group COMI” could be introduced for corporate group issues 
between mainland China and Hong Kong. The group COMI for a corporate 
group should be the jurisdiction where its management headquarters or head 
office is located. Group COMI would help the court decide which member of 
the group is in the main position, and the court in the location of such a 
dominant member would have the jurisdiction to open the main proceeding for 
the purpose of coordinating all the members’ proceedings. The general factors 
to consider for deciding the group COMI include where the major group’s 
business plans are made, where financial operations are carried out and 
where the management decisions that would influence most of the members’ 
business activities are made. The administrator in this proceeding should be 
the coordinator as well. The proceedings in the non-group COMI jurisdictions 
should be allowed to decide whether to join the coordination plan proposed 
by the coordinator. Since the issue of corporate group insolvency has not been 
addressed by the authorities of either jurisdiction, this hypothetical approach 
aims to provide a possible direction for solving issues between mainland 
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China and its special administrative regions.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
An effective legal regime to deal with the complexities of corporate group 
insolvencies remains a major unresolved issue at both domestic and 
international levels, and one of the main reasons is the inherent conflict 
between the principle of the independence of separate legal entities and 
consolidated insolvency proceedings. At the domestic level, ignoring the 
separateness of group members may be necessary in certain cases in order 
to maximise the value of the insolvent group for distribution, or achieve better 
reorganisation plans, but this approach has to be applied with limitations. For 
the insolvency of multinational corporate groups, the principle of cooperation 
and communication, encouraged by international insolvency regimes, seems 
to be the practical solution as it is consistent with the modified universalism 
for achieving a global result to the maximum extent possible.86 As for the 
Chinese insolvency system, it is important to address the corporate group 
issues because of the increasing number of state-owned corporate groups 
and multinational corporate groups involving Chinese parties. Since the 
Chinese corporate insolvency system is relatively new, especially the 
reorganisation system which was just introduced in the 2007 insolvency law, 
it is suggested that the Supreme Court could issue legal recommendations on 
this subject to supplement the current insolvency system. It should formalise 
the substantive consolidation approach with clear guidance, and an 
international cooperation procedure for multinational cases. Additionally, 
addressing corporate groups insolvency issues would also be a driving force 
for the development of other legislation for corporate groups.    
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This thesis has carried out an in-depth examination and discussion of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and its possible 
implications for reforming Chinese national and interregional insolvency 
regimes. This chapter will provide the conclusion to the thesis by first 
highlighting the main findings that have emerged from the different chapters 
and the answers to the main research questions. Potential implications will be 
summarised in the second part. The third part will discuss the limitations of 
this study and possible directions for future researchers. 
 
8.1 Findings and Reflection on Research Questions 
Question1: The Nature of Cross-border Insolvency 
Chapter 2 explored the complexities and difficulties connected to cross-border 
insolvency issues. The existence of cross-border insolvency issues has been 
caused by the rapid development of globalisation. While applying 
multinational corporate structure is necessary for seeking international 
competitive advantages, the failure of those companies has raised global 
difficulties. Essentially, the fundamental insolvency issues are magnified by 
the fact that the presence of assets, claims and creditors are located in more 
one jurisdiction. Although solving cross-border insolvency will face the same 
issues as resolving national insolvency, which is to fairly balance various types 
of creditors' interests with a limited amount of debtor's assets, cross-border 
insolvency law is not merely an extension of national insolvency law.1 Due to 
the multinational nature of the issue, the solution for cross-border insolvency 
must also deal with issues that are caused by the divergence of various 
national insolvency systems.2 Hence, three main conflicts of law issues are 
relevant, which are jurisdiction, choice-of-law, and recognition of foreign 
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judgments.  
The answers are related to two main theories: universalism and territorialism. 
Over the years, universalism has won the long-running debate between 
universalism and territorialism and has been recognised and applied as the 
fundamental principle of cross-border insolvency law.3 A single insolvency 
proceeding controlling debtors assets that are located all around the world 
reflects the concept of the undivided entirety of property. This approach is 
economically efficient since it reduces the collection costs and avoids the 
dramatic differences in national laws. However, there is always a struggle 
between the ideal principle and the reality, and the application of universalism 
had to make practical compromises. The invention of “modified universalism” 
reflects those compromises, which allows the existence of 
territorial/secondary proceedings while sharing the view of one main 
proceeding in the debtor’s home country playing a controlling role for 
international cases. Some argued that this feature could lead to a major 
departure from the original objectives of universalism. This study concludes 
that having secondary proceedings is necessary for an international regime 
for cross-border insolvency. The main purpose of this is to balance the local 
interests and the principle of universality, which means that such an approach 
could be willingly accepted by more countries.  
Furthermore, if only one jurisdiction could open insolvency proceedings 
against a debtor, it is possible that there would be an intensive fight over the 
centre of main interest (COMI) location among relevant countries, so territorial 
proceedings would reduce those COMI competitions. The modified 
universalism approach also emphasises the importance of cooperation and 
communication among different insolvency proceedings, which would be the 
main principle to achieve the aim of universality. The fact that both the 
European Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law system have adopted 
main and non-main proceeding approaches provides support to the feasibility 
of modified universalism, and cooperation and communication also have been 
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included as one duty of court under both regimes. 
 
Question 2: The Features and Effectiveness of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency 
Chapter 3 examined the application of the UNCITRAL Model Law in detail. 
Having realised that universalism is the fundamental principle, great efforts 
have been taken by different international organisations to develop a 
convergent regime for solving cross-border insolvency. Currently, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law is the first regime that has been widely accepted and 
adopted internationally. The nature of the Model Law is a set of 
recommendations to help countries establish a harmonised, effective and fair 
cross-border insolvency law under their own domestic insolvency law.4 The 
adoption is voluntary and enacting countries are allowed to make 
modifications. Without a regional arrangement like the European Union and 
considering the diversity of domestic insolvency regimes, a flexible approach 
is necessary and appropriate. First, it assists the extensive application among 
different countries, as the law is intended to be used as an international tool. 
Second, the flexibility and broad application could meet the world's urgent 
need for an effective cross-border insolvency system facing the rapid 
development of the multinational business. The basis of the Model Law 
focuses on simplifying procedures for recognition, relief and cooperation and 
communication between courts and insolvency representatives.5  
One of the main purposes of the Model Law is to facilitate recognition of 
qualified foreign proceedings, and it uses the jurisdictional concepts, COMI, 
and establishment, to decide recognition of foreign proceedings as main or 
non-main proceedings. The concept of the centre of main interests is a 
rebuttable presumption. As the law did not provide a clear definition of COMI, 
how to rebut this presumption of incorporated location has caused many 
issues. The incoherent interpretation of the meaning of COMI is one main 
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issue. The study found that although both the European insolvency regime 
and the Model Law adopted the COMI concept, its function under each regime 
is different. While the European Regulation is a jurisdiction-dominant 
procedure, deciding COMI is essential because it is related to basic issues 
including appropriate jurisdiction, applicable law and automatic recognition. 
Under the Model Law, the function is less significant, and as the US case law 
suggested, the interpretation of COMI should reflect the international nature 
of the law and apply "the principal place of business" test to make a 
comprehensive judgment based on all the relevant information. 
The Model Law has taken a neutral position on the matter of choice-of-law 
due to various insolvency systems from state to state. Instead, the effects of 
recognition are regulated by different types of relief. One enacting court could 
grant provisional relief before recognition or relief upon recognition, and 
automatic reliefs are only available to the recognition of foreign main 
proceedings. The different understandings among different enacting countries 
about the discretionary relief under article 21 of the Model Law have caused 
uncertainty, which is about whether an enacting court could grant relief based 
on the foreign law of the jurisdiction where the insolvency proceeding was 
opened. While the US case law suggested foreign laws could be applied under 
right circumstances, the UK judges took the opposite approach. This study 
agreed with the US approach because the language and explanation of the 
Model Law do not rule out the possibility of applying the foreign law and it is 
consistent with the principle of universalism.  
Another main feature of the law which is emphasised is that of cooperation 
among recognising courts, foreign courts and foreign representatives. Direct 
communication is encouraged when it is needed, which would avoid traditional 
procedures such as diplomatic channels or other time-consuming procedures. 
The duty to cooperate under Articles 25–27 could be essential to the success 
of the Model Law, as chapter 2 discussed, as cooperation and communication 
is the solution that could reduce the territorial influences under modified 
universalism and the key to achieving outcomes of universalism. 
The flexibility of the Model Law that allows enacting countries to make 
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modifications is a double-edged arrow. On the one hand, this feature could 
guarantee its acceptance rate among states. It is expected that enacting 
countries should only make necessary changes and promote international 
uniformity of the law. This type of modification is only to make sure the Model 
Law could fit into the domestic legal system. For example, article 21 (2) 
ensures local creditors' interests are protected, and the US chapter 15 
changed its wording from "adequately protected" to "sufficiently protected." 
Such a change was only to make sure that the terminology is coherent under 
its bankruptcy code. 
On the other hand, it could give states the opportunity to alter certain articles 
for their benefits, which could lead to the incoherence of the application of the 
Model Law and eventual departure from the principle of universalism. For 
instance, public policy is the main reason to refuse recognition under the 
Model Law, which has been interpreted by the UNCITRAL Working Group in 
a restricted manner and is expected to be applied in exceptional cases; 
additionally, the meaning of public policy in the international context should be 
understood more restrictively than the meaning under domestic law. However, 
some states have removed the word "manifestly" or changed the language, 
which increases the possibility that this article would be used as an easy 
excuse to refuse recognition. This study concluded that the Model Law was 
designed to work internationally, and the system has provided enough 
safeguards to protect local interests. While extra protections and alterations, 
especially for countries without comprehensive insolvency systems, are 
necessary, a balance has to be found between achieving international effects 
and protecting local interests. 
 
China’s Cross-border Insolvency Regimes and the UNCITRAL Model Law  
Question 3: Mainland China  
The development of the domestic insolvency system of China reflects the 
economic reform, and traditional Chinese thinking and political factors have a 
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great influence on Chinese insolvency cultures.6 Insolvency of non-stated 
owned enterprises was not regulated until the last two decades because state-
owned enterprises used to be the main form in the Chinese economic system 
and the insolvency of those businesses was directly related to governmental 
policies and orders. To support the national economic reform and participate 
in international business, the first modern insolvency law, the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law (EBL), was passed in 2006, and this regulates all types of 
corporate insolvency. The new insolvency law was a big improvement in the 
Chinese insolvency system. It brought about the adoption of more advanced 
arrangements that were borrowed from western insolvency systems, such as 
modern priority rules for distribution. More importantly, it emphasised the 
culture of corporate rescue by adopting reorganisation proceedings and 
introduced the concept of international insolvency.  
However, some factors from the planned economy system have been 
inherited in the new law, and involvement of government is the most significant 
one. Maintaining social stability and protecting employees are the two main 
reasons that the government would interfere in insolvency proceedings. This 
reflects the fact that although some state-owned enterprises have been 
privatised due to the economic reform, stated-owned capitals still have a 
significant influence on those "private" companies. Therefore, the new law 
provides legal justification and leaves room for government interference. It 
cannot be denied that government involvement has its advantages in 
supporting the transition process, but the basic line is that the independence 
of the court in insolvency proceedings shall be protected.  
Article 5 of the EBL is the only one article addressing issues of cross-border 
insolvency. Because of the influences from international organisations like the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank, the process of making 
this article was influenced by the principle of universalism. The first part of the 
article stipulates the extraterritorial effects of Chinese insolvency proceedings, 
and the second part provides regulations for recognition of foreign insolvency 
                                                             
6 Enoch K. Beraho and Richard Elisu, ‘Influence of Country Culture on Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency Legal Reform Management’ (2010) 14(2) International Journal of 
Management & Information systems 39, 46-47. 
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proceedings, which includes three main elements: international agreements 
or treaties; the principle of reciprocity; and public policy. In practice, the 
application of this article is very limited. First, only a few jurisdictions have 
established mutual civil and commercial judicial assistance agreements with 
China. Also, Chinese courts still apply restrictive and passive reciprocity rules 
for granting recognition of foreign judgments. Furthermore, even one foreign 
judgment could meet one of two recognition conditions. The reservation of 
public policy is another obstacle to pass. Public policy here includes the basic 
principle of Chinese laws, the sovereignty, public interests and local creditor's 
rights, and such broad coverage has offered Chinese courts discretionary 
power to refuse recognition. Therefore, recognition of foreign insolvency 
proceedings under this article could be very difficult. Although this article is a 
milestone in Chinese insolvency history, its insufficient application has been 
criticised and there have been calls for reform. Especially since a Chinese 
case (Zhejiang Topoint) was recognised based on Chapter 15 in the US, the 
advantages of the UNCITRAL Model Law regime have received more 
attention and discussion in China. 
Although article 5 still reflects territorial features, it was a good start towards 
accepting the principle of universalism. According to the comparative analysis, 
this study argued that there are legal principles under relevant Chinese laws 
sharing similar features with the UNCITRAL Model Law, which could provide 
a legal foundation for future adoption. Regarding the jurisdiction issues, the 
debtor's domicile is the basic rule. The General Principle of Civil Law and its 
interpretation further provides that debtor's domicile means the location of his 
major business operation, and if the place of major operation could not be 
found, the court of its registered location shall have the jurisdiction. This civil 
law interpretation mirrors the general application of the COMI concept under 
the Model Law. However, Civil Procedural Law also gives Chinese courts 
broad power to claim jurisdiction over foreign companies in China. With the 
broad jurisdiction rule, if China happens to be the location of COMI, a Chinese 
proceeding could be recognised as the foreign main proceeding in an enacting 
state, and international effect could be achieved. But if the foreign company 
only has an establishment in China, the Chinese proceeding is only a non-
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main proceeding and has limited effects. If the Chinese proceeding wished to 
participate in international insolvency, the jurisdictional rules under Chinese 
law should distinguish main and non-main proceedings.  
 
Question 4: Hong Kong 
Chapter 5 focused on the analysis of Hong Kong’s insolvency system. 
Because of political history, the insolvency system of Hong Kong has been 
heavily influenced by English statutory insolvency law and common law. The 
rules for corporate insolvency are regulated by the Companies Ordinance. As 
one of the most important financial centres in the world, it is surprising that 
there is no proper statutory corporate rescue regulation in Hong Kong. 
Regarding cross-border insolvency law, common law approaches are the 
main source in Hong Kong. Hong Kong judges have a good history and 
willingness to cooperate and assist foreign insolvency proceedings, and often 
make references to the principles of universalism or modified universalism. 
The principle for recognising foreign insolvency proceedings is related to the 
issue of jurisdiction. However, since there is no statutory basis for recognition, 
foreign representatives usually open separate insolvency proceedings in 
Hong Kong based on the statutory basis of winding-up unregistered 
companies.  
Case law has developed three core requirements to decide the jurisdiction of 
Hong Kong courts over foreign unregistered companies. Given the 
developments of recent case law, the traditional presence of assets test has 
been replaced, and such assets can satisfy the first core requirement 
regarding sufficient connection with Hong Kong. The second requirement is 
that the local winding-up proceeding would benefit those applying for it. The 
third requirement, which is that the court must be able to exercise jurisdiction 
over one or more persons interested in the distribution, can be omitted if the 
first two have been sufficiently satisfied and Hong Kong is central to the 
company's principal activities. Furthermore, it is noticeable that Hong Kong 
judges take a flexible approach interpreting those requirements, and holding 
the three requirements are only guidance for the court to exercise at its 
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discretion, so judgment should be made based on the actual evidence 
presented in a particular case. As a result, the power of winding-up 
unregistered companies was extended to cover off-shore companies (Yung 
Kee). This new development has the advantage of identifying the most 
appropriate forum for insolvency proceeding. 
Although Hong Kong judges have expressed their support of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law and its principles, the government still applies a ‘wait-and-see’ 
attitude toward the reform of cross-border insolvency law. However, through 
the comparative analysis, it is concluded that Hong Kong's common law 
approach for cross-border insolvency could achieve similar results as the 
Model Law. The newly-developed jurisdiction rule adopted by Hong Kong 
judges was the same with the concept of COMI. In short, the purpose of 
treating the three core requirements as discretionary guidance is to encourage 
judges to find the real business centre of the debtor and the appropriate 
insolvency place. Although Hong Kong courts have not officially applied the 
concept of COMI in case law, the recent Singaporean case, which adopted 
COMI analysis under common law for the first time, has provided a timely 
authority. Furthermore, modified universalism has been accepted by judges in 
Hong Kong, so it could be expected that they are willing to grant discretionary 
reliefs to cooperate and assist foreign proceedings if it is required. As a 
statutory cross-border insolvency law is still pending in Hong Kong, this court-
developed approach is necessary and effective.  
 
Question 5: Interregional Issues between the Mainland and Hong Kong 
The “One Country, Two Systems” concept has established a special 
relationship between mainland China and Hong Kong. The Basic Law 
legalised the concept and vested Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy, 
which means the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have 
independent executive, legislative and judicial powers. At the same time, after 
the introduction of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, an 
interregional free market has been established, which further encourages the 
economic cooperation and exchange between the two regions. After the 
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political transition, China is a country with various jurisdictions, including the 
civil law system and the common law regime. While the basic legal 
characteristics of the mixed legal system have been guaranteed by the Basic 
Law, supplementary regulations are missing for solving specific legal issues 
between the two regions. In particular, an interregional cross-border 
insolvency system is urgently needed. As the practical case showed, because 
of the tradition of government involvement in insolvency proceedings and local 
protectionism in the mainland, it is more difficult for Hong Kong parties to 
participate in the mainland insolvency proceedings than joining other foreign 
proceedings. Without a predictable and sufficient problem-solving system, 
participants of the economic interaction between two regions cannot evaluate 
possible risks in a transparent manner, which could jeopardise the economic 
stability in the region. 
This thesis argued that solving recognition issues would be a good start for 
solving the interregional insolvency issues in China, as the issue of judgment 
recognition has had previous legal development and foundation based on a 
bilateral agreement. Extending the current arrangement to cover interregional 
insolvency issues is not practical. Both jurisdictions agreed that solving judicial 
recognition issues between two areas should take place in small steps, so the 
scope of the arrangement is limited. Additionally, it was developed based on 
similar international conventions, which did not reflect regional factors. 
Without clear explanation on certain legal issues, such as the criteria for final 
judgment and refusing recognition, uncertainties still exist. Therefore, the 
suitable solution is to use the current arrangement as a starting point and 
design a special regional insolvency agreement focusing on recognition and 
judicial assistance issues. It is suggested that the proposed agreement should 
be developed based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. The main reason for this 
is that the Model Law has solved a similar issue, which deals with insolvency 
recognition among different legal jurisdictions. Moreover, the close political 
and economic relationship could provide better support to the regime based 
on COMI and cooperation. 
247 
 
8.2 Implications for the Reform of the Chinese Insolvency 
System 
Based on the discussions and findings of this study, there is no doubt that the 
Chinese cross-border insolvency system needs to be updated. It is suggested 
that the guiding principle for future reform should be the principle of 
universalism, which is the essential concept accepted globally. Applying 
universalism will be the inevitable trend, as convergence and harmonisation 
are the mainstream for solving international issues.7  As the concerns of 
judicial sovereignty and local interests are unavoidable, modified universalism 
is pragmatic. Whether a country needs a sufficient cross-border insolvency 
law is related to its economic strength. Since China plays a more significant 
role internationally, it is just a matter of time before Chinese legislators would 
consider applying the well-recognised principle to deal with its international 
issues. Furthermore, the principle of universality could also be the solution for 
interregional insolvency issues between the mainland and its SARs.  
The Supreme People's Court is considering the introduction of new 
interpretations to address insolvency cases with international elements, 
including cross-border insolvency. 8  This would be a great opportunity to 
introduce detailed guidance under the present Article 5 by reference to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the concept of COMI, which should include issues 
like jurisdictions of court, application of relevant laws and assistance and 
recognition concerning foreign insolvency proceedings. As chapter 4 
suggested, some of those issues have been addressed but separated under 
Chinese civil laws and other commercial laws. For example, relevant civil law 
principles for jurisdiction rules in China share a similar concept with COMI. 
This means that the Chinese system has the potential to accommodate the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, and requires a comprehensive system to unify those 
insolvency-related rules. 
                                                             
7 Hwa-Jin Kim, ‘Taking International Soft Law Seriously: Its Implications for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance’ (2001) 1 (1) Journal of Korean Law 1. 
8 Xinxin Wang, Yangguang Xu and Alan CW Tang, “PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
and Practice in China: 2007 to a Record-Breaking 2017” (2018) INSOL International-
Special Report. 
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Another area that the Supreme Court could address would be corporate group 
insolvency issues. As chapter 7 discussed, currently no relevant laws are 
regulating corporate groups’ issues in China. A court-developed approach 
such as substantive consolidation has caused discussions and arguments in 
academic society and the Supreme Court. As effort at both domestic and 
international levels are being put into this area, detailed guidance from the 
Supreme People’s Court would be a necessary supplement to the current 
insolvency law.   
Furthermore, an official interpretation acknowledging the Model Law would 
have more significant influence on Hong Kong. Primarily, it would provide the 
legal foundation for solving the insolvency issues between the mainland and 
Hong Kong. A bilateral agreement based on the Model Law regime would 
provide the appropriate solution. More importantly, it would potentially give 
Hong Kong an opportunity to adopt the Model Law finally. In deciding whether 
to enact the Model Law into Hong Kong's insolvency system, the local 
government is closely monitoring the attitudes of its major trading partners, 
including the mainland and Singapore.9 As Singapore has adopted the law in 
2017 to promote its position as a financial centre further, support from the 
mainland would be a major push for adoption.   
Another benefit of a detailed cross-border insolvency system is to reduce the 
government involvement in insolvency cases. Although government 
involvement has a long history and in fact has benefits in certain cases, 
improper interventions should be limited. Especially for international cases, as 
cooperation among proceedings is encouraged, excessive government 
intervention would cause a negative influence on the communication. 
Therefore there should be a clear demarcation between government 
administrative powers and judicial powers. A well-established and effective 
insolvency system will emphasise the importance of the legal system and 
                                                             
9 Bills Committee on the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Amendment) Bill 2015: Summary of Views of Submissions and Government’s 
Responses, CB (1)481/15V16 (04) (2016), Government's Responses No.59 < 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/bc/bc01/papers/bc0120160125cb1-481-4-
e.pdf> accessed 01 January 2018. 
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reduce certain concerns that local governments may have.           
8.3 Limitations and Areas of Further Research 
Although this study was carefully conducted, there were some unavoidable 
limitations. The first of these confines was the limited relevant primary 
materials on mainland China. There is a notable lack of academic work in 
Chinese cross-border insolvency law as this legal area is a relatively new area. 
Besides, the case reporting system in China is inadequate, so reliance had to 
be placed on secondary materials which included newspapers, journal articles 
and relevant reports from international organisations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Although those secondary sources 
are very insightful, it cannot be denied that they bring the possibility of biased 
reports. 
The second limitation is the scope of the study relating to enacting countries 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Law. As was 
explained at the beginning, the Model Law cases from the US and the UK are 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of the law. Since there are more than 40 
jurisdictions that have adopted the law, reviewing and examining its 
application in more jurisdictions would give more insightful and justified results. 
Although decisions from the two developed jurisdictions are frequently 
followed or referenced by other countries, the practical application of a soft 
law could still be various under different legal and economic jurisdictions. 
Especially in those less-developed jurisdictions that do not have a well-
established domestic insolvency system but have adopted the Model Law, 
their experiences would be beneficial to other developing countries. Therefore, 
for future empirical researchers that cover more cases from different enacting 
countries it would be necessary to have a comprehensive evaluation of the 
functions of the Model Law.  
Regarding the study of the Chinese insolvency system, this study was mainly 
about procedural law issues, and it is planned that future studies would focus 
on substantial law matters related to cross-border insolvency issues. 
Moreover, the interregional research was only focused on the Hong Kong 
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Special Administrative Region. Since Hong Kong is one of the most influential 
jurisdictions with regards to economic power and legal stability, the study 
intended to use it as an example to discuss interregional insolvency issues 
under the Chinese "one country, two systems" regime, which could provide a 
reference to other special regions including Macao and Taiwan. However, 
legal regimes among those regions could be different; hence, future studies 
are required to undertake detailed discussions on cross-border insolvency 
regimes in those regions of China. 
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